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Introduction 
 
The study will deal with the problem of CEO compensation value modeling which is one of 
the core issues of corporate governance. Contracts should attract and retain talented CEOs, incentivize 
them to exert high level of efforts to implement the company's strategy and ensure its competitive 
advantage. 
To begin with, CEO compensation structure usually consists of base salary and variable part. 
Base salary of CEO is less dependent on performance compared to variable part of compensation and 
is usually determined by the reputation of a manager, his experience at managing companies, size of 
a considered company, certain industry specifics and the level of CEO base salary across the chosen 
industry. Contrary, variable part of CEO compensation is directly dependent on performance of a 
company. According to Frydman and Saks (2010), a variable part of top management compensation 
in form of option grants and cash bonuses has been prevalent since 1950s in the U.S. public 
companies.  
Traditionally, a variable part of executive compensation is considered as a tool for solving the 
agency problem, that is caused by the conflict of interests between an agent (CEO) and a principal 
(company owners). The principal owns the capital and instructs it to manage the agent. However, an 
agent may have a tendency to opportunistic behavior due to the fact that there is a conflict of interests 
between the principal and the agent in the division of profits. That is why the mechanism of forming 
the variable part of CEO compensation, which eliminates motivation for opportunistic behavior, 
should be worked out. 
There are quite a lot of scientific studies on the topic of creation and solving models of 
«optimal contract». However, we still do not have any models, which are practically viable and tested 
for real companies. Thus, the goal of the research paper was to improve the mechanism of forming 
the variable part of CEO compensation based on the existing theoretical models and approaches, and 
test the applicability of this mechanism for the international public companies. 
The research problem:  development of methodology for improving the mechanism of 
forming the variable part of CEO compensation, which should incentivize CEO to exert high level of 
efforts to implement the company's strategy and ensure its competitive advantage.  
Research gap:  The mechanism of forming the variable part of CEO compensation, which 
can be applied on practice. 
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Goal of the research paper is improving the mechanism of forming the variable part of CEO 
compensation and test the applicability of the mechanism on international public companies. 
 The following tasks were to be solved: 
 Based on the scientific literature substantiate the requirements for the mechanism of forming 
the variable part of compensation;  
 Analyze CEO compensation value and practice of forming the variable part of compensation 
on example of international public companies in specific industries; 
 Improve the theoretical model of forming the variable part of CEO compensation; 
 Carry out a comparative analysis of the results of theoretical modeling and practice of forming 
the variable part of the CEO compensation in international public companies in specific 
industries 
The subject of this research is the size of the incentive part of CEO compensation. 
The object of this research is international publicly traded companies in specific industries. 
Following research methods were used: scientific literature review, current practice review 
and statistical analysis, theoretical modeling, case study analysis 
The master thesis will consist of introduction, four chapters, conclusions, list of references 
and appendices. 
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Chapter 1. CEO compensation problem 
 
Significant part of scientific papers on the topic of CEO compensation focus on the analysis 
of differences for compensation contract values across industries and countries. But it happened to be 
that the best statistical data and research on CEO compensation originates from the U.S., therefore 
this country will be in focus of our analysis. According to publications in this field [Jensen, Murphy, 
2004], [Gabaix, Landier, 2007] a substantial growth in CEO compensation in U.S. was noticed in the 
recent decades after a calm period of 1970-s. In their research, Frydman and Saks, demonstrated 
statistics on executive compensation starting from 1930-s. It was presented that the compensation 
value decreased significantly after the World War II and was growing on average at 0,8% per year at 
the following 30 years. However, in the period of 1998-2007 froth rates were overcoming 10% per 
year, and the total value of compensation reached a median of $7.9 mln in 2005 [Frydman, Saks, 
2007; Murphy, 2013]. 
Publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership structure will be in the focus of our 
research. When ownership and control are divided in such way, management can accumulate a 
significant managerial power. From the very beginning of analysis of this fact, a problem of excessive 
managerial power has been considered in science as agency problem [Jensen, Meckling, 1976]. 
Management of companies can utilize their privileged position in private goals with the help of, for 
instance, ineffective distribution of cash flows. In addition, they can find themselves entrenched on 
their positions, so that it becomes difficult to substitute them even in case of low productivity. 
Therefore, every research in the field of managerial compensation should be conducted in the context 
of agency problem. 
As it can be seen from the introduction, executive compensation problem requires following 
analysis.  
1.1 Evolution of agency problem 
The problem of managerial compensation is considered as one of the sides of corporate 
governance, which itself is a system of relationships between managers and owners of the company 
on the ensuring effectiveness of operations and protection of owner’s rights, and other stakeholders. 
It is important to mention that in corporate governance a topic of interrelationships of stakeholder is 
one the main ones. It could be explained by the fact that stakeholders determine a success of the 
company in the market (for instance, suppliers and consumers), which impact the value for owners 
[Bukhvalov, 2012]. 
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One of the main contradictions and classic problems of corporate governance is agency 
problem, which is focuses on the conflict of interest between owner and manager [Denis, McConnel, 
2003]. The interest of owners in company is associated with its value, which most commonly is 
represented as market capitalization. However, the ownerships stake in the company may be one of 
many investments of that owner’s investment portfolio. Therefore, even a strong decrease in market 
capitalization of the company is only partly influence owner’s wealth. The opposite position is take 
by the manager of the company: his reputation and wealth are closely connected with the success of 
that company he manages, which means that possible risks are very significant [Bukhvalov, 2012]. 
In our case under agent we will understand CEO (Chief Executive Officer), and under principal we 
will understand shareholders and, as representatives of their interests, board of directors. 
If we look back at the history of research of agency problem, it was firstly mentioned 
explained by Ross [Ross, 1973].  He stated that, because of the separation of ownership and control 
and the inclination for opportunistic behavior, a manager can pursue an opportunity to decrease his 
efforts or rather make unnecessary work from principal for higher compensation. So, the manager 
aims to maximize his own wealth, rather than the value of shares. Thus, the key problem is how to 
align the interests of the principal and agent. 
Utility of a principal depends on actions of the agent and he wants agent to maximize his 
principal’s utility. Such issue as the information asymmetry prevents the principal from interpreting 
the exact information on activities and decision of the principal. The utility function of the agent is 
supposed to be his remuneration less his costs put in the value creation. Contrary, the utility function 
of principal   is his return from investments in the company. 
Separation of ownership and control was one of the central concern from the beginning of the 
20th century and one of the main topics of analysis of public companies. This problem is about 
difference in interests of owners and managers in public companies, and corporate governance tends 
to resolve this problem [Kenneth, Nofsinger, 2004]. 
The market capitalization value as a benefit for a principal, receives various treatments in 
different models. Thus, early models were aimed at seeing the company's profit as a value that needs 
to be maximized, while modern models usually follow the path of value-oriented management (value 
management). However, nowadays such metric as market capitalization gains more popularity over 
profits. The problem of financial effectiveness will be in detail considered by us later.  
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Traditionally, within an agency problem, compensation contract of the CEO is considered as 
the tool of the solution of an agency problem (theoretical approaches to determination of the optimum 
contract) or in itself as a part of an agency problem (the theory of managerial power).  
To begin with, there was a concept of the optimum contract firstly time designated in works 
[Holmstrom, 1979], [Grossman, Hart, 1983] which claimed that the compensation contract of CEOs 
can be designed in such way so that interests of shareholders and the managers were equally 
considered. Next, free market mechanisms will allow attracting the most capable CEOs for the fair 
remuneration, which will bring the company a necessary combination of talent and dedication to put 
significant efforts to improve and the company.   
On the other hand, the theory of managerial power [Bebchuk, 2003] was pushed. In that theory 
the main hypothesis is that that observed practice of establishment of a certain level of remuneration 
of the CEOs is explained better by the fact that managers are capable to influence this process in the 
company, and thus can establish certain amounts of remuneration, effective for them. In this case, 
remuneration of the CEOs can be considered as the mechanism, via which some CEOs can take a rent 
from shareholders. As a result, the stronger position the CEO has, the larger remuneration and smaller 
duties he is inclined to establish to himself [Choe, Tian, 2008]. Following the assumption that there 
is managerial power, remuneration of top management is considered not only as the tool for the 
solution of an agency problem, but also as a component of this problem itself.  
Therefore, considering the contract for the manager in practice, it is necessary to understand 
that for the solution of an agency problem we need to structure the stimulating components. In this 
regard, four principles of creation of the contract, which could solve an agency problem, were offered 
[Milgrom, Roberts, 1992]: 
 When the complete information about results of work of the manager is unknown, the 
principle of maximum informational content should be applied [Holmström, 1979]. It 
means that any value for measurement of effectiveness of manager’s, which reflects 
his level of the efforts, should be considered in remuneration. These metrics could 
include relative assessment of effectiveness in comparison with other similar to 
differentiate internal factors from factors of the external environment, such as, for 
example, fluctuations in demand in the market. Because of the fact that influence of 
external arbitrary factors is omitted, the change of remuneration happens mainly 
thanks to actions of the manager that increases his incentives to acceptance of risk; 
12 
 
 However, the establishment of tough incentives for the agent is not always an optimum 
path for a principal. The principle of intensity of incentives claims that optimum 
intensity of incentives depends on four factors: the additional income created by 
additional efforts; accuracy with which the analyzed actions are estimated; extent of 
acceptance of risk from the manager and sensitivity of the agent to stimulation;  
 The principle of intensity of monitoring supplements the previous principle when high 
intensity of incentives has big coefficient of correlation with situations when the 
optimum level of monitoring is also high. Thus, the principal can effectively choose 
strategy from sets of combinations of contributions for incentives and monitoring.  
 The principle of equality of remuneration means that activities, equally valuable to a 
principal, shall be equally valuable to the agent. It belongs to the problem when the 
agent can be involved in several actions simultaneously, and, if one of them is exposed 
to smaller monitoring from a principal, then the agent will neglect it, as the agent 
prefers the actions, which are bringing him higher marginal income. 
 
1.2. Theoretical approaches for compensation modeling 
Nowadays in theoretical approaches of optimal contract determination [Core, Gray, 2001], the 
optimal contract is constituted in such a way that the agent earns effective reward to maximize value 
for shareholders, and that the optimal contract maximizes the net expected value for shareholders 
after all transactional expenses (such as costs of contract creation) and remuneration payments. 
Specialists in finance did considerable work in this direction, trying to put the theory into practice. 
However, it is very difficult to do because of impossibility to observe and consider all possible 
parameters in such model at the same time, such as a marginal product of work of the CEO, tendency 
of the CEO to avoid of risk, fair value of work and general wealth of the manager. 
Theoretically, managers receive effective financial incentives to maximize value for 
shareholders through a compensation program and reduce the possibility of opportunistic behavior 
on the part of the manager. The optimal contract does not mean that it is ideal, but rather it simply 
means that it is the best of all possible alternatives chosen within the company, which would exclude 
the possibility of opportunistic behavior on the part of the agent and would encourage him to act in 
the interests of the principal. In addition, the optimal contract does not necessarily excludes agency 
costs, but it rather compares the marginal effect of the contract with the marginal costs of its creation. 
In conclusion, parameter of optimality itself may vary depending on changes in the business 
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environment and period. All these factors, given a rise to many hardly observable variables that need 
to be taken into account for the formation of the optimal contract in practice, limit its implacability. 
The first attempts to evaluate an optimal size of the contract began in the mid-20th century, 
when the main method of its study was linear programming. Later, in 1960, statistical models of the 
relationship between the various parameters were developed, and some research in particular 
[Grossman, Hart, 1983] [Holmstroem, 1979], have helped to develop a tool to solve the problem of 
assessing the optimal contract - to maximize the utility function of the principal depending on various 
limitations. However, as it was previously mentioned, it is impossible to take into consideration all 
the options and limitations of statistical models. 
In addition, an analysis of interdependency between the management fees and the 
effectiveness work was conducted at that time. For this purpose, it was important to come up with the 
right assessment tools to evaluate managerial performance. Thus, it was demonstrated that proper 
material measure of CEO incentive plan is a degree of his influence on the increase in the value (size) 
of company [Baker, Hall, 2004]. However, it was also proven that the relationship between company 
size and CEO remuneration is very sensitive to the selected period of the analysis, and, in general, it 
is not objectively possible to determine this relationship, as we have seen rapid growth in the amount 
of remunerations and the sizes of the companies since the 1970s [Frydman, Saks, 2010]. 
Moreover, a principal usually cannot directly observe the level of efforts applied by CEO 
because such efforts are difficult to estimate based on external analysis. It is difficult to determine the 
level of effort because the physical monitoring is quite expensive itself, which is especially crucial 
for small shareholders in the conditions of diluted ownership structure in US companies. The financial 
and business results of the company for these structural reasons may be subject to manipulation by 
the CEO. As a result, we face the problem that, in fact, it is almost impossible to observe the level of 
management effort, which means that there are favorable conditions for opportunistic behavior by the 
CEO. 
Besides that, one of the problems in theoretical approaches for estimation of the level of 
management effort is the fact that almost all the work evaluated only by two states efforts (high and 
low), while, in fact, they should be described in much more complex mathematical models. The use 
of a high-level efforts associated with some costs (the opportunity cost of lost opportunities), and the 
higher the level of effort, the more significant the marginal increase in costs is 
Modeling the level of effort was applied in the research, in which two levels of effort of the 
manager were considered: high and low, in addition to the fact that the company could get low or 
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high income [Tirole, 1998]. One of the assumption of the model was that the level of income 
determines the amount of remuneration of CEO, however, the considered the utility function was 
unchanged, which ultimately means that the CEO has no incentive to use high-level efforts. 
In the 20th century, a number of theories and models that sought to determine the optimal 
contract were developed, but many of them turned out to be inapplicable in practice. A more detailed 
look at practical approaches to modeling the optimal contract is presented in the next paragraph. 
 
1.3. Optimal contract modeling approach 
In this paragraph, we consider the theoretical works that try to explain the factors influencing 
constant growth of the CEO remuneration, low sensitivity of this remuneration from the actual impact 
and the high sensitivity from luck. This will help to form an idea of what obstacles exist in modeling 
the optimal contract. 
To begin with, one of the biggest drawbacks of the optimal contract models is that they do not 
differentiate agents by their quantitative characteristics. Some researchers tried to introduce CEO 
talent into the model as a variable. According to the theory, CEO talent has a great value in large 
companies, which means that large companies will attract more talented CEO and pay them higher 
remuneration [Rosen, 1981]. Moreover, they developed appropriate models, which assume that the 
talent has a multiplier effect on the value of the company [Edmans, Gabaix, 2009]. Unfortunately, 
any practical models that take into account the potential management talent still have not been 
developed. 
The increasing competition between companies for managerial talent derives not only from 
increased size of firms. In recent studies [Murphy, Zabojnik, 2007] the theory and the empirical 
results were presented, that confirmed the growing importance of generic skills of CEO in comparison 
with specialized skills of CEO to the company. Moreover, even more detailed conclusions were 
obtained [Giannetti, 2012], which stated that increasing probability of possible job changes (which 
may be a result of the large number of generic skills) encourages managers to choose to be hired for 
short-term projects rather than long-term projects, which enhances their attractiveness on the labor 
market for CEOs. To prevent this behavior from the CEO, the shareholders should take a decision to 
allocate a greater portion of the company’s revenue from long-term projects to CEO, which overall 
will increase the expected rewards to CEO. In addition, such factors as the increase in international 
trade volumes, contributed to the fact that foreign companies are more actively entering the labor 
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market of CEO talent, which further stimulate the growth of managerial remuneration [Marin, 
Verdier, 2012]. 
However, increasing sizes of companies stimulate increases in the remuneration of CEOs 
through not only the search and hiring managers that are more talented. Thus, it demonstrated, 
theoretically and empirically, that large companies are more difficult to manage, and, therefore, CEO 
in such companies deserve a higher reward. In addition to this, the problem of agency relationships 
is more acute in large companies, which lead to stimulating manager with company stock, and hence 
the larger reward for risk-taking [Miller, Gayle, 2009]. 
A reversed approach was suggested in another study, showing that, if the market makes 
conclusions about the performance of CEO based on his remuneration, companies may intentionally 
increase the size of CEO pay to improve the company's image and even temporarily stimulate the 
growth of the share price. This leads to the fact that all firms seek to pay its CEO more than the 
average for the market, thereby stimulating growth to the average level of executive compensation in 
the industry [Schaefer, Hayes, 2008]. 
Another essential element in the studies of CEO pay is its (compensation) sensitivity to the 
performance of the company. As performance measures usually indicators of profitability and market 
valuation are used. However, numerous scientific papers, representing multiple attempts to figure out 
what is the relationship between the change in the level of remuneration of the CEO and the stock 
price, have been criticized, because in these models only the compensation of the current period was 
accounted for, not accumulated wealth of managers [Murphy, 1985]. Later [Jensen, Murphy, 1990] 
combined several approaches in evaluation of the relationship between the effectiveness of the CEO 
and the wealth of large US public companies between 1974 and 1986, namely the change in wealth 
to changes in the value of the company counting on one US dollar. 
The relatively low sensitivity of CEO welfare to the company's financial result was 
demonstrated by the example that the CEO loses only $ 3.25 per every $ 1,000 in the loss of value of 
the company [Jensen, Murphy, 1990]. Also, this study was the beginning of a number of major works, 
which were aimed on proving that there is a decreasing dependence of CEO welfare to the company's 
value in one-dollar value by increasing the size of the company. 
While CEOs of companies, as it has already been shown, suffer not enough losses in the case 
of the low company performance, additional complexity in modeling the incentive plan is that 
management is often encouraged for the result triggered by growth of the market, in other words, 
external factors that are outside of the scope area of responsibility of management. In other words, 
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those managers are rewarded for good luck [Bertrand, Mullainathan, 2001]. This practice calls into 
question the theory linking the remuneration of top management with their effectiveness. 
Then [Hall, Liebman, 1998] continued research in the direction of identifying the relationship 
between CEO ownership share in the company and the remuneration level. However, the hypothesis 
of the relationship between effectiveness of communication and the level of remuneration was also 
put under question mark, remaining one of the main problems in the theory of compensation. 
Among other interesting approaches to modeling the optimal contract it is necessary to 
identify attempts to explain a growth of CEO remuneration in recent years through the strengthening 
of institutions of corporate control and closer monitoring of CEO job, which are suffering from more 
serious requirements [Hermalin, 2005]. In addition, the relationship of remuneration CEO and the 
company's corporate strategy was studied. The authors of this study showed that the higher 
remuneration encourages managers to execute more ambitious strategies [Dow, Raposo, 2005]. 
Moreover, returning to the problem of managerial efforts evaluation, it is worth mentioning 
that it would be logical to tie CEO remuneration to shareholder value in case when a principal cannot 
fully observe the efforts of the agent. For comparison, in the case if a manager had only a fixed 
payment, it would not be enough to spur on the use of a high level of effort, which is associated with 
higher costs, without additional compensation [Holmstrom, 1979]. Therefore, the two-part structure 
has been designed with two main components of the remuneration: a fixed and a variable part, which 
stimulates the CEO on the use of high-level efforts. 
In recent years, increasing attention was addressed to such element of remuneration as 
severance package, especially in light of the recent financial crisis. Mostly this element is paid to the 
CEO, who were fired, compared with those who left the company on their own. Therefore, very often 
this compensation rewards CEO for the low effectiveness of the company [Yermack, 2006]. 
Finally, severance package can hardly be considered in the context of agency problem, when 
the CEO controls only its own level of effort, but can be explained by a broader approach. It was 
shown that the possibility to get a severance package may hold the CEO from entrenchment by him 
concealing negative information, which may lead to the dismissal [Inderst, Mueller, 2008]. However, 
for example, some cases were also considered, when search for and introduction of new technologies 
compared with existing ones were considered as more important element in the work of the CEO, 
and, moreover, allowed sometimes a compensation for non-successful results [Ederer, Manso, 2008]. 
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1.4. Managerial power approach 
On the example of works by Jensen and Murphy in the previous section we saw that only 
weak dependences between company performance and executive compensation were discovered in 
1990s. So this conclusion led to new approaches which focus on different aspect of principal-agent 
problem. Due to the fact that in the case of weak corporate governance, a powerful CEO can extract 
additional bonuses from his position and independently establish the desired compensation, in 
executive power executive compensation is considered as part of the agency's own problem. 
In this approach it is assumed that CEO is «controlling» the board of directors and that board 
and CEO are cooperating with each other, setting each other extra compensation (more that needed 
to provide rational incentive for CEO to work successfully), and protecting each other. Possible 
constraints include reputational loss for CEO in case of being caught extracting excessive 
compensation. The real life form of that is market cost of reputation devaluation and other social 
costs.  
Some of researches looked at how managerial power influence on executive compensation 
design. In the management power hypothesis [Bebchuk, Fried, 2004] it is said that the form of 
compensation, which allows to extract from the rent, is either related to the value (options for shares, 
fund rewards, pensions), or not observed. When stock options are given to general directors before 
the release of good reports or news, the phenomenon of denial takes place (Yermack, 1997). 
There are multiple studies where various aspects of managerial influence over their own 
compensation are examined. In one of those, researchers came to the conclusion that companies 
where CEO just receives his compensation for siting out have a negative influence on the companies 
with strong corporate governance in the labor market for CEO [Acharya, Volpin, 2010]. Another one 
tends to explain that companies select highly paid peers for selecting CEO compensation at the 
competitive level. The effect gets even stronger in case CEO is a chairman of the board of directors 
or peer group is too small [Faulkender, Yang, 2010]. 
In addition, some researchers are considering cases of forgery of reporting documents. CEO 
may try to manipulate the disclosed reports with necessary results if his compensation depends on 
company performance. Some authors present the evidence that there is a positive relationship between 
using stock-based awards and manipulation of reporting [Burns, Keida, 2006]. 
Recent studies argue that payment of performance and corporate governance are in addition 
to solving the agency problem, thus harmonizing managerial authority and optimal approaches to 
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contracts [Dicks, 2012]. As a conclusion, the companies with weak governance provoke usage of 
excessive compensation.  
Also, more and more attention is paid upon CEO’s bargaining power. Thus, it was shown that 
corporate strategies that increase CEO bargaining power relative to other stakeholders, will lead to 
an increase in CEO equity, cash and total compensation [Pandher, 2013]. 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
There is a large amount of research papers on modeling the value of CEO remuneration and, 
in particular, the size of the variable part of the remuneration, through the studies of the structure and 
determinants of compensation. However, there is still a number of contentious issues. 
Based on the analysis of theoretical approaches, we can formulate some of the requirements 
for the procedure of formation of the variable part of the remuneration CEO. 
First, game-theoretic approach should be chosen as a method of modeling the variable part of 
the CEO compensation. This decision is motivated by the fact that determining the size of the variable 
part of the CEO compensation is directly connected with solution of opportunistic behavior problem, 
which is better simulated by game-theoretical models. In our analysis, it was also shown that the 
statistical model estimating the size variable remuneration CEO showed the inconsistency. 
Second, it worth mentioning that some of the actions of an agent cannot be observed, and the 
results of his actions can be random. Moreover, the amount of remuneration is affected by a large 
number of specific conditions, such as industry affiliation, time interval of solution, changes in the 
legal environment, fluctuations in market conditions, changes in technology, etc. 
The model should also take into account the personal characteristics of the CEO such as talent 
or reputation that affect the value of the manager and, thus, the expected rewards to achieve high 
performance of the company. There are currently no practical models that take into account the talent 
of manager. Therefore, a chosen model should take into account, at least, the reputation of CEO in a 
historical perspective. 
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Chapter 2. Research Methodology 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and justify research methods to be used in the 
empirical part of the thesis. As was discussed in the previous chapter, most of current research studies 
on executive compensation present various dependencies of compensation on other variables. An 
obvious limitation of these studies is that these models are used for theoretical purposes to obtain 
qualitative results. Consequently, there is a lack of studies which explain the compensation evolution 
starting from 1960s-70s and present practical recommendations for constructing compensation 
packages. 
In accordance with the requirements mentioned in the first chapter of the document, a special 
theoretical model developed by Casamatta and Guembel will be used. 
2.1. The compensation model 
In their paper Casamatta and Guembel consider two variants of compensation models. The 
first model assumes that the company performs the same strategy for two periods. The second one 
assumes that the can change a manager or strategy after the first period. We will use the second model, 
since it is more realistic in view of the fact that usually after the first phase of execution of the strategy 
board of directors may call into question the efficacy of the strategy itself and the level of effort of 
the company's CEO in the event of failure to achieve their strategic goals. However, some of the 
conclusions of the first models will be also used by us in the analysis, and the model itself will be 
presented in the Appendix later. 
As was shown in the previous report [Yanauer, 2016], this model represents a theoretical 
interpretation of the game of agency problem, whose goal is to simulate the incentive compensation 
plan for the CEO (based on the efficiency component of the payroll) to encourage the implementation 
of the strategy. The principal (owner, shareholder, investor) hires an agent (CEO, manager) who 
select the company's strategy to be implemented in the following period, and then by a decision of 
the principal contract with current CEO is to terminated or not. To develop the model, the following 
assumptions have been considered: 
1. The game involves two players - the principal (owner / investor / shareholder; in some cases, 
the board of directors) and the agent (CEO, manager). All interactions between them occur within the 
company itself.  
2. All communication between two players (principal and agent) happens during two periods, 
t ∈ {1,2}. 
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3. The principal hires the agent at the start of the first period and arranges a contract with certain 
amount of compensation, 𝑤(𝑅), where 𝑤 is an incentive part of overall compensation of agent and 𝑅 
is the performance of the company in the first period.  
4. The hired agent can be of two types: H – high type and L – low type. A high-level manager 
always chooses a successful strategy 𝑆0 = 𝐺 whereas a low-level manager chooses a poor, 
unsuccessful strategy 𝑆0 = 𝐵. The likelihood that the CEO has a high type of H (prior to the 
implementation of the strategy in the Company) is referred to as the reputation of the CEO 𝑞0 ≥ 0.5 
and called CEO reputation. The type of CEO is unknown to the principal or agent. The agent's 
reputation after the 2nd and 1st periods is denoted as follows:: 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑀 = 𝐻 | 𝑅1 =
 𝑅𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅2 = 𝑅𝑗) and 𝑞
𝑖 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑀 = 𝐻 | 𝑅1 =  𝑅𝑖), 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {𝑙, ℎ} respectively. 
5. To execute the chosen strategy, the agent must choose whether to undertake high or low efforts 
𝑒1 ∈ {𝑒1, 𝑒1}; For the principal there are no efforts (which reflect the essence of the problem). High 
level of efforts 𝑒1 means individual costs 𝑐 for the manager. The difference between high and low 
levels of effort is expressed by the following formula: 
∆𝑒1 = 𝑒1 − 𝑒1. 
6. If CEO chooses the successful strategy 𝑆0 = 𝐺, then the Company performance is high 𝑅ℎ 
with probability 𝑒1 and low 𝑅𝑙 = 0 with probability (1 − 𝑒1). If the chosen strategy is unsuccessful, 
𝑆0 = 𝐵, the Company performance is low 𝑅𝑙 = 0 with probability equal to 1. 
7. At the end of the 1st period the principal receives an information signal 𝑠𝐺   with respect to the 
needed strategy. We assumed that 𝑝𝐺 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑠𝐺 = 𝐺) is probability that the signal identifies the 
successful strategy.  
8. The principal decides on the choice of strategy for the second period. If the Company's 
performance after the 1st period is high 𝑅ℎ, there is no value in changing the strategy, thus 𝑆1 = 𝑆0 =
𝐺. However if the Company performance is low 𝑅𝑙 = 0, the principal considers the signal 𝑠𝐺: he 
observes whether the signal confirms the choice of the strategy. If 𝑠𝐺 = 𝑆0, the strategy is not to be 
amended; otherwise 𝑆1 ∈ {𝑠𝐺 , 𝑆0}. 
9. Subsequently, the owner decides whether to leave the CEO or to terminate the contract with 
him, and hire a new CEO. 
10. In the second period, the CEO (old or new) decides whether to undertake high or low 
efforts𝑒2 ∈ {𝑒2, 𝑒2}; A similar effort for the owner is not observed. Again, the manager's high efforts 
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correspond to the individual expenses c for the manager. The difference between high and low levels 
of effort is expressed by the following formula: 
∆𝑒2 = 𝑒2 − 𝑒2 
11. If the applied strategy is successful 𝑆1 = 𝐺, the Company performance is high 𝑅ℎ with 
probability 𝑒2 and low 𝑅𝑙 with probability (1 − 𝑒2). In case of the unsuccessful strategy 𝑆1 = 𝐵 the 
Company performance is low 𝑅𝑙 with probability equal to 1. 
As already mentioned, the CEO cares not only about his monetary contract, but also about his 
reputation after the implementation of the strategy or termination of the contract. Denote the CEO's 
reputation after period i as 𝑞𝑖, the definition of reputation is the likelihood that the manager has a high 
type H, if the Company will work well or badly (𝑅ℎor 𝑅𝑙 respectively) and whether the Company's 
strategy is changing or not in the second period. 
Denote the CEO value as f (q), provided that he/she has a reputation for q; the formula is 
presented below: 
𝑓(𝑞) = 𝛼𝑞,      (2.1) 
where 𝛼 > 0. 
The agent's reputation is constantly updated, even if the contract with him was terminated 
after the 1st period. The model considers only the reputation of the first, "old", CEO, who made a 
strategic decision to implement. The "new" CEO does not have reputational risks, because he does 
not choose a strategy. 
Let us find the value of reputation 𝑞 with Bayes’ formula: 
1. If 𝑅1  = 𝑅ℎ , also 𝑆1 = 𝑆0 and 𝑅2  = 𝑅ℎ, then 𝑞 = 𝑞
ℎ = 1. 
2. If 𝑅1  = 𝑅𝑙, 𝑆1 = 𝑆0 and 𝑅2  = 𝑅𝑙, then 
𝑞 = 𝑞0
𝑙,𝑙 =
𝑞0(1−𝑒1)(1−𝑝𝐺)(1−𝑒2)
𝑞0(1−𝑒1)(1−𝑝𝐺)(1−𝑒2)+1−𝑞0  
   (2.2) 
3. If 𝑅1  = 𝑅𝑙, 𝑆1 ≠ 𝑆0 and 𝑅2  = 𝑅𝑙, then 
𝑞 = 𝑞1
𝑙,𝑙 =
𝑞0(1−𝑒1)(1−𝑝𝐺)
𝑞0(1−𝑒1)(1−𝑝𝐺)+(1−𝑞0)(𝑝𝐺(1−𝑒2)+(1−𝑝𝐺)) 
  (2.3) 
4. If 𝑅1  = 𝑅𝑙, 𝑆1 ≠ 𝑆0 and 𝑅2  = 𝑅ℎ , then 𝑞 = 𝑞1
𝑙,ℎ = 0. 
The interaction between the owner and the CEO is presented in the form of a decision tree in 
Appendix 1. Dotted lines include the same sets of information, in other words, a player with a stroke 
can not distinguish nodes in a set of information. Several branches are not shown in detail because 
the result will never happen. Branches where the CEO makes small efforts are similar to those in 
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which he makes great efforts; the only difference in probability. Also. There are 4 alternatives for the 
owner: A - do not change the strategy, nor the CEO; B - do not change strategy, hire a "new" CEO; 
C - change the strategy and hire a "new" CEO; D - change the strategy, leave the "old" CEO.  
Payoffs of each player are described as follows: 
1. If the contract with the agent does not stop, he receives the amount of payments for two 
periods. If he is dismissed, he receives compensation only for the first period, and the "new" manager 
receives compensation for the 2nd period.  
Let us denote the following: 
𝑤𝑖 is CEO’s compensation for the 1st period provided 𝑅1  = 𝑅𝑖, where 𝑖 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙}; 
𝑤𝑖,𝑗 is CEO’s compensation for the 2nd period provided 𝑅1  = 𝑅𝑖, 𝑅2  = 𝑅𝑗 where 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙}; 
𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑖,𝑗
 is a «new» CEO’s compensation for the 2nd period provided that a «new» manager is 
hired and 𝑅1  = 𝑅𝑖, 𝑅2  = 𝑅𝑗 where 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙}. 
2. The principal payment is equal to the sum of the Company's performance indicators for two 
periods, less the remuneration of the agent(s). 
Solution of the model. Compensation contract takes into account the decision of the model. 
Equilibrium strategies for the principal and the agent form the general equilibrium of Nash; the model 
is solved by inverse induction [Yanauer, 2016]. 
Let's look at the last move of the game, where the top manager makes a decision about the 
level of effort. In each subhead, the manager has 2 alternatives: exert high level of efforts 𝑒2 or exert 
low level of efforts  𝑒2. High efforts mean higher returns for the principal. 
Let's designate the conditional probability that the executed strategy of the second period is 
successful (taking into account the Company's performance in the 1st period and the fact of the 
strategy change or not) as 𝑝: 
𝑝 = [
1 𝑖𝑓𝑅1  = 𝑅ℎ 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝐺  = 𝑆0 
𝑝0 𝑖𝑓𝑅1  = 𝑅𝑙 , 𝑠𝐺  ≠ 𝑆0𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆1  = 𝑆0
𝑝1 𝑖𝑓 𝑅1  = 𝑅𝑙 , 𝑠𝐺  ≠ 𝑆0𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆1  = 𝑠𝐺
   (2.4) 
 
where     𝑃0 =
𝑞0(1−𝑒1)(1−𝑝𝐺)
𝑞0(1−𝑒1)(1−𝑝𝐺)+1−𝑞0 
           (2.5) 
   𝑃1 =
𝑝𝐺(1−𝑞0)
𝑞0(1−𝑒1)(1−𝑝𝐺)+1−𝑞0  
            (2.6) 
 
23 
 
To find the compensation value, we need to solve the linear programming problem: the 
principle maximizes the expected gain in the second period, minimizing the expected compensation 
of the agent. The objective function is as follows: 
                        min[𝑝(𝑒2 𝑤
𝑖,ℎ + (1 − 𝑒2 )𝑤
𝑖,𝑙) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑤𝑖,𝑙] 
Subject to: 
𝑤𝑖,ℎ −  𝑤𝑖,𝑙 ≥
𝑐
𝑝∆𝑒2
− ∆𝑓             
𝑝(𝑒2𝑤
𝑖,ℎ −  (1 − 𝑒2)𝑤
𝑖,𝑙 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑤𝑖,𝑙 ≥ 𝑐           
𝑤𝑖,ℎ ≥ 0, 𝑤𝑖,𝑙 ≥ 0          
There are four possible outcomes: 
1.  𝑅1 = 𝑅ℎ. It is not feasible to change the strategy and therefore results are equivalent to the Base 
game: 
𝑤ℎ,ℎ =
𝑐
∆𝑒2
     (2.7) 
𝑤ℎ,𝑙 = 0     (2.8) 
Compensation is the same for the «old» and «new» CEOs. 
2. R1  = Rl, sG = S0, then p = 1. Compensation for the «old»  CEO is the following: 
    𝑤𝑆1=𝑠𝐺=𝑆0
𝑙,ℎ = max [
𝑐
𝑝∆𝑒2
− ∆𝑓;
𝑐
𝑒2
]       (2.9) 
𝑤𝑆1=𝑠𝐺=𝑆0
𝑙,𝑙 = 0    (2.10)    
(1.12) 
3. 𝑅1  = 𝑅𝑙, 𝑠𝐺 ≠ 𝑆0 but 𝑆1 = 𝑆0, then p = 𝑝
0, compensation for the «old» CEO is: 
    𝑤𝑆1=𝑠𝐺=𝑆0
𝑙,ℎ = max [
𝑐
𝑝0∆𝑒2
− ∆𝑓;
𝑐
𝑝0𝑒2
]   (2.11) 
     𝑤𝑆1=𝑆0
𝑙,𝑙 = 0      (2.12) 
4. 𝑅1  = 𝑅𝑙 and the strategy was changed (𝑆1 ≠ 𝑆0). 
The contract with «old» CEO is not terminated: 
    𝑤𝑆1≠𝑆0
𝑙,ℎ = 𝑐
𝑝1∆𝑒2
− ∆𝑓          (2.13) 
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where ∆𝑓 = 𝑓(𝑞𝑖,ℎ) − 𝑓(𝑞𝑖,𝑙)       (2.14) 
      𝑤𝑆1≠𝑆0
𝑙,𝑙 = 0        (2.15) 
The contract with «new» CEO is the following: 
    𝑤𝑆1≠𝑆0,𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑙,ℎ = 𝑐
𝑝1∆𝑒2
          (2.16) 
     𝑤𝑆1≠𝑆0,𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑙,𝑙 = 0        (2.17) 
In accordance with these values of compensation for the 2nd period, the CEO will always 
make great efforts, as his expected gain is high effort than in the case of low efforts. Now let us 
consider the principal’s move. 
1. If after the 1st period the Company performance is high 𝑅ℎ or the performance is low 𝑅𝑙 = 0 
but the signal identifies that the initial strategy should be maintained 𝑠𝐺 = 𝑆0, the owner has two 
alternatives: pursue the initial strategy with the "old" or "new" CEO. The basic solution for the game 
shows that hiring a new manager within the initial strategy is not optimal; so we assume that in this 
case the owner always prefers to leave the "old" CEO in the Company. 
2. If or the performance is low 𝑅𝑙 and the signal confirms that the initial strategy will fail 𝑠𝐺 ≠
𝑆0, the owner has four alternatives: 
A – not change the strategy nor the CEO 
B – not change the strategy, hire a «new» CEO (non-optimal) 
C – change the strategy and hire a «new» CEO 
D – change the strategy, leave the «old» CEO (non-optimal) 
The decision of the base game, presented in the study, demonstrates that option B is not 
optimal. Consider alternatives C and D, provided that the strategy is changed, 𝑆1 ≠ 𝑆0. In this case 
compensation for the «old» and «new» CEOs should be compared (formulas (1.15) and (1.19) 
respectively, taking into account ∆𝑓 < 0 in formula (1.16)). Compensation of the "old" CEO is higher 
than for the "new" CEO; therefore, when a new strategy is adopted, the owner prefers to hire a new 
manager. Therefore, alternative D is not optimal, so the owner chooses between options A and C. 
 Provided that the expected gain of the owner in the case of the initial implementation of the 
strategy is higher than if the new strategy is implemented in the second period, he decides to follow 
the original strategy (and leave the old CEO). 
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 Consider the first step of the manager. He has 2 options in 2 subgames: apply high or low 
effort. To find the optimal compensation, stimulating efforts, it is necessary to solve the following 
linear programming problem: 
     min[𝑞0(𝑒1 𝑤
ℎ + (1 − 𝑒1 )𝑤
𝑙) + (1 − 𝑞0)𝑤
𝑙]           
Subject to: 
𝑤ℎ −  𝑤𝑙 ≥
𝑐
𝑞0∆𝑒1
− 𝑒2(𝑤
ℎ,ℎ − w𝑆1=𝑆0
𝑙,ℎ ) − (1 − 𝑒2)∆𝑓          
𝑤ℎ ≥ 0              
𝑤𝑙 ≥ 0              
The problem solution is the following: 
   𝑤ℎ = max [0;  
𝑐
𝑞0∆𝑒1
− 𝑒2(𝑤
ℎ,ℎ − w𝑆1=𝑆0
𝑙,ℎ ) − (1 − 𝑒2)∆𝑓] (2.18) 
𝑤𝑙 = 0      (2.19) 
Given these results, it is transparent that the manager will make great efforts in every 
subheading in the first period in order to maximize the expected compensation. Therefore, the Nash 
equilibrium strategies for both players look like this: 
1. For the manager: in both periods he should exert high efforts 𝑒1 and 𝑒2. 
2. For the owner: accounted for 
𝑃0 ≥ 𝑃1 −
𝑃1w𝑆1≠𝑆0,𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑙,ℎ −𝑃0w𝑆1=𝑆0
𝑙,ℎ
𝑅2
     (2.20) 
He should not change the strategy or the manager. Otherwise, he should change the strategy 
and hire a new manager. 
Let us calculate expected payoff for the owner for both periods: 
1. If 𝑆1 = 𝑆0:           (2.21) 
𝑞0(𝑒1(𝑅 − 𝑤
ℎ + 𝑒2(𝑅 − 𝑤
ℎ,ℎ)) + (1 − 𝑒1)(𝑝𝐺𝑒2(𝑅 − w𝑆1=𝑠𝐺=𝑆0
𝑙,ℎ + (1 − 𝑝𝐺)𝑒2(𝑅 − w𝑆1=𝑆0
𝑙,ℎ )) ) 
2. If 𝑆1 ≠ 𝑆0: 
𝑞0 (𝑒1 (𝑅 − 𝑤
ℎ + 𝑒2(𝑅 − 𝑤
ℎ,ℎ) + (1 − 𝑒1)𝑝𝐺𝑒2(𝑅 − w𝑆1=𝑠𝐺=𝑆0
𝑙,ℎ ))) +  
     + (1 − 𝑞0)𝑝𝐺𝑒2(𝑅 − w𝑆1≠𝑆0,𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑙,ℎ )          (2.22) 
The game solution tree is demonstrated in Appendix 2. 
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The presented above game composition and solution was based on the previous research on 
the topic [Yanauer, 2016].  
2.2. Specification of parameters for the model  
To make the appropriate calculations using the model, we needed to get data for the 
corresponding variables or to develop methods for approximating some variables. 
Principal role. In the theoretical model, we assume that the director can take an active part in 
the game and can make decisions regarding the choice of strategy and the CEO. Let's start with the 
fact that in the real practice of corporate governance the shareholders have the right to monitor the 
activities of CEO but with significant limitations. If the company has a major shareholder that owns 
more than 50% of the company, there is an opportunity to assess the likelihood of intervention in the 
above-mentioned strategic decisions based on the individual characteristics of behavior, such as 
participation in strategic decision-making in the company in previous years. However, as mentioned 
the US public companies have almost always dispersed ownership structure, and therefore do not 
have the majority shareholder. 
For the above mentioned reason, the function of the operational monitoring of the 
management activities are transferred to Board of Directors, therefore, we accept the Board of 
Directors as a principal, as it is obliged to act in the interests of shareholders. Moreover, there are 
certain expectations of shareholders in relation to the activities of the members of the Board of 
Directors: proper care (duty of care), loyalty (duty of loyalty), disclosure (duty of disclosure) 
[Forrester, Ferber, 2011]. We can get information on whether the chairman of the independent 
director of the Board of Directors and on the term of his tenure, to test the hypothesis that the 
independent directors act solely in the interests of shareholders and are not subject to undue influence 
by the CEO [Gutierrez-Urtiaga, 2000]. The initial hypothesis is the that the longer the chairman of 
the board of directors retains its place, the more entrenched and dependent becomes CEO. 
In each of the practical cases, we will analyze the ownership structure individually. 
Agent role. In the theoretical model, by the agent we understand a member, which has been 
delegated the asset management of the principal in order to maximize the utility (value) for the 
principal, such as to increase the value for shareholders. Therefore, we make a valid assumption to 
understand CEO as agent in the model. 
Strategy. To apply the model considered necessary to define the difference between a 
successful and unsuccessful strategies. The high economic results depend not only on the chosen 
strategy, but also on the external (economic, political, social and technological) factors, and various 
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internal factors (eg, the level of efforts being made). In fact, as a result of a successful strategy, we 
understand some long-term (more than 3 years) performance of the company that exceeds the industry 
average performance in the same period of time. More precisely, in order to apply the model, we are 
interested in financial incentives CEO on strategy execution. 
There are different classifications of strategies that can be found in academic sources on 
strategic management. Thus, in public companies, strategies can be divided into four levels of strategy 
(with an indication of responsible parties in brackets): corporate (CEO), divisional (business unit 
manager or executive vice president (the VP)), functional (director of marketing, finance, logistics 
and so on) and operational (plant manager, office, branch, etc.). Of course, the strategy should be 
coordinated at all levels, from operational to corporate levels. In our research we focus on corporate 
strategies in public companies. 
 In other approaches, the strategy is divided into the following types depending on the scale 
of coverage of markets (market penetration, market development, product development, market 
development, diversification), from the vertical and geographical scale (vertical integration "forward" 
and "back", the geographical expansion), the degree of diversification (related, unrelated), the 
elimination strategy, cost savings and reductions and combined strategies [Grant, 2010]. 
According to another classification [Porter, 1980], there are four basic competitive strategies 
in the industry: cost leadership, differentiation, focus on costs and focus on differentiation. Leadership 
Strategy in cost or price leadership refers to the ability of the company to provide low costs, 
differentiation strategy is focused on creating a unique product in the industry and competitive 
strategy focus is the concentration of all the company's efforts on a specific niche of consumers. 
The model helps to stimulate the CEO for the implementation and enforcement of effective 
and successful strategies. 
Financial performance. In general, shareholders pay attention to two aspects, evaluating the 
performance of the company: their income (current and future) and the riskiness of their investments. 
To assess these parameters, it is necessary to measure the company's financial or non-financial 
performance. However, we assume that the company's non-financial performance can be indirectly 
assessed from a financial point of view; therefore, continue to consider the types of financial 
indicators. Also it is worth noting is that in the model, at the end of the period, financial results will 
be evaluated in relation to the targets. Typically, the operating performance of the company is 
measured by profitability, such as operating income or revenues and are used for setting targets for 
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the monetary incentive programs. With regard to the shares and options on shares of the company, in 
this case, it is generally considered market indicators, such as earnings per share. 
There are several possible groups of financial indexes. The first group profitability indicators 
(EBIT, operating income, net income, revenues, cost), including profitability (ROI, ROE, ROA, 
ROIC) and market indices and multipliers (EPS, P / E, P / B). You can also select value-oriented 
indicators, such as a fundamental value, market capitalization, cash flow. Operating indicators include 
indicators of business activity, liquidity, efficiency and independence. In addition, some companies 
measure results of operations in terms of the ratio of borrowed funds and equity. 
Compensation. There are two approaches to identify the unknown variable that is responsible 
for the material rewards: 
1. If it is directly connected to performance (short or long), and targets are clearly mentioned 
in the form of annual reports (DEF 14A) to the Securities and Exchange Commission of the USA, it 
is considered a cash incentive fee (Non-equity incentive plan) (SEC); 
2. We consider a monetary incentive fee (Non-equity incentive plan) and remuneration in the 
form of equity, depending on the result (Performance-based stock units), as elements of a single 
stimulus package. The targets for the company's shares are also listed in our reports to the SEC. 
Other components of the remuneration, such as options on the company's shares (stock 
options) and shares of restricted circulation period (time-based restricted stock units) are not 
considered in this study due to the fact that, as a rule, are used as periodic encouragement CEO of, 
and not connected directly to performance. 
To calculate the size of the incentive fee for the initial CEO after the 1st and 2nd periods using 
the formula (1.7) - (1.13) (1.14) (1.18) - (1.19). In order to calculate the remuneration for the new 
CEO's remuneration by formula (1.16) - (1.17), if it was decided to reject the initial CEO after the 1st 
period. Our approach for CEO compensation planning process analysis is fully correspondent with 
generally accepted scheme presented in the Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. CEO Compensation Planning Process. Source: [Longnecker, Henke, 2010]. 
Other variables. A full list of variables that are used in the model can be found in Tab. 1 
Table 1. Additional model variables. Source: [Yanauer, Zenkevich, 2016] 
Variable Description Calculation method 
q  CEO reputation See additional calculation methods for 
𝑞0 below; 
Formulas (2.2) and (2.3) 
𝑓  CEO value  Formula (2.1) 
∆𝑓  Change in CEO value Formula (2.14) 
𝑐  Cost of using high efforts Bonus (planned) the relevant period 
In the absence of bonus payments, use 
the average bonus in the industry 
e  Efforts exerted by CEO See additional calculation methods 
below 
𝑝  The conditional probability of 
implementing a successful strategy in 
the second period 
Formulas (2.4) - (2.6) 
pG Probability of successful strategy 
identification through signaling 
See additional calculation methods 
below 
Condition for changing the strategy Formula (2.20) 
 
Further clarifications should be made regarding evaluation of probabilities in the model. 
Reputation of CEO. here are two methods of estimating the parameter: 
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1. It is estimated the entire previous history of the manager's job at the post CEO. In this 
case, the following parameters should be calculated: 
 The total number of years during which the company, in which the manager 
worked as the CEO of, have been successful; 
 The total number of years during which the manager worked as CEO of various 
companies. 
The ratio of these two parameters is the desired probability. 
2. Evaluated only the last place of the manager to the position of CEO. Similarly, we find 
additional options: 
 The number of years during which the latter company, in which the manager 
worked as the CEO of, has been successful; 
 The number of years during which the manager worked as the CEO of the latter 
company. 
The ratio of these two parameters is the desired probability. 
However, these methods have some practical limitations. Thus, in the analysis of real-world 
examples using the model we found that some CEO until his appointment worked on less high 
managerial positions, such as, for example, the CFO or vice president. Therefore, we have adapted 
the calculations and calculates the probability based on experience in other positions, and where 
possible to use the corresponding target metrics. 
Also, there were cases when some CEO before taking the office of public company, worked 
in private structures, respectively, the information on them is very small. In that case only information 
from the last place of work is used for the calculation, if possible. 
In addition, if the manager considered in the period of time the model and responsible to the 
implementation of the strategy has worked in the same company, we evaluated his performance in 
the previous period as if he worked in a private company (relative to the number of successful and 
unsuccessful years). 
Efforts of CEO. For this variable may allocate two evaluation methods: 
1. Similarly, to CEO to reputation calculation, we estimate the historical success of the 
companies that the manager led. We believe that in order for the company to be successful, it 
should show results above the industry average. Therefore, you must use the following 
additional parameters: 
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 The number of years over which the company, led by CEO of, shows the result of 
higher than average for the industry; 
 The number of years during which the manager worked as the CEO of the company. 
The ratio of these two parameters is the desired probability. Such calculations are made for a 
number of indicators, and we pick the highest probability as the probability of high effort and the 
least, as the probability of low effort. 
2. In accordance with the fact that a high level of effort leads to additional costs from the CEO , 
we can assume that during such periods the manager is paid with a cash bonus. Accordingly, 
we can estimate the probability as the ratio of years, when the bonus has taken place to the 
total number of years. Maximum likelihood will give us the highest probability of effort and 
the least - the likelihood of low effort. 
You can also highlight some of the limitations of the methods used. Thus, in some cases, the 
available information may only allow to evaluate the performance of the CEO at the same place. In 
that case we compare results with that of industry average. Then, by analogy with the above methods, 
we take the highest probability for probability of high effort and the least - the likelihood of low 
effort. Similarly, with the CEO reputation, if he worked for the company before the period considered 
in the model, we take some time back, as if he was working in another company and assesses the 
performance of these years.  
Probability of successful strategy identification. This option is estimated on the basis of the 
analysis of the Board of Directors. That proportion of independent directors on the total number of 
Board of Directors can give us an approximate probability of correct strategy recognition. Such 
authors as Core (1999) and Gutierrez-Urtiaga (2000) state that the independence of directors 
stimulates the improvement in implementation of responsibilities of the executive. And, since, their 
area of responsibility includes monitoring the strategy and CEO of compensation, we assume that the 
corresponding coefficient reflects the desired probability. 
Adjustment coefficients. The fact that the model considers the finished game within two 
periods determines the distribution of high reputational risks for these periods. In real practice, 
strategies are introduced over a longer period and it is worthwhile to consider several more periods 
in order to more accurately assess the probability of outcomes and more accurately predict the 
outcomes for the players and distribute the reputation risks more evenly. Also, because of the limited 
play in two periods, the reputational stimulation of the second period is significantly less than the 
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first, but, in fact, it is similarly important for the CEO to show a high result both in the first and second 
period in order to receive a greater compensation. 
In order for the theoretical model to be more accurate in cases of a low result in the company's 
current operations, it may be necessary to introduce an additional parameter that determines the 
degree of payment of the monetary bonus depending on the degree of achievement of the targets 
individually for each company. 
So, we can consider a situation in which the company receives a low income of 0, which does 
not imply the payment of incentive compensation, the target minimum income level of the company 
𝑅𝑙, established by the company itself as satisfactory, and also the desired target level of income 𝑅ℎ. 
The company can determine the coefficients 𝜀 and 𝐸, which would establish the percentage of the 
remuneration paid from the target value 𝑤(𝑅ℎ). 
Thus, if the company receives an income equal to 𝑅𝑙 < 𝑅 <  𝑅ℎ, then the expected size of the 
CEO incentive reward in a particular period will be: 
                                                         𝑤𝑖 = 𝜀[𝑤(𝑅ℎ)]                       (2.23) 
 0 < 𝜀 ≤ 1 
In the event that the high income of the company 𝑅ℎ was observed, then the expected size of 
the CEO's incentive reward in a particular period would be: 
                                                         𝑤𝑖 = 𝐸[𝑤(𝑅ℎ)]                                                         (2.24) 
𝐸 ≥ 1 
Note that the coefficients, as well as the possible more detailed description of targets, are 
established by each company and are subject to individual adjustment. As a result, such a modification 
of the considered model will allow to adapt the model to modern incentive reward practices, 
considered in Chapter 4 of this work, and to increase the practical applicability and accuracy of the 
model. 
 
2.3. Conclusion 
Chapter 2 has reviewed the improved model for evaluating the optimum size of the variable 
part of CEO compensation in accordance with the procedure of deciding its value [Casamatta, 
Guembel, 2007]. This model has several advantages. 
Firstly, the model itself is a two-step decision-making process between the principal and the 
agent, when on the first stage the implementation of the strategy by the CEO is considered. After the 
principal knows the results after the first year, he/she can change the strategy or CEO. Theoretical 
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model argues that the strategic inertia and entrenchment of current CEO may actually be the best 
solution even in case of low performance of the company because the costs to replace the strategy 
assume also the costs to replace the CEO (in accordance with the decision of the model), which can 
be very significant. If a change of CEO occurs, the new CEO will not be burdened with reputational 
risks, which are important for the current CEO. 
It is important to mention that the model takes into account the non-material incentives to 
execute the high level of effort, such as the reputation of CEO. Comparatively recent studies confirm 
[Apreda, 2005] that reputation is one of the key external mechanisms of corporate governance. 
Research in the field of administrative powers also consider reputational loss as a stopping factor for 
the CEO to increase their own wealth at the expense of the company. This finding correlates with the 
works, which deals with management talent as one of the factors of non-financial incentives for 
executives. 
On the basis of the results contained in Chapters 1 we were able to formulate recommendations 
on the specifications of parameters of the model for the example of public companies in the US. The 
relative simplicity of the model and the availability calculation methodology allow for the use of the 
model in the future to assess the value of non-equity incentive plans of the CEO and for the conduction 
of comparative analysis of the practice of such incentives plans on the examples of US and non-US 
public companies. 
In following parts of the paper it will be crucial to consider a real practice of executive 
compensation in international public companies. As for the model testing and application it will be 
necessary to determine industries, markets and countries for the analysis. Our hypothesis is that 
companies from mature and young, fast-growing industries will have different composition of equity 
and non-equity compensation plans all over different markets, but the model should be able to explain 
either case. To show the applicability of the model several case studies will be presented in the 
Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3. Practical aspects of CEO compensation on the example of U.S. public 
companies 
 In this chapter we will consider general formation principles of corporate governance system 
and executive compensation in the U.S. public companies, main regulatory documents and industry 
specificity. We chose this country for a detail analysis, because it has by far the most mature and 
regulated approach to executive compensation in public companies. Besides that it is possible to 
extract substantial sample of comparable public companies within one industry to be able to make 
general conclusions. Paragraph 3.1 represents the definition of public company and considers major 
roles in a system of corporate governance. Paragraph 3.2 represents the analysis of historical 
development and current state of executive compensation regulation in US public companies. In the 
paragraph 3.3 we will more closely consider the procedure of decision making as for financial 
stimulation of CEO. Paragraphs 3.5 and 3.6 will be devoted to the industry analysis of the formation 
of material remuneration of CEOs in the retail and IT industries.  
3.1. Introduction into corporate governance system of US public companies 
Under the new definition of 2013 from the FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board), 
an organization that sets GAAP standards in the United States, a public company is a company that 
meets at least one of the following criteria: 
 The company is required to publish its financial statements or provide for subsequent 
publication in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); 
 In accordance with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934), as well as its amendments and related statutory acts, the company is obliged 
to provide its financial statements to state regulatory bodies; 
 The company is obliged to provide financial reporting to state regulatory authorities 
in case of sale of existing shares or issue of new shares; 
 Securities of the company are traded freely and without restrictions on the stock 
market; 
 If the securities of a company's paper are freely traded on the stock market, it regularly 
publishes its financial statements in accordance with US GAAP and other legal 
regulations. [FASB - proposed guidance, 2013] 
More briefly, a public company is a company that issued securities during in the IPO process 
and trades on at least one stock exchange or over-the-counter market. Although a small percentage of 
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shares could initially be traded, a company becomes fully public when the market determines the 
value of the entire company as a result of daily trading [Public Company, Investopedia]. 
The first regulatory document regulating public companies in the United States was the 1933 
Securities Act of 1933, issued after the Great Depression crisis (The Securities Act of 1933) [Federal 
regulation of publicly traded companies, Reporters Committee]. According to this law, investors 
could obtain financial, as well as other information about the company that issued securities to the 
stock exchange. The law forbade the publication of incorrect or distorted information [Act of 1933, 
SEC U.S.]. 
Further, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was adopted, which enforced the mechanisms 
of the 1933 law in the activities of the established Securities and Exchange Commission. Also, this 
law tightened the requirements for reporting of public companies. The size of the companies to which 
this law applies has changed over the years, but at the moment it is applied to public companies with 
more than 500 shareholders and a total assets value of $ 10 million. Currently the law also requires 
the company to provide annual (10-K) and quarterly 10-Q) reports to EDGAR's open electronic 
database on the website of the Securities and Exchange Commission [Act of 1934, SEC US]. 
Before moving to description of organizational structures, it is necessary to make a note on 
the structure of ownership in public companies in the United States. Historically, a high level of 
shareholder protection was provided, which contributed to a gradual shift from concentrated 
ownership to dispersed one. According to the mid-1990s, the United States was ranked first in the 
world in terms of the share of companies with dispersed ownership structure (90%), while the share 
of companies with concentrated (family property) was 10%. 
One of the reasons for this type of distribution was, among other things, the adoption of the 
Glass-Steagall Act in 1933, which divided banks into commercial and investment banks and limited 
the ability of banks, engaged primarily in credit and deposit operations, to deal with securities and 
investment transactions. Thus, institutional restrictions were imposed on the development of the 
banking-oriented system in the US, and the departure from the European model of property in 
companies [Bukhvalov, 2012]. 
By the 1990s, through the definition of a controlling owner through ownership of at least 20% 
of the company's shares, the percentage of companies with dispersed property among the 500 largest 
US companies was 80% [Gadhoum, Lang, Young, 2009]. 
The development of the corporate governance system in the United States was also influenced 
by the growth of the share of professional portfolio investors among shareholders. So, by the 
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beginning of the 1990s institutional investors as a whole owned 45% of shares outstanding in the US 
market [Bukhvalov, 2012]. 
Due to the prevalence of companies with dispersed property in the US, it is necessary to 
examine in detail the corporate governance system as a system of interaction between the owner and 
the manager of the company on ensuring efficiency and its functioning and protecting the interests of 
the owner and other interested parties, as well as the stakeholders themselves. In corporate 
governance, it is common to consider the "shareholders - board of directors - management" triangle 
(including the CEO), in which the role of the principal relates to the shareholders, and the role of the 
agent in the company to CEO. However, the interaction between shareholders and the CEO is not 
direct, and the responsibility for resolving the conflict of interests between these stakeholders lies 
with the board of directors. Therefore, in the future, we will treat shareholders and the Board of 
Directors equally as a principal. We will look at all three stakeholders separately. 
Shareholders (investors) of the company are the owners of the company, and can be either 
individuals, financial institutions or the state. All these shareholders can have different priorities and 
strategic vision, but, in general, they expect that they will receive a return on invested capital, which 
they can control through the shareholders' meeting. At the shareholders 'meeting, the results of the 
company's activities are monitored, nominees are approved for positions on the board of directors, 
questions regarding directors' remuneration and other issues are resolved. Shareholders have the right 
to exercise their voice through the board of directors, which, among other things, establishes a system 
for remuneration of the CEO in the company, and generates performance targets for management.1 
A board of directors, on the one hand, is the highest level of management in the company, on 
the other hand, it acts in the interests of shareholders and is monitored by shareholders. Moreover, 
shareholders have expectations about the activities of the board of directors: proper care of duty, duty 
of loyalty, duty of disclosure (Forrester, Ferber, 2011). In general, the following functions of the 
board of directors can be distinguished: approval of the company's strategy, identification of key 
performance indicators, identification of risks for the company, appointment of new managers, 
determination of management fees, ensuring reliability of published reports, approval of major 
transactions, protection of the company's reputation, representation of shareholders' interests and 
ensuring activities in accordance with the current laws [Larcker, 2011]. 
Directors are elected by voting at a meeting of shareholders. The board consists of 5 to 20 
members, depending on the company, which are then divided into executive directors (directly hired 
                                               
1 Based on the analysis of the researched companies in the paper 
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by the company, for example, the CEO) and independent directors, who should constitute the majority 
of the board, for example, according to the rules of the NYSE and NASDAQ [SEC Approves NYSE 
and NASDAQ Proposals Relating to Director Independence, Findlaw]. 
The compensation committee on the board of directors determines the remuneration of the 
CEO and suggests it for approval by all independent directors or shareholders (using the Say on Pay 
system, introduced under the Dodd-Frank [Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, SEC 
U.S.]). Therefore, the reward system should be built in such a way as to promote the creation of 
additional value for shareholders. 
Finally, the CEO of the company, as a representative of management, is a third party in the 
triangle of corporate governance. He is appointed by the board of directors in order to directly perform 
administrative and representative functions in the company's activities and be responsible for them, 
to choose the strategic direction of development. In US public companies, as a rule, CEO performance 
is assessed on the basis of the targets set by the remuneration committee. The following main 
functions of the CEO can be singled out: development and implementation of the company's strategy, 
risk management of the company, monitoring and management of operational activities, execution of 
decisions of the board of directors, ensuring the reliability of the internal reporting and control 
systems [Roles and Responsibilities CEO, Electronic resource]. 
 
3.2. Evolution of CEO compensation in US public companies 
Until the 1950s, remuneration of executives was formed mainly in the form of wages and 
annual bonuses, which were paid in the form of cash or shares. In addition, the size of bonuses was 
set objectively according to a predetermined scale of compliance with the results of operating activity 
[Frydman, Saks, 2010]. In the 1960s, long-term incentive payments, based on performance over 
several years, became a significant element in the compensation system. 
It can also be noted that before the year of 1950, a practice of using options as a reward was 
unpopular, but this pattern changed with the introduction of a tax reform that established a much 
lower capital gains tax. In general, the average remuneration of directors of companies remained 
unchanged until the 1970s. So, as shown in Figure 1, the increase in the average (median) reward was 
0.8 (0.7) percent per year from 1946 to 1976, but then showed a significant increase of 6.5 (5.3) 
percent annually during the period from 1976 to 2003. By the end of the analyzed period in 2003, the 
real size of the total remuneration was more than 5.5 times higher than in 1940. 
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Figure 2. The median and median values of the CEO's total compensation in the United States, 
1936-2003. Source: [Frydman, Saks, 2005]. 
In comparison with the average level of wages in the US before the World War II, the average 
compensation of top management was 63 times higher than that. This ratio declined sharply during 
the war, amounting to only 41 times. Then, after such a significant decrease, the ratio continued to 
decline gradually until the mid-1970s, when it was half the pre-war level. Inequality in the 
remuneration of ordinary workers and top management continued to grow and overcame the 
importance of the Great Depression in 1987, but showed the maximum historical value in 2000, when 
the ratio became 330 to 1. 
 
Figure 3. The median and median values of the CEO's total compensation in the United States 
relative to the average wage, 1936-2003. Source: [Frydman, Saks, 2005]. 
39 
 
Such a significant increase in compensation in the 1990s is due, in large part, to the growth in 
option payments to CEOs, as can be seen in Figure 3, which shows the structure of the median 
compensation of companies included in the S&P 500 index. This incentive reward element was 
considered extremely effective for reasons that it was directly related to the market price of the 
company's shares. 
The crisis in the stock market in the early 2000s led to a decline in remuneration, however, by 
2007, when it seemed that the markets had fully recovered, the growth rate returned to its pre-crisis 
levels. However, the financial crisis in 2008 contributed to a reduction in the amount of CEO 
compensation by various estimates up to 45% by 2009. In 2012, the stock market recovered its 
position, as well as the CEO's remuneration, whose median value, as seen in Figure 4, was $8.9 
million. This value is not a historical high, but still exceeds the values of the mid-1990s. 
 
Figure 4. The structure of the median compensation of the CEO of the companies included in 
the S & P 500 index, 1992 - 2011. Source: [Murphy, 2013]. 
The significant increase in the CEO's remuneration since the mid-1980s, as already discussed, 
is directly related to the growth in the popularity of option incentive schemes. However, it is possible 
that this trend has institutional reasons, and the growth in the popularity of options is related to the 
benefits in terms of taxes and accounting [Murphy, 2002]. But, as can be seen in Figure 4, the options 
fee has become less popular in recent years, and a certain reason for this is difficult to be called. 
 
3.3. Normative regulation of CEO compensation in the US public companies 
Apart from the already mentioned Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, there are also other laws regulating financial law in the United States of America. For example, 
the most significant law since the Great Depression, the law that amended the regulation of 
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remuneration for top management, was the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act adopted in 2010 and designed to reduce the risks to the US financial system. 
In particular, the section E - Accountability and Executive Compensation (paragraphs 951-
953) states that at least every 3 years the shareholders meeting should review or approve the executive 
directors remuneration system. Also, the Dodd-Frank law approved the mandatory Say on Pay 
procedure, which means that not less than every 3 years, shareholders must approve a specific amount 
of remuneration for the CEO at a general meeting. [Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, SEC US]. As the analysis of companies in Chapter 4 has shown, this practice is often 
of an annual nature, and, unfortunately, targets are set increasingly as targets for the next year ahead, 
which may be negative for the introduction of long-term strategies. Also, the law ruled that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission should check the transparency and fairness of incentive reward 
systems in the US public companies. 
In addition to federal legislation, this area is directly regulated by the rules of listing on the 
US stock exchanges. Thus, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ established 
that executive directors' compensation should be approved only by independent directors [New York 
and Nasdaq Compensation Committee Listing Standards, LexisNexis]. Moreover, the NYSE requires 
that the compensation committees in companies consist of only independent directors. For example, 
NASDAQ understands an independent director as a director who does not accept any additional 
reward in any form from the company as a member of the compensation committee, with the 
exception of the fixed salary of a member of the board of directors of that company. Both stock 
exchanges also consider as a factor of independence the absence of any material interest of the director 
in the company's ownership. 
Besides the conditions for the independence of directors in a compensation committee, from 
July 1st of 2013, a compensation committee should annually assess the independence of its external 
consultants on the basis of the degree of interaction between the consultant company and the public 
company, ownership interest, and close relations with committee members [New NYSE and Nasdaq 
Compensation Committee Listing Standards, LexisNexis]. 
Also, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, adopted in 2002, could be noted, which established that the 
CEO and CFO of the company may be deprived of cash, securities, as well as income from the sale 
of the company's securities for a period of 12 months in case of inadequate financial reporting to the 
SEC because of the malfeasance. If the compensation was received before the SEC makes an 
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indictment, then the directors are required to return the full amount of the received compensation 
[Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. SEC U.S.]. 
In general, the following state bodies are responsible for regulating the remuneration of 
executive directors of public companies in the US: [Government Regulation of Executive 
Compensation, Execomp.org]: 
 US Department of Labor. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act establishes 
basic rules and norms for remuneration of labor in the United States, including the 
fiduciary duties of pension funds to act in the interests of their beneficiaries. 
 US Treasury Department. Primarily, the influence of this body is limited to testing the 
system of remuneration for compliance with US tax law in matters of remuneration 
with deferred payment of taxes, as well as other ways of avoiding taxation. 
 US Internal Revenue Service is a division of the US Treasury Department, and one of 
the key tasks in regulating the remuneration of top management by this body is to 
verify compliance with the IRC (Internal Revenue Code) principles. In accordance 
with Section 162 (m) of the IRC, remuneration of executive directors in public 
companies may not exceed $ 1 million, unless there is a qualified incentive system in 
the company, which implies: the existence of targets, a compensation committee, 
shareholder approval, Certification committee remuneration [Section 162 (m): Limit 
on Compensation, Practical Law Company]. 
 Securities and Exchange Commission. The functions of the body include general 
supervision of public companies, observance of federal laws that we have previously 
considered. 
As a result, we see that in the last 20 years due to the increase in the volume of compensation 
managers and the number of corporate scandals, for example, in the company Enron, the US 
government introduces increasingly stringent laws that establish requirements for the process of 
forming remuneration for top management, especially focusing on the independence of directors on 
the compensation committee of public companies. 
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3.4. The decision making process for material compensation of CEOs in the US public 
companies 
Usually CEOs of public companies receive compensation comparable to competitors in the 
industry, so that the company can retain a talented manager; reward, in its structure that takes into 
account the interests of both the manager and shareholders. 
As previously discussed, a decision on the appointment of a specific remuneration to 
management is made by the board of directors. Thus, the committee on remuneration of the board of 
directors prepares recommendations on the structure and size of the compensation package of the 
CEO (usually with the help of independent external consultants and with the help of benchmarking 
for remuneration in competitive companies). Then these recommendations are reviewed and 
approved at a meeting of independent directors at the next meeting of the board of directors. 
Besides the internal approval, public companies are required to disclose information on 
management's remuneration to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In accordance with 
the requirements, the information in full, accessible form should be presented in the following forms 
of public reporting [Forms List, SEC U.S.]: 
1. Form Report DEF 14A. Annually published report, which contains information on all issues 
requiring the vote of shareholders. Including, discloses information on the formation, size and type 
of remuneration for management. It is in the report DEF 14A that the summary tables on the 
remuneration components of all executive directors for the last 3 years are presented (if the company 
is public for more than 3 years). These tables were actively used by us during the implementation of 
the theoretical part of the study. 
2. Annual report form 10-K and quarterly report form 10-Q. Disclose information on annual 
and quarterly remuneration, respectively. 
3.5. The structure of material compensation of CEOs in the US public companies 
Typically, the CEO's compensation consists of a fixed and a variable part. The fixed part is a 
well-known salary in Russia, which is established by contract and paid in cash annually. At the same 
time, the variable part is designed to stimulate the CEO to improve management effectiveness and 
improve the company's performance, and represents two elements: short-term and long-term 
incentives. 
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Table 2. CEO compensation structure in the U.S. public companies [Taxes and executive 
compensation, Economic Policy Institute]. 
Components of compensation Elements of compensation 
Fixed compensation Base salary 
Short-term and long-term incentives Cash Bonus 
Non-equity incentive plan 
The long-term incentives Restricted Stock Units, Performance Stock Units, Stock 
Grants 
Stock Options 
Other compensation Pension and deferred compensation  
All other compensation 
 
In more detail, consider the elements of each category [Taxes and executive compensation, 
Economic Policy Institute]: 
1. Base salary is a fixed compensation component, the size of which does not depend on the 
effectiveness, therefore it is not included in the list of tax exemption in accordance with 
Section 162 (m) of the IRC (the amount of remuneration not depending on the effectiveness 
and not exceeding 1 million dollars in the amount, is not subject to taxation). The size of 
wages, as a rule, is determined by the level of responsibility, previous experience and the level 
of wages in competitive companies. 
2. Bonuses can depend on the effectiveness of a particular manager, a group or the whole 
company. Also one of the peculiarities of them is that they depend on the performance in the 
past period and are accordingly paid at the beginning of the next year. But despite the 
dependence on the results of the activity, bonuses can be assigned without approval, which 
means that this element is not legally dependent on the result in accordance with Section 162 
(m) of the IRC. 
3. Non-equity incentive plan may also depend on the effectiveness of a particular manager, 
group or the whole company. But the difference from the bonus is that the targets are spelled 
out in the company's reports (can be found in the form of DEF 14A), which means that this 
element of compensation will be treated as a performance-based compensation in accordance 
with the Section 162 (m) IRC. 
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Prior to the introduction of the relevant rule, companies indicated a cash bonus and a cash 
incentive reward under one category, but under the new rule, companies should share the bonus paid 
at the discretion of the board of directors and incentive compensation paid strictly in accordance with 
the documented performance targets. Moreover, companies began to divide the monetary (non-equity 
incentive plan) incentive compensation and remuneration in the form of equity-based incentives. 
4. Stock remuneration means that literally a manager is assigned a share of the company's shares 
that have some value while their market price is greater than zero. Such shares may be free or 
restricted (Restricted Stock Units), which is the most popular option (in this case, you can sell 
shares only after a certain period, for example, 3 years). There is also a scheme according to 
which a manager can receive shares only upon achievement of performance targets 
(Performance Stock Units). Moreover, at achievement of indicators and reception of actions 
in the property, the manager can dispose of them at once. In accordance with Section 162 (m) 
of the IRC, the type of remuneration dependent on the result is only Performance Stock Units, 
which fall under the abbreviation PBRSUs (Performance based restricted stock units). 
5. Stock options act like ordinary options, that is, in the case of an option call, the manager is 
profitable to execute it if the strike price is less than the market price, and vice versa in the 
case of a put option. If the option fee program is approved by shareholders, then such 
consideration will be treated as a performance-based remuneration in accordance with Section 
162 (m) of the IRC. 
6. Deferred compensation is a reward earned in one period, but paid in another period in the 
future. A classic example of deferred remuneration is a pension. It is worth noting that such a 
remuneration is taxable if it is received before retirement, and is not taxed upon receipt after 
formal retirement under the law. 
Other types of benefits, such as the use of personal transport, travel expenses, etc., that do not 
depend on the results of activities, also apply to other remuneration. 
 
3.6. The practice of forming the material remuneration of CEOs in the IT industry and 
the retail industry 
In order to illustrate the applicability of the theoretical approach considered in the paper, it is 
necessary to narrow the field of research and select several industries for a deeper analysis. Despite 
the fact that a particular company is being considered for modeling, it is necessary to obtain the entire 
data for the industry in order to obtain industry-wide indicators, as well as to select companies for 
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analysis in empirical part of the work. As the remuneration features may differ from industry to 
industry, we decided to choose two industries, and then compare the results of the analysis. 
The industry should be representative, which means that companies need to vary in size. Thus, 
that conclusions can possibly be extrapolated to other industries. 
 In reality, not only public companies are included in specific industries. However, 
information on the results of activities, as well as compensation of management of private companies 
is not available in public, so the subject of our analysis are public companies in the United States. 
Moreover, corporate conflicts in private companies, as a rule, are not so serious because of the more 
concentrated nature of property. 
In addition, for a serious industry analysis, it is necessary to compile an extensive sample of 
performance and reward in the company, which is hindered by the lack of access to relevant databases, 
for example, ExecuComp. As a result, because of the complexity in the collection of data, a sample 
was collected that, with certain assumptions, can be considered representative. 
Also, it is necessary to consider a stable period of time in the absence of any major crises. 
Therefore, in this section we use for analysis the period from 2011 to 2013, which is characterized by 
the recovery of the US economy without significant market fluctuations. In Chapter 4, in analyzing 
specific situations, the time period can be extended because the model discussed in Chapter 2 assumes 
analysis over two periods. 
So, all public companies in the U.S. can be divided on average in 14 key industries, when 
analyzing which, the largest number of "external2" CEOs we observed in industries such as retail and 
the IT industry. 
The choice in favor of retail and the information sector was made because retail is a fairly 
mature industry with well-established players, while the IT industry is a fast-growing segment. 
Therefore, parameters such as demand, competition and the products themselves are very different, 
hence the factors and strategies necessary for success will also differ. It is generally accepted that the 
key factors of success in developing industries are: brand development, rapid product development 
and marketing, innovations, while for mature industries such factors as efficiency from scale and 
diversity, low costs can be key success factors. We will analyze the various strategies of the company, 
illustrating their diversity. 
In the retail industry, we considered 80 companies from such sectors as Hypermarkets & Super 
Centers, Home Improvement Retail, General Merchandise Stores, Apparel Retail, Automotive Retail, 
                                               
2 It is about the CEO, who had not work in the company before 
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Department Stores, Computer & Electronics Retail, Specialty Stores, Homefurnishing Retail, Food 
Retail3. These industries in themselves are also very different in terms of demand, marginal, cost 
structure, but we decided to merge them, because in case of considering individual sectors, the number 
of companies in the sample would be too small. 
The following information on companies' performance in the period from 2013 to 2015 was 
taken from the sources of Yahoo Finance and Thomas Reuters Datastream: 
 Market capitalization, billions of USD 
 Return on assets, % 
 Total Assets size, billions of USD 
Data on the CEO's compensation in the period from 2013 to 2015 were obtained and 
independently aggregated on the basis of the EDGAR database of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) of the USA: 
 Base Salary, USD 
 Bonus, USD 
 Stock Awards, USD 
 Stock Options, USD 
 Non-equity incentive plan, USD 
 All other compensation, USD 
 Total compensation, USD 
The table below presents the statistics on a sample of 77 retail industry companies for the year of 
2015: 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics on the compensation of CEO in the retail industry. Source: compiled 
independently 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, the gap in the amount of total remuneration in the industry is 
very significant. So in TJX Companies Inc. CEO in 2015 received 21.77 million dollars, and in Alco 
Stores Inc. - 0.64 million dollars. In general, there is a normal distribution according to industry data. 
                                               
3 In accordance with the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) 
Base Salary, 
USD
Bonus, USD
Stock awards, 
USD
Stock 
Options, USD
Non-equity 
incentive 
plan, USD
All other 
compensatio
n, USD
Total 
compensation
, Million USD
Market 
capitalisation, 
Billion USD
Age of CEO, 
years
CEO tenure in 
the company, 
years
Total CEO 
tenure, years
Average value 999123 188699 3194794 1130309 1105263 237617 7,26 9,80 58 7 9
Median value 1000000 0 2070029 86747 630000 86573 6,01 2,62 58 5 8
Standard dev. 486061 578554 3681209 1573433 1230439 447952 5,45 25,65 8 6 6
Minimum 1 0 0 0 0 0 0,64 0,03 42 0 0
Maximum 3867981 3500000 14200512 6750011 6050370 3033082 21,77 207,54 86 29 29
Quantity 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77
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It is also worth noting that the data provide information on the personal characteristics of the 
CEO, who will also help in the analysis of practical situations. So, in 2015, in the retail industry, the 
average age of the CEO is 58 years, the seniority in the position of CEO in the company in question 
is 7 years, and the total seniority of management of various companies is 9 years. 
The distribution of remuneration components in the industry is as follows (average values for 
2013): 13.7% - wages, 2.6% - bonus, 44% - shares, 15.6% - options, 15.2% - incentive reward, 8.9% 
- another reward. This information does not represent an accurate distribution, but it allows us to draw 
conclusions about the main trends. So, still, one of the main types of remuneration in retail is 
rewarding shares. 
Next, consider the descriptive statistics for a sample of 82 companies in the IT industry in 
2015: 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics on the remuneration of CEO in the IT industry. Source: compiled 
independently 
 
Here the distribution of remuneration components in the industry is as follows (average values 
for 2015): 7.2% - wages, 3.2% - bonus, 46.9% - shares, 34.3% - options, 7% Incentive reward, 1.4% 
- another reward. This information does not represent an accurate distribution, but it allows us to draw 
conclusions about the main trends. So, still, one of the main types of remuneration in the information 
industry is remuneration with shares and options, as, in general, many of the companies under 
consideration are young enough. 
It is also interesting to consider the fact that the average age of the CEO in the IT industry is 
52 years compared to 58 years in the retail industry, which confirms our assumption that the industry 
itself is younger, dynamic and requires management of the company knowledge and application of 
modern information technologies. We also see that here a greater part of the remuneration is paid to 
shares and options - 81.2% compared to 60.6% in the retail industry, and a fixed part of the reward is 
almost 2 times less. But, on the whole, the average value of total remuneration is comparable in both 
sectors. 
Base Salary, 
USD
Bonus, USD
Stock awards, 
USD
Stock 
Options, USD
Non-equity 
incentive 
plan, USD
All other 
compensatio
n, USD
Total 
compensation
, Million USD
Market 
capitalisation, 
Billion USD
Age of CEO, 
years
CEO tenure in 
the company, 
years
Total CEO 
tenure, years
Average value 513461 230592 3345314 2449150 500078 84331 7,13 14,22 52 7 10
Median value 491806 0 1415501 475463 305000 19018 4,05 1,67 52 6 9
Standard dev. 290022 806000 5676549 5942644 866273 228035 9,99 49,26 9 6 7
Minimum 1 0 0 0 0 68436 0,25 0,19 30 0 0
Maximum 1500000 5969863 38035712 38054126 6500000 1645421 57,81 376,40 72 19 37
Quantity 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
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3.7. Conclusion 
Chapter 3 analyzes the practice of forming a material compensation for CEOs of the U.S. 
public companies in terms of regulation, decision-making process for the amount of material 
incentives for CEOs, and its structure in US public companies. Separately, the analysis of the practice 
of material compensation of CEOs in the retail industry and the IT industry of the United States was 
conducted. 
For further research, two industries have been selected: the retail industry and the IT industry. 
In these industries, there is a high level of income and growth rates. However, the compensation of 
CEO in the industries is structured differently in many ways because of differences in the stages of 
the life cycle of companies. The size of the remuneration in the retail industry, where mature 
companies predominate, are different from those in the growing information technology sector. 
In addition to the requirements for the model for forming the variable part of the CEO's 
remuneration in Chapter 1, you can add the following: 
First, in the theoretical model it makes sense to consider the company's strategy, the results of 
its implementation in quantitative form and their comparison with the target performance of the 
company. As it was shown, the remuneration committee establishes such indicators for performance 
evaluation in order to reconcile the amount of incentive reward depending on the degree of 
achievement of the targets. 
Secondly, the model for the formation of the variable part of the CEO remuneration should be 
specified to one or more elements of the structure of the variable part of the remuneration. Here it is 
a question of monetary stimulating remuneration, or compensation of shares and bonds of the 
company. 
In practice, the size of CEO compensation is affected by random factors in the macro 
environment. Therefore, it is highly desirable that the desired theoretical model takes into account the 
influence of such external factors. 
Taking into account all the requirements for the model for the formation of variable part of 
remuneration, for the further comparative analysis, a game-theoretic model was chosen, which is an 
application of modeling the size of the incentive reward to the CEO, which would stimulate him to 
successfully execute the company's strategy [Casamatta, Guembel, 2007]. 
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Chapter 4. Modeling of CEO incentive plans on the example of the U.S. public 
companies 
In this chapter, we will consider several examples of the theoretical model application for 
modeling compensation size for general directors on examples of the retail industry and the IT 
industry (case analysis method). A retrospective application of the model to specific situations will 
be presented and a comparison will be made with real historical compensation data in order to test 
the practical applicability of the model and evaluate the reward system in the particular situation 
under consideration. In conclusion, recommendations for improving the remuneration systems under 
consideration in the cases in question will be presented. 
Each case will be considered according to the following plan: company description, ownership 
structure, description of the board of directors in the company, biography and profile of the general 
director, description of the situation, reward system at the time of analysis, solution of the theoretical 
model and comparison of its results with real historical data. At the end of the section, a conclusion 
will be presented based on the results of the analysis. 
4.1. Modeling of CEO incentive plans for the companies of IT industry 
4.1.1. The compensation system at Yahoo Inc. 
Until the buyout from Verizon Communications in 2017, Yahoo was a public company 
headquartered in Sunnyvale, USA and one of the world leaders in the Internet services industry. 
Search engine Yahoo took the 4th place in the world with a market share of 7.68% (as for 2015) on 
the personal computer platform and the 2nd place in the world with a market share of 5.2% (as for 
2015) on the mobile platform Devices [Desktop Search Engine Market Share]. Yahoo was founded 
in 1995 and is one of the oldest companies in the Internet services market. Later in 1996, the company 
began to bargain on the US NASDAQ. In addition to the search engine, Yahoo offers users more than 
60 other services [Yahoo Finance], such as, for example, financial portal (Yahoo! Finance), service 
for storing photos (Yahoo! Flickr), instant messaging (Yahoo! Messenger). 
Ownership structure. At the moment of the case, 69.7% of the company's property belonged 
to institutional investors, 29.8% to mutual investment funds and only 0.5% belongs to the company's 
insiders. The top 20 shareholders held 34% of the company, while the largest shareholder - Vanguard 
Group, Inc. - does not exceed 5% [Morningstar]. Thus, we can conclude that the concentration of 
property was rather low. Due to the dispersed ownership structure, we will use the board of directors 
as the principal when using the theoretical model. 
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The annual shareholders' meeting mainly addresses the issue of selecting board members by 
a majority vote, recommendations on remuneration to members of the board of directors, approval of 
an external auditor, review and approval of various other policies and decisions [10-SEC Filings 
Yahoo Inc.]. However, due to the low concentration of ownership and the frequency of meetings, it 
is difficult to consider the shareholders meeting as a management body actively involved in strategic 
planning. 
Board of Directors. During 2010, the Board of Directors meeting took place 10 times, and the 
number of its members was equal to 10. According to the guidelines of the company's management, 
members of the board of directors must attend at least 75% of all meetings for the duration of their 
mandate. 
According to the Company's Management, the compensation committee consists of four 
independent directors who are engaged in the issues of reviewing and proposing to the general 
meeting of compensation systems for executive directors in accordance with the company's goals and 
objectives, options and share compensation systems, evaluation of the work of the CEO and other 
executive directors for the past period, the establishment of target criteria for the payment of 
remuneration, the conclusion of the extension and cancellation of contracts with potential and current 
executives E directors. Also, the remuneration committee deals with the remuneration for 
independent directors. 
From June 2007 to April 2011, all members of the board of directors, with the exception of 
the CEO and COO of the company, were independent directors. Also, according to the company's 
management, each member of the Remuneration Committee, the Audit and Management were 
independent directors. In total, 8 out of 10 Directors are independent. The share of independent 
directors on Yahoo's board of directors will be used by us as the probability of recognizing a 
successful strategy for the theoretical model in this case [DEF 14A SEC Filings Yahoo Inc.]. 
Description of the problem. Carol Bartz was appointed CEO for Yahoo Inc. In 2009, as a 
candidate with a brilliant resume and successful work experience for 14 years as CEO in the IT 
industry (Autodesk), in order to bring new ideas to the company and return it to one of the leading 
positions in the market. After joining the company, Carol took over the negotiations with Microsoft, 
which tried to buy Yahoo, but, as a result, it turned into a partnership agreement between the 
companies. Under this agreement, Yahoo refused to use its own search engine, and used the Microsoft 
Bing search system, which, moreover, transferred all the technology, and would receive 12% of the 
total revenue generated in the search and advertising services [The Microsoft-Yahoo Search Deal, In 
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Simple Terms]. Thus, Carol Bartz planned to focus the company's development on third-party 
services and invest in them, and give back the development of Microsoft's search engine. In addition 
to this strategy, Bartz has introduced a number of innovations aimed at saving, and cuts, which left 
the company many talented managers and developers [Carol Bartz Fired as Yahoo's CEO]. In the 
end, despite the agreement with Microsoft, the company's revenue continued to fall, new products 
were not so successful, and experts noted the strategic shortsightedness and inability of Bartz to retain 
leading specialists and overcome the organizational crisis. 
The new strategy in 2013: after the dismissal of Carol Bartz, under the management of the 
new CEO, Yahoo bought about 40 promising start-up companies in order to develop new services on 
the market, with the same purpose increased the headquarters of mobile platform engineers in 10 
times. 
Profile of the general director. Carol Bartz, 60, CEO at Yahoo from 2009 to 2011. Fortune 
magazine included Bartz in the list of the most influential women in the global business, both during 
her work in Autodesk and after joining Yahoo! [Carol Bartz dismissed from the post of Yahoo! CEO]. 
Experience [Bloomberg]: 
Jan. 2009 - Sep. 2011 - CEO of Yahoo Inc. 
2008 - 2009 - Director, Member of the Audit Committee and Finance Committee of Intel 
Corporation 
Apr. 2006 - Jan. 2009 - Chairman of the Board of Directors of Autodesk, Inc. 
1992 - Apr. 2006 - CEO, Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of Autodesk, Inc. 
The performance history of Carol Bartz in Autodesk is presented in Table. 41. Based on these 
data, the reputation and likelihood of making high and low efforts for the theoretical model were 
calculated. 
Table 5. CEO compensation structure in Yahoo! Inc. In US dollars. Compiled by: Annual Proxy 
Statements (DEF 14A) Yahoo Inc., 2009-2011. 
Type of compensation 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Base Salary 969,872 1,000,000 735,025 454,862 1,000,000 
Bonus 0 0 0 0 2250 
Stock awards 12,974,722 6,626,995 9,414,211 35,000,002 8,312,316 
Stock Options 29,169,334 2,114,474 2,601,376 0 13,847,283 
Non-equity incentive 
plan 
1,500,000 2,000,000 477,534 1,120,000 1,700,000 
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All other 
compensation, 
2,615,345 5,365 3,141,389 40,540 73,863 
Total compensation 47,229,273 11,946,834 16,369,535 36,615,004 24,936,000 
 
Non-equity incentive plan. Additional material remuneration in the form of cash bonuses is 
established by the compensation committee in accordance with the developed program EIP 
(Executive Incentive Plan), by which the cash bonus is determined by 70% of the company's operating 
cash flow, and by 30% - by individual performance. In accordance with this plan, each executive 
director is assigned a target value of the monetary bonus as a percentage of the base salary by 
category. This distribution by category occurs depending on the size of the actual operating cash flow 
at the end of the period. For 2010, the scheme for determining the monetary incentive fee is as follows: 
[Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A) Yahoo Inc.]: 
Table 6. Yahoo! Inc.: scheme of non-equity incentive plan distribution. Compiled by: Annual Proxy 
Statements (DEF 14A) Yahoo Inc., 2009-2011. 
Result/Target KPI EIP bonus coefficient 
85% or less 50% 
100% 100% 
105% 120% 
115% 170% 
120% or above 200% 
 
Individual performance indicators are set jointly by the compensation committee and 
management. In general, these indicators include the achievement of strategic goals for the planning 
period and general estimates with recommendations on the results of the CEO [Annual Proxy 
Statements (DEF 14A) Yahoo Inc.]. 
Long-term incentives through stock awards and stock options. Historically, the company has 
attached great importance to this type of remuneration of executive directors in order to motivate 
them to achieve long-term financial goals. In assessing the size of this kind of compensation, Yahoo 
is guided by the best practices of other public companies. Just as for the cash bonus (EIP plan), the 
company used a target of $ 1.825 billion in operating cash flow at the end of 2009, 
Target and historical indicators for the CEO in the period from 2009 to 2011: 
53 
 
Table 7. Yahoo Inc! Target and historical indicators for the CEO. Compiled by: Annual Proxy 
Statements (DEF 14A) Yahoo Inc., 2009-2011. 
 
Year Index Target value Historical value Weight 
2009 Operating cash flow 1,825 USD 
Billions 
1,688 USD Billions 100% 
2010 Operating profit 630 USD 
Billions 
748 USD Billions 50% 
2010 Revenue 6,625 USD 
Billions 
6,548 USD Billions 50% 
2013 Revenue growth rate 
ex-TAC 
3.4% 6.1% 50% 
2013 Operating profit 
margin ex-TAC 
19.6% 17.6% 50% 
 
Solution of the model and comparison of the results. This case was divided into two periods: 
the first period from 2009 to 2010, the second period - 2012 - 2013 years. 
In accordance with the model presented in Chapter 2, we introduced the parameters necessary 
to assess the material remuneration of the CEO and assess the likelihood of changing the strategy and 
changing the CEO. 
So, in order to assess the reputation of the CEO, Carol Bartz, we used data on revenue and 
operating profit of Autodesk, Inc., in which the CEO worked earlier (Table 42). The initial reputation 
of the general director is 𝑞0 = 0.67 (8 successful years out of 12). As successful years, we consider 
the company's growth period (positive growth in revenue and operating profit, highlighted in green 
in Table 42). 
The level of effort is estimated by industry average indicators in terms of growth rates and 
operating margin of profit. The probability of applying high effort is 𝑒1 = 0.83 (10 successful years 
out of 12), and 𝑒1 = 0.67 (8 successful years out of 12). In the second period, we use the level of 
effort of Marissa Mayer, the new CEO of the company, for which 𝑒2 = 1, and 𝑒2 = 0.83. 
The company did not pay cash bonuses (as implied in the model), so the average cash bonus 
for the industry was selected from the sample in (c = 0.19). 
54 
 
As a result of the solution of the model, which is presented in Table 8, the company's board 
of directors was to fire the CEO and change the strategy to improve the financial performance of the 
company. In addition, the board of directors had to hire a new CEO, who could implement a new 
successful strategy. The material reward for the current CEO in the first period was 0, while for the 
new CEO it could be $ 1.490 million (the company showed an operating profit growth of up to $ 800 
billion and a successful strategy in the second period). 
In reality, Yahoo, as it follows from the simulation results, dismissed the company's CEO, 
Carol Bartz, and hired Merissa Mayer as CEO. This appointment had a positive effect on the 
company's value (the stock price increased by 37%), and the financial targets were met (operating 
profit margin of 16.4% vs. the target value of 13.3% %). The amount of real material non-issue 
incentives Melissa Mayer made in the second period 1.7 million dollars (against 1.490 million dollars 
on the theoretical model). However, despite the first signs of recovery, Yahoo is still lagging behind 
its main competitors and has not achieved high financial performance indicators. 
Applying adjustment coefficients, first period compensation of Carol Bartz should be equal 
to $1,90 million due to the 118% beat on  KPI of Operating profit in 2010, which results in the 
coefficient of 170% due to the table presented before multiplied by 1.117 modeled (𝜀[𝑤(𝑅ℎ)]). The 
second period compensation of Merissa Mayer should be equal to 1.788 million dollars (120% EIP 
bonus coefficient, due to operating profit margin beat in 2013, multiplied by the modeled value of 
1,490). 
Table 8. Results of modeling for Yahoo! Inc. 
 
 
4.1.2. The compensation system at Blackbaud Inc. 
Blackbaud was founded in New York in 1981, and from the very beginning it focused only 
on non-profit organizations, and has such clients as social and educational institutions, hospitals, 
cultural, religious, art institutions, etc. The company is the world leader in software development for 
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this type of customers. After a series of mergers and acquisitions, Blackbaud expanded its activities 
to charitable funds and corporate CSR programs. At the end of 2015, the company had more than 
30,000 customers in 69 countries. 
Ownership structure. Institutional investors of the company own 65% of the property, mutual 
investment funds - 34.5%, insiders - 0.5%. Considering the list of the 20 largest shareholders, it should 
be noted that only three of them have a share exceeding 5%, with a maximum value of 6.39% 
[Morningstar]. This information may lead to the conclusion that in the company the property is 
sputtered. As already mentioned in Section 2.2., we then use the company's board of directors as a 
principal for use in the model of the theoretical modeling of the CEO's material compensation. 
Board of Directors. The size of the board of directors of the company is 7 people. It includes 
audit committees, remuneration, corporate governance, whose members are exclusively independent 
directors. Only 6 out of 7 members of the board of directors, except for the CEO and the company's 
president, are independent directors of [Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), Blackbaud Inc,]. 
Blackbaud has adopted the Say-on-Pay rule, which consists in the fact that the board of 
directors prepares recommendations for the remuneration of executive directors, which are then 
considered at a shareholders' meeting, which in turn can vote for certain amendments. Due to the fact 
that the ownership structure is deferred, the practice of applying such a mechanism for determining 
remuneration has proved to be the best. 
Description of the problem. In January 2012, Blackbaud entered into an agreement worth $ 
293.9 million to buy a competitor, Convio, which also deals with software for non-profit 
organizations. As a result of this transaction, the management of Blackbaud intended to significantly 
improve its client services to raise funds in the Internet, the most growing segment in this market. It 
is also worth noting that the main customers of Convio were large customers, while Blackbaud 
concentrated on medium-sized organizations. 
However, the results at the end of 2012 showed that the financial result of the merged company 
went below the planned level, although this deal was originally considered as an investment with a 
long payback period. The company announced its plans to grow into a company with revenues of $ 
1 billion, but this forecast did not come true. Mark Chardon has been at the head of the company 
since 2005, and since then the company more than tripled its revenue and became the world leader in 
its industry, however, in the last year the company's growth slowed and internal organizational 
problems arose in connection with the acquisition of Convio. 
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Profile of the general director. Mark Chardon, 57, CEO of Blackbaud Inc. From 2005 to 2013 
Experience [Bloomberg]: 
2005 - Aug. 2013 - CEO and President, Blackbaud Inc. 
2001 - 2005 - CFO, Microsoft Information Worker Business 
1998 - 2011 - GM and VP, Microsoft France 
1984 - 1996 - Partner (office of CEO), Digital Equipment (HP) 
The structure of compensation. Compensation package of the company is designed in such a 
way that all types of remuneration, with the exception of wages, are associated with clear quantitative 
metrics that are associated with creating value for the shareholders of the company, and that the 
company remains competitive in the labor market of highly professional managers. These metrics 
will be mentioned in the following sections. 
Table 9. Structure of CEO compensation, Blackbaud Inc, in US dollars. Compiled by: Annual Proxy 
Statements (DEF 14A), Blackbaud Inc, 2012-2014. 
Type of compensation 2012 2013 2014 
Base Salary 608,925 408,933 600,000 
Bonus 0 0 0 
Stock awards 942,827 0 1,500,000 
Stock Options 0 0 2,000,000 
Non-equity incentive plan 589,421 436,693 870,000 
All other compensation, 42,026 30,340 0 
Total compensation 2,183,199 875,966 4,970,000 
 
Non-equity incentive plan. This type of compensation is indicated in the company's reporting 
as non-issue material incentives. In 2013, the compensation committee set a 100% bonus to the CEO's 
salary to meet the planned targets 
Long-term incentives through stock awards and stock options. Based on the recommendation 
of shareholders in the process of Say-on-Pay program implementation, since 2010 the compensation 
committee has been paying considerable attention to this type of material incentive for the general 
director. The size of the compensation package is determined based on the results of work for 3 
calendar years (for example, 2011-2013), and is determined by the achievement of targets in the 
following categories: annual growth rate of revenue, EBIT at the end of the year, retention rate. 
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Table 10. Performance targets for Blackbaud Inc. Compiled by: Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 
14A), Blackbaud Inc, 2012-2014. 
Year Index Target value Historical value Weight 
2012 Revenue 197,7 USD 
millions 
193,35 USD 
millions 
25% 
2012 EBIT 106.7 USD 
millions 
108.94 USD 
millions 
50% 
2012 Orders for next 
year 
95,0 USD 
millions 
92,245 USD 
millions 
25% 
2013 Revenue 516 USD 
millions 
498,98 USD 
millions 
50% 
2013 EBIT 282.2 USD 
millions 
274 USD millions 50% 
 
Solution of the model and comparison of the results. By the first period we referred the period 
from 2012 to 2013, and to the second period - 2014. Similar to the example of Yahoo, we assessed 
all the parameters based on the information on the CEO's biography (Table 43) and the remuneration 
history (Table 9) and financial performance at Blackbaud (Table 10). The level of effort for the second 
period was calculated for the new CEO of the company - Mike Gianoni. The cash bonus in the 
company was not paid, therefore 
Based on the results of the simulation, we can conclude that the company should have changed 
the strategy and the CEO. The revenue used as a financial result showed that the strategy was 
unsuccessful in the first period (498 out of 516 million dollars), and in the second period was more 
successful, as the revenue was already 564 million dollars. 
In reality, Mark Chardon was also dismissed after the first period in 2013 with a cash bonus 
of 0 and an ineffective incentive fee of $ 437 thousand, whereas according to the theoretical model 
his incentive reward should be 0. New CEO, Mike Gianoni received an incentive fee of $ 870 
thousand in the second period, while the theoretical model offers him $ 1.37 million. This discrepancy 
could have occurred because we used the average cash bonus for modeling, while Blackbaud is a 
relatively small company in the sample. 
Applying adjustment coefficients, first we see from the form DEF 14A of the year 2013 that 
the achievement against the corporate performance measures was 96.7% with respect to Adjusted 
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Revenue and 97.5% with respect to Adjusted EBIT, for a corporate performance factor of 97.1% 
[Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), Blackbaud Inc, 2013]. Thus, for the first period we can apply 
apply the average coefficient of 97% to the modeled result of 0,23, getting $0,22 million. As for the 
second period, in 2014, the result against the corporate performance measures was 101.5% with 
respect to Adjusted Revenue and 104.3% with respect to Adjusted EBIT, for a corporate performance 
factor of 102.7% [Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), Blackbaud Inc, 2014]. Thus, for the second 
period we can apply apply the average coefficient of 103% to the modeled result of 1,37, getting 1.41 
million dollars. 
Table 11. Results of modeling for Blackbaud Inc 
 
4.1.3. The compensation system at Blucora Inc. 
The company Blucora (until 2012 Infospace) is a public company that was founded in 1996, 
its headquarters is in Delaware, USA. Blucora is represented in three segments of Internet services: 
information retrieval (three leading sites: Dogpile, WebCrawler and MetaCrawler), preparation of tax 
reporting (through the TaxACT unit) and e-commerce. The company cooperates in the field of search 
engines with such players of the market as Google. 
Ownership structure. Institutional investors own 61% of the company's ownership, mutual 
investment funds - 38%, company insiders - 1%. Of the 20 largest shareholders of Blucora, only two 
own shares that exceed 5% of the property, and respectively equal to 5.02% and 5.01% [Morningstar]. 
From these data, you can draw a preliminary conclusion about the dispersed nature of the ownership 
in the company. Accordingly, we consider it legitimate to use the board of directors as a principal in 
the model of theoretical modeling of the amount of material incentives for the CEO. 
Board of Directors. The board of directors includes 9 people who are on such committees as 
an audit committee, a remuneration committee, a corporate governance committee, and a committee 
on mergers and acquisitions. According to the requirements of the Securities Commission (SEC) and 
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the NASDAQ exchange, all members of the committees are independent directors, of whom 8 out of 
9 are on the Board of Directors (𝑝𝐺 = 0,89). 
The compensation committee evaluates the activities and contributions to the overall 
performance of the company's executive directors, the recommendations to the general board of 
directors on changes in the structure of fees, the tracking of compensation trends in other companies, 
and the involvement of external consultants to assist in the previously listed responsibilities [Annual 
Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), Blucora Inc]. 
Description of the problem. During and after the end of the World Financial Crisis, Infospace's 
performance was extremely low, numerous reductions followed, and business, due to its lack of 
diversification, was threatened by the sale. For example, revenue in 2008 in percentage terms was 
50% of 2005 revenue, in 2009 - 60%, and in 2009 - 65% [Thomson Reuters Datastream]. The 
company needed to find new growth drivers, one of which was entering the emerging market of tax 
services through the purchase of TaxACT Holdings, Inc. in 2011. However, this transaction was more 
expensive than anticipated ($ 287.5 million), and its effectiveness was only to be assessed in the 
coming year. In addition, it was after the purchase of TaxACT that the company changed its name to 
Blucore and re-branded it. 
Profile of the general director. William Rukelshaus, 47, CEO of Blucora Inc. Since 2010. 
Experience [Bloomberg]: 
2010 - Present - CEO and President, Blucora Inc. 
2007 - 2010 - Director, Blackbaud Inc. 
2002 - 2006 - Senior Vice President, Corporate Development, Expedia Inc. 
The structure of compensation. 
Table 12. Blucora Inc.: CEO's compensation structure in US dollars. Compiled by: Annual Proxy 
Statements (DEF 14A), in Blucora Inc, 2012-2014.  
Type of compensation 2011 2012 2013 
Base Salary 400,000 415,192 450,000 
Bonus 150,000 0 0 
Stock awards 371,200 506,800 823,140 
Stock Options 2,325,087 634,379 1,094,270 
Non-equity incentive 
plan 
540,000 613,311 450,450 
All other compensation, 8,748 4,873 10,515 
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Total compensation 3,795,035 2,174,555 2,828,375 
 
Non-equity incentive plan. The target value of the bonus, as a certain percentage of the base 
salary, is consistent with the executive director at the conclusion of the contact. Thus, managers who 
have greater responsibility and weight in making operating decisions, in general, have a higher 
percentage of the cash bonus on the company's performance. The targets for the 2011 results were 
revenue and EBITDA [Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), Blucora Inc.] 
Long-term incentives through stock awards and stock options. As an incentive reward for the 
long-term perspective, three elements are used: Restricted Stock Units, Performance Stock Units, 
Stock Grants. 
Table 13. Performance targets in Blucora Inc. Compiled by: Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), in 
Blucora Inc, 2012-2014. 
Year Index Target value Historical value Weight 
2011 Revenue 198,147 USD 
millions 
193,35 USD 
millions 
50% 
2011 EBITDA 21,830 USD 
millions 
33,783 USD 
millions 
50% 
2012 Revenue 260,264 USD 
millions 
344,814 USD 
millions 
50% 
2012 EBITDA 31,213 USD 
millions 
50,648 USD 
millions 
50% 
 
Solution of the model and comparison of the results. As the first period we accept 2011, and 
as the second period - 2012. All parameters were evaluated similarly to other cases and in accordance 
with the model specifications given. 
 According to the results of the theoretical simulation, we can see that the non-equity 
incentives of William Rukelshaus should be equal to 216.8 thousand dollars, while in real life it was 
equal to 540 thousand dollars. Thus, the model showed that in a situation where potentially successful 
strategy did not show itself in the first period, the board of directors could overestimate its potential, 
or the CEO's contribution. However, such a strategy paid off to the company, as in 2012 it showed a 
significant increase in financial results. 
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As we can see from the form DEF 14A for 2011, EBITDA was used as the two Company-
based performance measures of the annual bonus plan with the maximum maximum target of 135% 
[Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), Blucora Inc, 2011].  Using the data from the table on 
performance targets, we can extract that EBITDA in 2011 was 1,54 times higher the target value, so 
the maximum bonus of 135% should be applied in this case.  Applying adjustment coefficient, we get 
the compensation for the first period equal to 337,5 thousand dollars. As for the second period, the 
maximum possible bonus target was increased to 150% by the compensation committee [Annual 
Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), Blucora Inc, 2012]. EBITDA for the year of 2012 was 1,54 times 
higher the target value leading to a 50% bonus over the modeled value of 216 thousand dollars 
resulting in 325 thousand dollars. 
Table 14. Result of modeling for Blucora Inc. 
 
 
4.1.4. The compensation system at Linkedin Corporation 
Linkedin Ltd was founded in 2003, then changed its name to Linkedin Corporation in 2005, 
and acquired its public status after entering the IPO in 2011 on the NYSE. The company represents 
the world's largest professional social network with more than 300 million users in more than 200 
countries. Linkedin allows users to create and maintain a list of business contacts. The company 
divides its profit sources into three areas: solutions for companies to search for employees (placement 
of vacancies, access to the resume database, official page of the company), marketing direction 
(mainly contextual advertising), premium subscription (special status that opens additional 
capabilities). On average, over the past 3 years, these directions create, respectively, 50%, 30% and 
20% of the company's total revenues. Linkedin is the leader in its field, far ahead of its competitors, 
for example, Viadeo c 50 million users [Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), Linkedin Corporation]. 
Ownership structure. Institutional investors own 64.5% of the company's ownership, mutual 
investment funds - 35%, company insiders - 0.5%. Of the 20 largest shareholders of Linkedin 
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Corporation, 14 own shares of less than 1%, and the largest shareholder holds 2.93% [Morningstar]. 
In general, we can draw a preliminary conclusion about the dispersed nature of property in the 
company. Accordingly, we will use the board of directors as a principal in the model of theoretical 
modeling of the amount of material incentives for the CEO. 
Board of Directors. This management body of the company is represented by 7 directors. 
According to the company's corporate agreement, the board of directors is divided into three sub-
groups, whose directors' powers expire with a difference of one calendar year. As in many of the 
companies under consideration, the members of the board of directors represent three core 
committees: an audit committee, a remuneration committee, and a corporate governance committee. 
In addition, 5 out of 7 members of the board of directors are independent directors (𝑝𝐺 = 0,71) 
[Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), Linkedin Corporation]. 
Description of the problem. Linkedin successfully listed its shares during the IPO in 2011 at 
a price almost 3 times higher than the placement price. However, many analysts were skeptical about 
this assessment of the company due to the lack of its real prerequisites and new sources of revenue 
for LinkedIn [LinkedIn share price more than doubles in NYSE debut]. At the same time, the 
company itself noted that almost all revenue in previous years came from companies interested in 
recruiting services on the site. A paid subscription service existed, but only 1% of users used it, while 
the main competitors of Viadeo and Xing had 10% and 18% of subscribers, respectively [Does it beat 
global in the professional-networking business?]. Linkedin decided to develop this direction, 
however, it was necessary to find a balance between free and paid services, and not to lose users. 
Profile of CEO. Jeffrey Weiner, 42, CEO of LinkedIn since 2009. Experience [Bloomberg]: 
2009-present - CEO, Linkedin 
2008-2009 - Executive Director, Greylock 
2001-2008 - EVP, Yahoo! 
1994-2000 - VP Online, Warner Bros. 
Table 15. Linkedin Corporation: the structure of the CEO's compensation in US dollars. Compiled 
by: Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), at Linkedin Corporation, 2011-2013. 
Type of compensation 2011 2012 2013 
Base Salary 422,500 535,000 450,000 
Bonus 0 0 0 
Stock awards 6,638,000 0 18,709,690 
Stock Options 0 0 28,678,729 
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Non-equity incentive 
plan 
507,000 636,650 1,094,531 
All other compensation, 3750 3750 4664 
Total compensation 7,571,250 1,175,400 4,907,1363 
In accordance with the company's 2011 Executive Bonus Plan, half of the CEO's targeted 
remuneration was based on the achievement of corporate goals, and the other half on achieving 
individual goals. As corporate goals metrics such as revenue for the year, the number of users of the 
social network, the number of unique visitors to the site, the number of page views, and EBITDA 
were used. Individual results were evaluated by the remuneration committee on the basis of subjective 
assessments with an emphasis on such a CEO quality, as a manifestation of leadership abilities. 
Non-equity incentive plan. In accordance with the company's 2011 Executive Bonus Plan, half 
of the CEO's targeted remuneration was based on the achievement of corporate goals, and the other 
half on achieving individual goals. As corporate goals metrics such as revenue for the year, the 
number of users of the social network, the number of unique visitors to the site, the number of page 
views, and EBITDA were used. Individual results were evaluated by the remuneration committee on 
the basis of subjective assessments with an emphasis on such a CEO quality, as a manifestation of 
leadership abilities. 
Table 16. Performance targets for Linkedin Corporation. Compiled by: Annual Proxy Statements 
(DEF 14A), at Linkedin Corporation, 2011-2013. 
Year Index Target value Historical value Weight 
2011 Revenue 450 USD 
millions 
522 USD millions 20% 
2011 Number of users 133 millions 145 millions 20% 
2011 Number of unique 
visitors (per 
month) 
38 millions 44 millions 20% 
2011 Page views 28,000 33,000 20% 
2011 EBITDA 48 USD 
millions 
99 USD millions 20% 
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Solution of the model and comparison of the results. This case was divided into two periods: 
the first period in 2011, the second period in 2012. All parameters were evaluated similarly to other 
cases and in accordance with the model specifications provided. 
Based on the results of theoretical modeling, we can see that the company (the principal) 
should not have changed either the strategy or the CEO after the first period. However, the model 
indicates that Jeffrey Weiner's remuneration in the first period should be equal to 0, despite the high 
performance. In fact, he received a cash incentive fee of $ 507 thousand dollars. This discrepancy 
may be connected with the fact that the element of reputational risk for Jeffrey Weiner is very high 
(initially high reputation and effort level), therefore irrespective of the size of the incentive reward, 
he will seek to maintain and improve its reputation in the second period. In such a situation, it is more 
profitable for a principal (board of directors) not to pay a bonus to the general director.  
In the second period Jeffrey Weiner received a non-equity incentive fee of $636 thousand, 
whereas according to the modeling results we got a value of $450 thousand. This discrepancy can be 
explained, firstly, by the fact that the average bonus size was used for calculations of cash bonus in 
the industry, as well as the fact that the company has recently become public and does not yet have a 
well-functioning mechanism for remunerating top management in accordance with the rules of public 
companies in the United States. 
Due to complicated system of individual performance metrics based on 5 KPIs for each 
executive, we just see from the report that Jeffrey Weiner was assigned a 120% bonus to his base 
cash incentive [Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), at Linkedin Corporation, 2011]. Applying this 
coefficient to our resulting value of 0,450 we got that he should have received a non-equity incentive 
of 540 thousand dollars in the first period. As we the next year, Jeffrey was assigned with 119% bonus 
[Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), at Linkedin Corporation, 2012], resulting in 535 thousand 
dollars of non-equity incentives. 
Table 17. Simulation results for Linkedin Corporation 
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4.1.5. The compensation system at CA Technologies Inc. 
CA Technologies is a public American company founded in 1973, headquartered in New 
York. The company is developing software for managing the information infrastructure of 
enterprises, operations, databases, portfolios of projects in order to increase the productivity and 
efficiency of these systems. The company's clients are more than half of the representatives of the 
Global Fortune 500 list, 20 largest global banks and 25 largest federal agencies. CA Technologies 
manages a development team of 13,000 people in 45 countries worldwide [Company Information, 
CA Technologies]. 
Ownership structure. Institutional investors own 64% of the company's property, mutual 
investment funds - 35.8%, insiders of the company - 0.2%. The largest shareholder of CA owns a 
share of 2.15%, and the average share of the top 20 shareholders does not exceed 1% [Morningstar]. 
From this we can conclude that the dispersed nature of ownership in the company. 
 Board of Directors. In 2011, 10 out of 11 directors were independent on the company's board 
of directors (𝑝𝐺 = 0,91). The governing body itself is divided into four core committees: Audit, 
Compensation and Human Resource Management Committee, Corporate Governance, Legal Affairs 
and Risk Management [Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), CA Technologies]. 
Description of the problem. William McCracken joined the company in 2005 and became 
CEO in 2010. At that time, the company had a number of developments and patents in the field of 
information technology, but existing products did not allow it to increase revenue. Therefore, CA 
spent more than $500 million on the purchase of 3 promising companies (the most well-known - 
3Tera) in 2010, working in the field of cloud services, storage and protection of information [Our 
strategy's to both build and buy: CA Tech's McCracken]. Thus, the company changed its course from 
the large-scale development and sale of universal software to the provision of cloud services and 
virtualization services [CA to acquire cloud platform provider 3Tera]. It should be noted that the 
market reacted negatively to this strategy of the company, and its shares fell in price by 20% in 2011. 
The new strategy in 2012: with the arrival of Michael Gregoire as CEO, the company once 
again focused on internal development and development (the creation of 40 profile research units), 
introduced a program to attract talented engineers, began adapting products from large companies to 
medium-sized businesses, improving the software itself, rather than cloud services [Q&A: CA CEO 
Gregoire at the one-year mark]. 
Profile of CEO. William McCracken, 69, CEO of CA Technologies since 2010. Experience 
[Bloomberg]: 
66 
 
2005-2012 - Director and CEO, CA Technologies, Inc. 
2002-2010 - President, Executive Consulting Group, LLC. 
1993-2001 - Various management positions, IBM Corporation 
Michael Gregoire, 46, CEO of CA Technologies since 2012. Experience: 
2005-2012 - CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors, Taleo Inc. 
2000-2005 - EVP Global Services, PeopleSoft / Oracle 
1998-200 - Managing Director, EDS Information Solutions Organization 
The system of compensation. The company in its compensation strategy adheres to the 
principle of stimulating the long-term performance of executive directors, for example, by replacing 
the remuneration with shares by the results of one year for a reward based on the results of three 
years. Also, on average, only 18% of the total remuneration is wages, and 82% (20% - monetary 
bonus, 67% - shares and stock options) depend on the achievement of the directors of the delivered 
indicators. 
Table 18. CA Technologies: CEO compensation structure in US dollars. Compiled by: Annual Proxy 
Statements (DEF 14A), at CA Technologies, 2010-2012. 
Type of compensation 2010 2011 2012 
Base Salary 1,114,584 1,000,000 1,000,000 
Bonus 1,300,000 0 0 
Stock awards 561,879 4,073,518 3,909,219 
Stock Options 492,621 1,473,826 821,710 
Non-equity incentive 
plan 
242,507 1,266,000 1,764,000 
All other compensation, 36,627 214,091 282,672 
Total compensation 3,748,218 8,027,435 7,777,601 
 
Non-equity incentive plan. The compensation committee at the end of the year reviews and 
coordinates with the CEO and CFO performance targets needed to determine which bonus awards 
are divided into corporate goals (operating income and revenue growth rate) and separately the same 
indicators for the technology development group and client solutions. In addition to financial results, 
some qualitative or visual goals are taken into account, such as observing delivery dates, localizing 
products, adding new options to applications, and so on. [Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), CA 
Technologies]. 
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Long-term incentives through stock awards and stock options. The company is moving from 
a one-year to three-year program of capital incentives. As the metrics for payment of options is the 
company's share price, for the payment of shares - revenue growth rate, operating profit margin, 
operating cash flow [Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), CA Technologies]. 
Table 19. Targets in CA Technologies. Compiled by: Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), at CA 
Technologies, 2010-2012. 
Year Index Target value Historical value Weight 
2011 Operating profit 1,527 USD 
Billions 
1,498 USD 
Billions 
60% 
2011 Revenue growth 
rate  
6,0%  4,3% 40% 
2012 Revenue growth 
rate 
8,3% 8,1% 40% 
2012 Operating profit 
margin 
34,1% 34,8% 60% 
 
Solution of the model and comparison of the results. This case was divided into two periods: 
the first period in 2010-2011, the second period in 2012. All parameters were evaluated similarly to 
other cases and in accordance with the model specifications given. The level of efforts for the second 
period was calculated for the new CEO. 
  Based on the results of the modeling, we conclude that the former CEO's compensation in the 
first period should be 0 due to the execution of the unsuccessful strategy. However, the company, 
according to the rules of remuneration, pays a bonus in any case, which is equal to the proportional 
value of the achieved result from the target value. In fact, in 2010 and 2011, William McCracken 
received a cash award of $ 1.5 million. After the second period, the new CEO (Michael Gregoire), 
according to the model, was about to receive 1,79 million dollars, while in fact received $1,764 
million in cash financial compensation. 
 Applying adjustment coefficient approach for the first period, we took an operating profit and 
revenue growth rate as main KPIs stated by the company for determining «Annual Performance Cash 
Incentive Award Payouts» [Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), CA Technologies, 2011]. The final 
weighted average coefficient for modeled value of 1,157 is 87,5%, therefor the payout of the first 
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period should be equal to 1,33 millions of dollars. As for the second period, the weighted average 
coefficient is equal to 100%, which implies that the payout will remain equal to 1,79 million dollars. 
Table 20. Results of modeling for CA Technologies Inc. 
 
 
4.2. Modeling of CEO incentive plans for the companies of retail industry 
4.2.1. The compensation system at Fred’s Inc. 
The company Fred's was founded in 1947 as a regional chain of low price stores in the 
southeastern United States. To date, the trading network has approximately 700 stores, 300 
pharmacies in 15 US states, and Fred's headquarters are located in the city of Memphis, Tennessee. 
As follows from the description, the chain stores serve low- and middle-income families in small 
towns (85% of stores are located in towns with a population of less than 15,000 people). The 
company's product portfolio includes pharmaceutical products (36.3%), household goods (22.6%), 
food and tobacco products (16.7%), cleaning products (8.8%), beauty and health products (7,5%), 
clothing (6.3%), sales to other franchise stores (1.8%) [10-to SEC Filings Fred's Inc.]. 
Ownership structure. The most significant part of the shares belongs to institutional investors 
- 60%, mutual investment funds - 36.5%, insiders of the company - 3.5%. Of the company's 20 largest 
shareholders, 8 hold stakes of 5% or more, with the largest share of 11.68% [Morningstar]. Thus, we 
can conclude that the dispersed nature of ownership in the company, and this means that there is 
reason to consider the board of directors of Fred's as a principal in the implementation of game-
theoretic modeling. 
Board of directors. The board of directors includes 7 people, including the Chairman of the 
Board of Directors and the CEO of the company. Members of the Board of Directors represent 
committees on corporate governance, on elections, on audit, on compensation, on pharmaceutical 
issues (deals with the strategy and development of the pharmaceutical business of the company). The 
compensation committee is responsible for establishing a unified system of material remuneration in 
c R
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the company, as well as for monitoring and evaluating the activities of the directors and management 
of the company. In the board of directors, 5 out of 7 directors are independent (𝑝𝐺 = 0,71). 
Description of the problem. Due to increased competition and the specifics of its business 
model, by 2010 Fred's faced extremely low profitability of the business (operating margin of 2.4%) 
for the possibility of further expansion. Therefore, under the guidance of the CEO, the introduction 
of a strategy was made focusing on 5 key areas (Core 5 Program), such as interior items, holiday 
products, pet products, pharmaceuticals, chemicals and cleaning products, in which the company still 
had competitive advantages over independent sellers in small settlements. The company was moving 
away from daily consumption goods to more marginal and expensive categories. For this purpose, 
within two years the company has planned significant capital expenditures to increase the floor space 
for expensive types of goods by 50% [10-SEC Filings Fred's Inc.]. 
Profile of CEO. Bruce Efird, 52, CEO of Fred's since 2010. Experience [Bloomberg]: 
2007-2014 - President and CEO, Fred's, Inc. 
1998-2005 - Executive Vice President, Merchandising, Mejer, Inc. 
The structure of compensation. 
Table 21. CEO compensation structure in Fred's, Inc. In US dollars. Compiled by: Annual Proxy 
Statements (DEF 14A), in Fred's, Inc, 2010-2013. 
Type of 
compensation 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
Base Salary 650,000 650,000 682,692 700,000 
Bonus 0 0 0 0 
Stock awards 318,138 340,379 395,000 0 
Stock Options 0 106,500 965,000 0 
Non-equity incentive 
plan 
354,250 227,500 0 0 
All other 
compensation, 
13,742 14,483 44,464 22,277 
Total compensation 1,336,130 1,338,862 2,087,156 722,277 
 
Non-equity incentive plan. The company has approved a special program for financial incentives 
management (MIP), which sets the target value of the bonus for CEO, CFO, EVP and SVP, depending 
on the value of earnings per share (EPS). 
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Long-term incentives through stock awards and stock options. Fred's pays options to top managers 
based on performance (EPS) this year. Call options can be executed by the manager when the same 
EPS target is reached in the future. 
Table 22. Targets in Fred's, Inc. Compiled by: Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), in Fred's, Inc, 
2010-2013. 
Year Index Target value Historical value Weight 
2010 EPS 0,86 USD 0,75 USD 100% 
2011 EPS 0,86 USD 0,86 USD 100% 
2012 EBIT 59,6 USD 
millions 
51,31 USD 
millions 
100% 
2013 EBIT 48.9  USD 
millions 
39,08 USD 
millions. 
100% 
Solution of the model and comparison of the results. This case was divided into two periods: 
the first period from 2010 to 2011, the second period - 2012 - 2013 years. The results of theoretical 
modeling show that after the first period the CEO had to receive a reward of $1,3 million, while in 
fact his cash bonus for 2011 was $ 0.23 million, in the whole variable part of compensation for 2010-
2011 is $ 1,345 million. In the second period, due to poor performance, the CEO remuneration should 
be equal to 0, as in reality the board of directors considered that the strategy was unsuccessful, and 
the CEO does not need to be stimulated financially. 
Applying adjustment coefficients, EPS is the only target KPI used for determining cash 
incentives for executives in the company in 2011 and EBIT in 2012 and 2013 [Annual Proxy 
Statements (DEF 14A), in Fred's, Inc, 2010-2013]. As for the first period, we see that the target EBIT 
and historical EBIT are equal, therefore the bonus will have the adjustment coefficient of 1 and is not 
changed from $1,3 million. However, in the second period, as EBIT for both 2013 and 2012 is less 
than target value, the average coefficient is 0,83. Taking the maximum possible reward from the 
model of $0,25 million multiplied by 0,83, we get $0,2 million. 
 
Table 23. Results of modeling for Fred's Inc. 
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4.2.2 The compensation system at Dollar Tree Inc. 
Dollar Tree Inc. - an American company included in the list of Fortune 500, which owns a 
network of inexpensive stores, in which goods cost $ 1 or less. For 2016, the company has about 5100 
stores in 48 US states and in Canada, as well as 10 major distribution centers. Dollar Tree is one of 
the most growing companies in the retail industry in the US, opening every year from 2011 to 2016. 
About 300 stores. In addition, since 1995, the company bought 695 stores from local competitors 
through acquisitions. In the grocery portfolio, the store chain has home care products, decorations, 
gifts, beauty and health products, various stationery products and fast food products [10-SEC Filings 
Dollar Tree Inc.]. 
Ownership structure. Institutional investors own 67.5% of the company's property, while 
mutual investment funds - 31%, and company insiders - 1.5%. Among the twenty largest shareholders 
of the company Dollar Tree, only one has a share of property exceeding 5% and equal to 7.2% 
[Morningstar]. According to this information, it can be concluded that the property in the company is 
sprayed, which means that for the purposes of theoretical modeling, we can accept the board of 
directors as a principal from the company. 
Board of directors. The principles of corporate governance of the company establish rules for 
the board of directors, according to which they must act in the interests of the company and its 
shareholders. The size of the board of directors is dictated by the need of the company at a particular 
moment in time. Also, according to the norms of public companies, the majority of the board of 
directors should consist of independent directors. In addition, the board of directors includes the CEO 
and several other executive directors, which ensures the representation of management on the board 
of directors [Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), Dollar Tree Inc]. 
The board of directors has the following committees: Audit Committee, Compensation 
Committee, Corporate Governance Committee. According to the charter of the board of directors, the 
c R
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compensation committee establishes remuneration for the CEO, conducts an evaluation of his 
activities with the involvement of external consultants. 
For 2010, the board is represented by 11 directors, 8 of which are independent (𝑝𝐺 = 0,73). 
This parameter will be used as the probability of recognizing a successful strategy in the theoretical 
model. In particular, therefore, the CEO, Bob Susser, is not the chairman of the board of directors, 
since this would reduce the likelihood of correctly recognizing the nature of the strategy, as the CEO 
was able to dictate his terms. 
Description of the problem. Due to the high concentration of other low-cost stores of 
companies such as Dollar General Corporation and Family Dollar Stores Inc., Dollar Tree is forced 
to look for additional ways to expand its business. One such path was the entry into the Canadian 
market in 2010, where the company had not previously been introduced. This exit came through the 
purchase of the Canadian company Dollar Giant with 86 stores in 4 provinces of the country. By the 
end of 2011, the number of stores in Canada increased to 99 [Dollar Tree's Canadian expansion plans 
a good sign for Dollarama]. The company's management plans to expand its presence in this market 
to 1,000 stores in the next five years. 
Profile of CEO. Bob Sasser, 60, has been CEO of the company since 2004. Experience 
[Bloomberg]: 
2004-2014 - CEO and President, Dollar Tree, Inc. 
1999-2004 - COO, Dollar Tree, Inc. 
1994-1996 - VP, General Merchandising, Michaels Stores, Inc. 
The structure of compensation. The company practices a system known as "Say on Pay," when 
the board of directors asks shareholders to approve the remuneration of an executive director. For 
2011, the company used the following compensation structure: basic salary (17.6%), cash bonus 
(29.5%), long-term capital compensation (52%) and other types (0.9%). 
Table 24. Dollar Tree Inc.: the structure of the CEO's compensation in US dollars. Compiled by: 
Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), Dollar Tree Inc., 2010-2013. 
Type of 
compensation 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
Base Salary 971,154 1,080,769 1,301,923 1,410,577 
Bonus 0 0 0 0 
Stock awards 2,178,000 3,193,858 13,676,384 3,839,768 
Stock Options 0 0 0 0 
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Non-equity incentive 
plan 
1,948,750 1,813,020 1,847,813 1,909,929 
All other 
compensation, 
58,236 56,769 63,670 58,089 
Total compensation 5,963,640 6,144,416 16,889,790 7,218,363 
 
Non-equity incentive plan. In accordance with the Management Incentive Compensation Plan 
(MICP), the bonus is paid at the beginning of the next year based on the results of achieving personal 
targets and the company's performance. This bonus is expressed as a percentage of wages. 
Long-term incentives through stock awards and stock options. The compensation committee 
appoints this type of remuneration based on the Omnibus Incentive Plan. Since 2009, the main 
element of long-term incentives has been restricted stock units. These shares are paid on the basis of 
achieving the target results (operating profit) for the last 3 years, which helps the company to ensure 
a stable growth of value for shareholders in the interests of executive directors. 
Table 25. Targets in Dollar Tree Inc. Compiled by: Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), in Dollar 
Tree Inc., 2010-2013. 
Year Index Target value Historical value Weight 
2011 Operating income 727,572 USD 
millions 
782,1 USD 
millions 
100% 
2013 Operating income 992,492 USD 
millions 
993,6 USD 
millions 
100% 
 
Solution of the model and comparison of the results. This case was divided into two periods: 
the first period from 2010 to 2011, the second period - 2012 - 2013 years. 
Based on the results of theoretical modeling, we can say that the CEO should receive a non-
equity compensation in both the first and second periods. So, after the first period, he should get $3 
million, and after the second - $0,45 million, while in reality these amounts were equal to $1,8 and 
$1,9 million. It is worth noting, that in sum the model gives a result of $3,45 million for 2 periods, 
while the historical value is $3,7 million. A significant difference in the second period is due to the 
fact that the theoretical game is limited to two periods, and in life the principal continues Stimulate 
the CEO for further periods. 
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With the application of adjustment coefficients, we took operating income as a performance 
target for both periods. As you can see from the table presented above, the company achieved its 
target performance metric with the coefficient of 1,07 in 2011, so that the adjusted incentive become 
$3,21 million. As for the second period, the coefficient is 1, therefore the payout remains $0,45 
million. 
Table 26. Results of modeling for Dollar Tree Inc. 
 
 
4.2.3. The compensation system at Kohl’s Corporation 
Kohl's Corporation was founded in 1988 in Wisconsin, USA, and is the largest chain of 
department stores in the country. In 1998, the company's shares were included in the S & P 500 index, 
and also Kohl's Corporation is on the Fortune 500 list. By 2017, this chain of department stores has 
1162 stores in 39 states of the United States, as well as the popular online store of the same name. 
Kohl's product portfolio includes the clothing of well-known brands, footwear, accessories, beauty 
products and household goods [10-SEC Filings Kohl's Corporation]. 
Ownership structure. In Kohl's Corporation, 63.7% of shares belong to institutional investors, 
36% to mutual investment funds, and only 0.3% to company insiders. Among the 20 largest 
shareholders, 4 have a share exceeding 5% with the largest value of 9.28%, which indicates a 
dispersed ownership structure in the company. Thus, we can once again use the board of directors as 
a principal role. 
Board of directors. The board consists of 12 directors, 10 of whom are independent directors 
(𝑝𝐺 = 0,83). Members of the board of directors hold positions in the committees on audit, corporate 
governance and remuneration. In turn, the duties of the compensation committee include setting up a 
remuneration structure and evaluating the CEO's performance in accordance with the key objectives 
of personal and corporate performance [Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), Kohl's Corporation]. 
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Description of the problem. Kohl's Corporation needed new drivers for growth, as every year 
the opportunity to open a new store in a good location is getting harder. So the company planned to 
open only 20 small shops (from 55 to 68 thousand square pounds). However, the main strategy for 
2011 was the gradual re-planning of all the chain stores in a fast scheme, which reduces construction 
and repair work by more than 50% compared to 2007. The main idea was to reduce the warehouse 
space to increase the sales area, organize additional fitting rooms, and re-design the store for the new 
design of the company. Strategically, the company decided to invest in the renovation of existing 
assets to ensure a steady increase in sales and success in the competitive struggle in the future. By 
2012, the company has updated 200 of its stores, and plans to complete the management program by 
the end of 2013 [10-SEC Filings Kohl's Corporation]. The first reports say that this strategy has made 
it possible to achieve significant sales growth in the cosmetic departments [Kohl's Gets a Beauty 
Boost from the Store Remodels Dollarama]. 
Profile of CEO. Kevin Mansell, 61, CEO of Kohl's Corporation since 2008. Experience 
[Bloomberg]: 
2008-present - CEO, Kohl's Corporation 
1999-present - President, Kohl's Corporation 
1982-1999 - Various managerial positions, Kohl's Corporation 
The structure of compensation. In 2011, the remuneration structure of Kevin Mansell looked 
as follows: 14.2% - basic wage, 59.5% - long-term incentives, 22.7% - short-term monetary 
incentives, 3.6% - another compensation. 
Table 27. The compensation structure of the CEO in Kohl's Corporation. Compiled by: Annual Proxy 
Statements (DEF 14A), at Kohl's Corporation, 2011-2013. 
Type of compensation 2011 2012 2013 
Base Salary 1,339,300 1,329,300 1,339,300 
Bonus 0 0 0 
Stock awards 2,799,984 2,800,011 6,000,119 
Stock Options 2,806,198 2,800,003 0 
Non-equity incentive plan 2,145,000 531,720 535,720 
All other compensation, 371,261 355,758 303,165 
Total compensation 9,422,443 7,816,792 8,178,304 
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Non-equity incentive plan. The main idea of short-term cash reward in the company is to 
stimulate the CEO to achieve the set performance targets. In accordance with the Annual Incentive 
Plan for 2011, the net profit and the competitor selection index were chosen as indicators, which 
should be lower than Kohl's effectiveness for obtaining the Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A) 
bonus, Kohl's Corporation] 
Long-term incentives through stock awards and stock options. Determination of annual long-
term incentives occurs through the same targets as in the case of short-term bonuses, however, they 
are considered over a longer time period of 3 years [Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), Kohl's 
Corporation]. 
Table 28. Targets in Kohl's Corporation. Compiled by: Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), at 
Kohl's Corporation, 2011-2013. 
Year Index Target value Historical value Weight 
2011 Net profit 1,050 USD 
Billions 
1,196 USD 
Billions 
50% 
2011 ROI 17,92% 18,65% 30% 
2011 The company is ahead 
of the competitors' 
performance index 
N/A N/A 20% 
2013 Net profit 1,045 USD 
Billions 
0,889 USD 
Billions 
50% 
2013 ROI 17,22% 15,5% 30% 
2013 The company is ahead 
of the competitors' 
performance index 
N/A N/A 20% 
 
Solution of the model and comparison of the results. The period of the case analysis was 
divided into two periods: 2011 and 2012-2013. All parameters of the model have been estimated in 
accordance with the procedure dismantled in Chapter 2. 
Based on the results of the game-theoretical modeling, we received that due to the 
implementation of a successful strategy in the first period (2011), in which the CEO surpassed the 
established targets for net profit and return on investment, Kevin Mansell was to receive a reward of 
$1,75 million. whereas in real life it short-term stimulating bonus was $2,145 million in the second 
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period due to lack of effectiveness and completeness of the game, the model assumes a fee 0, whereas 
in reality principal left the agent and continued to encourage a high level of effort for a further period 
of $0,535 million. 
With the application of adjustment coefficient method for this case, we can calculate weighted 
average coefficients for both periods given the data for performance metrics. Therefore, for the first 
period the weighted average coefficient (without «The company is ahead of the competitors' 
performance index») is 1,1 and for the second period is 0,87, while the adjusted payouts are $1,9 
million and $0,84 million respectively. 
Table 29. Results of modeling for Kohl's Corporation 
 
4.2.4. The compensation system at Barnes & Noble, Inc. 
Barnes & Noble, Inc. is included in the Fortune 500 list and is the largest book sales network 
in the US and the leading player in the market for sales of information, electronic media products and 
educational benefits in the country. As of May 2017, the company serves 1,361 bookstores in 5 US 
states, including 700 stores on university campuses, and also sells through one of the largest themed 
online stores in the country. In addition, the company owns the publishing company Sterling 
Publishing Co., Inc., a division of NOOK, which develops e-books, sells and adapts content, and 
develops reading software for mobile and fixed platforms [10-SEC Filings Barnes & Noble, Inc]. 
Ownership structure. Institutional investors own shares of the company in the amount of 62%, 
mutual investment funds - 26%, company insiders - 12%. Only 3 of the 20 largest shareholders hold 
a stake with a stake of more than 5%, with a maximum value of 8,19%, from which it can be 
concluded that the ownership structure is dispersed in the company [Morningstar]. This means that, 
similar to other examples of theoretical modeling, we will take the board of directors of the company 
as a principal. 
Board of Directors. The board of directors includes 10 directors, 8 of whom are independent 
directors (𝑝𝐺 = 0,8) [Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), at Barnes & Noble, Inc.], excluding the 
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company's CEO and chairman of the board of directors. Traditionally, three profile committees have 
been singled out in this corporate governance structure: audit committee, competition committee, 
corporate governance. 
Description of the problem. As you know, sales of print media are shrinking yearly due to the 
appearance of electronic reading formats. In such circumstances, Barnes & Noble, Inc. were forced 
to change their expansion strategy to cut more than 10 stores annually from 2009, and focus on their 
e-book business as publications and devices (NOOK). In 2012, Barnes & Noble entered into an 
agreement with Microsoft Corporation, in which it sells a stake in NOOK, affiliated with the 
technology giant, for the right to create official software for reading. Under this agreement, NOOK 
will receive $ 60 million annually from Microsoft. After a number of other deals, it was safe to say 
that Barnes & Noble, Inc. focused on e-commerce with printed materials and device development, 
and reading software [10-SEC Filings Barnes & Noble, Inc]. 
New strategy in 2014. The new CEO came to the company when the NOOK division showed 
a serious drop in sales. It was decided to divide the printed and electronic business into different 
companies [Barnes & Noble Heads Back to the Future]. At the same time, management Barnes & 
Noble believed that it is possible to restore sales of printed books due to large marketing efforts and 
new ideas in merchandising. This year may become decisive in the further development of the 
company. 
Profile of CEO. William L. Lynch, J, 42, CEO of the company since 2009. Experience 
[Bloomberg]: 
2009-2013 - CEO, Barnes & Noble, Inc. 
2004-2008 - CEO, Gifts.com (a division of IAC Inc.) 
Michael Huseby, 58 years old. Experience: 
2013 - present time - CEO, Barnes & Noble, Inc. 
2004-2011 - EVP and CFO, Cablevision Systems Corporation 
1999-2002 - EVP, AT & T Broadband 
The structure of compensation. In the structure of the CEO's remuneration in 2011, the base 
salary is 12%, the short-term incentive package 4.5%, the long-term incentive package 83.2%, the 
other compensation 0.3%. 
Table 30. CEO remuneration structure in Barnes & Noble, Inc. In US dollars. Compiled by: Annual 
Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), at Barnes & Noble, Inc., 2012-2014. 
Type of compensation 2012 2013 2014 
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Base Salary 1,142,308 850,000 997,208 
Bonus 450,000 1,275,000 0 
Stock awards 3,098,340 500,000 6,637,500 
Stock Options 5,285,000 0 0 
Non-equity incentive plan 0 0 2,604,000 
All other compensation, 32,750 35,783 41,025 
Total compensation 10,008,398 2,660,883 10,279,733 
 
Non-equity incentive plan. The compensation committee appoints bonuses to the CEO 
depending on the achievement of EBITDA targets for the company as a whole, and separately for 
business lines such as Retail, Digital, College. In addition to the incentive bonus, the company 
sometimes pays a so-called trust bonus, which managers can be encouraged, for example, 
successfully implementing a successful transaction. 
Table 31. Targets in Barnes & Noble, Inc. Compiled by: Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), at 
Barnes & Noble, Inc., 2012-2014. 
Year Index Target value Historical value Weight 
2012 Consolidated 
EBITDA 
242,3 млн. 
долл. 
164,4 млн. долл. 100% 
2014 Consolidated 
EBITDA 
148 млн. долл. 251 млн. долл. 100% 
 
Solution of the model and comparison of the results. The period of analysis of the case was 
divided into two periods: 2012 and 2013-2014. All parameters of the model have been estimated in 
accordance with the procedure presented in Chapter 2. 
Based on the results of game-theoretic modeling, we received that, as a result of the 
unsuccessful implementation of the strategy in the first period, the CEO should have received a short-
term incentive reward equal to 0. In fact, the board of directors was also not impressed with the 
performance for 2012 and did not reward William L. Lynch. Further to the end of the second period, 
the company's profitability situation improved and, as a result of the overfulfilment of the plan, the 
new CEO, Michael Huseby, was to receive a compensation of $2,848 million, while the board of 
directors was more cautious and rewarded the CEO of $ 2.604 million. 
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Applying adjustment coefficients approach and consolidated EBITDA as a main performance 
metric, we got the coefficient be equal to 0,68 and 1,17 (1,17 is a limit set by the compensation 
comittee) respectively, while the final adjusted payouts are $0,1 million and $3,33 million. 
Table 32. Simulation results for Barnes & Noble, Inc 
 
4.2.5. The compensation structure at Lowe´s Companies, Inc. 
Lowe's Companies is an American public company (since 1961), which is on the Fortune 500 
list (# 43) and is the world's second-largest retailer of materials for construction and repair. As of 
January 2017, the company had 1,749 stores in the US, 37 in Canada and 10 in Mexico, its staff 
employs more than 175,000 employees. The main competitor of Lowe's and part-time world leader 
in the industry is the American Home Depot [10-SEC Filings Barnes & Noble, Inc]. 
Ownership structure. Institutional investors own 66.5% of the company's shares, mutual 
investment funds - 33.3%, company insiders - 0.2%. Of the 20 largest shareholders of Lowe's 
Companies, three hold stakes in excess of 5%, and the largest shareholder holds a 6.08% stake 
[Morningstar]. In general, we can draw a preliminary conclusion about the dispersed nature of 
property in the company. Accordingly, we will use the board of directors as a principal in the model 
of theoretical modeling of the amount of material incentives for the CEO. 
Board of Directors. The board of directors includes 11 people who are on such committees as 
an audit committee, a remuneration committee, a committee on corporate governance. All members 
of the board, with the exception of the company's CEO, are independent directors, of whom 10 out 
of 11 are on the board of directors (𝑝𝐺 = 0,91). 
The compensation committee evaluates the activities and contributions to the overall 
performance of the company's executive directors, recommendations to the general board of directors 
on changes in the structure of fees, monitoring remuneration trends in other companies, and by 
recruiting external consultants to assist in the previously listed responsibilities [Annual Proxy 
Statements (DEF 14A), Lowe's Companies]. 
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Description of the problem. After being appointing Robert Niblock as CEO in 2005, the 
company pursued an aggressive expansion strategy, increasing the number of chain stores from 1,300 
in 2007 to 1,700 in 2011. And this strategy showed itself successful before the crisis in 2008-2009, 
which had a particularly strong impact on the real estate market. However, despite the obvious signals 
of declining demand, Lowe's Companies continued aggressive expansion, which led to a record fall 
in margins in 2009-2011. In this situation, investors decided to invest in a more profitable Home 
Depot, which in time adapted to the new market conditions. 
New strategy since 2011. The company almost ceased to implement capital expenditures for 
the construction of new stores, and for the first time in 8 years the number of stores decreased 
compared to last year. Lowe's Companies have changed their strategy from increasing sales and 
places to the development of e-commerce. For example, the mobile application MyLowes, which 
allows you to order goods and services via the Internet [Why Lowe's Is One For The Future], has 
become very popular. 
Profile of CEO. Robert Niblock, 49, has been CEO of Lowe's Companies since 2005. 
Experience [Bloomberg]: 
2005-present - CEO and President, Lowe's Companies 
2000-2003 - CFO, Lowe's Companies 
1999-2000 - Senior Vice President of Finance, Lowe's Companies 
1997-1998 - Vice President & Treasurer, Lowe's Companies 
The compensation structure. Lowe's Companies apply the practice of Say-on-Pay for 
additional approval of shareholder compensation programs. What distinguishes the company from its 
competitors is that the remuneration committee set a fixed ratio in the remuneration structure of the 
CEO in 2010: the base salary is 10%, the target cash bonus is 20%, the target long-term incentive is 
70%. According to the committee, it is this structure that allows maximally stimulating the CEO to 
increase value for shareholders through their own performance. 
Also, the company attracts consultants from Farient Advisors so that they annually assess how 
much the Performance-Adjusted Compensation (PAC): 1) is adequate in comparison with the growth 
of the company's revenue and competitors; 2) is sensitive in the total return of shareholders. These 
indicators are estimated on the basis of the last three years [Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), 
Lowe's Companies]. 
Table 33. Structure of CEO compensation in Lowe's Companies in US dollars. Compiled by: Annual 
Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), in Lowe's Companies, 2009-2012. 
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Type of compensation 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Base Salary 1,100,000 1,100,000 1,155,000 1,185,000 
Bonus 0 0 0 0 
Stock awards 3,864,960 4,340,380 5,599,700 5,343,893 
Stock Options 3,658,200 4,189,230 2,232,749 3,740,675 
Non-equity incentive 
plan 
2,839,683 2,225,036 1,494,732 1,664,996 
All other 
compensation, 
204,515 195,052 160,562 201,878 
Total compensation 11,667,358 12,049,698 11,642,743 12,136,442 
 
Non-equity incentive plan. In the last few years (in 2010 and onwards), the company used EBIT (75%) 
and revenue (25%) as metrics to reward the CEO of the company with a cash bonus. The 
Remuneration Committee believes that these indicators are an effective performance evaluation, as 
they assess the overall profitability of the company and encourage management to both revenue 
growth and cost optimization. In 2011, the committee added three additional strategic goals, set at the 
beginning of the year, as an additional metric. So in 2011 the strategic goals were: the hobby of the 
share of Internet sales in the revenue structure, the increase in the productivity of operational 
personnel, effective leadership. 
Table 34. Targets in Lowe's Companies. Compiled by: Annual Proxy Statements (DEF 14A), in 
Lowe's Companies, 2009-2012. 
Year Index Target value Historical value Weight 
2010 EBIT 3,487 USD 
Billions 
3,560 USD Billions 75% 
2010 Revenue 49,493 USD 
Billions 
48,815 USD Billions 25% 
2011 EBIT 3,559 USD 
Billions 
3,630 USD Billions 60% 
2011 Revenue 50,521 USD 
Billions 
50,208 USD Billions 20% 
2011 Strategic goals N/A 3/3 successfully 
achieved 
20% 
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Solution of the model and comparison of the results. As a first period, we accept the period of 
analysis of the first strategy - 2009-2010, and as the second period - 2011. All parameters were 
evaluated similarly to other cases and in accordance with the model specifications given. 
  Based on the results of the theoretical simulation, we can see that the material compensation 
of Robert Niblock after the first period should be equal to $ 2,181 million, while in real life it was 
equal to $ 2,225 million. Then, the company changed its strategy, which, apparently from 
performance metrics, turned out to be successful, although the model did not assume a change of 
strategy. In any case, the CEO's cash bonus in 2011 was $ 1,5 million, while the model gives a result 
of $ 0,525 million. Thus, the model showed that in a situation where a potentially successful strategy 
proved itself in the first period, the board Directors could take into account the reputational risks of 
the CEO and reduce his real financial reward. However, the company changed its strategy in 2011, 
and the reputational risks of the CEO became less, respectively. 
With the application of adjustment coefficient method for this case, we can calculate weighted 
average coefficients for both periods given the data for performance metrics. Therefore, for the first 
period the weighted average coefficient is 1,01 and for the second period is 1,01, while the adjusted 
payouts are $2,2 million and $0,53 million. 
 
Table 35. Results of modeling for Lowe's Companies 
 
4.3. Analysis of the results 
Based on the results of our modeling, as well as historical data obtained, a comparative table 
was compiled, as well as the graphs presented below: 
Table 36. Summary table on the results of modeling 
c R
0,600 0,800 0,600 0,857 0,571 0,909 0,15 30 3500
0,200 0,286 0,027 0,885 0,004 0,116 29,884 0,110 3,298
Change?
0,525 6,59 0,593 2,181 0,198 No
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Figure 5. Compensation comparison for the 2nd period 
 
 
Fact Model Fact Model Fact Model Fact Model
Fred’s, Inc. 0,75 No No 1,345 1,300 0,000 0,000 1,345 1,300
Dollar Tree, Inc. 0,545 No No 1,800 3,000 1,900 0,450 3,700 3,450
Kohl’s Corporation 0,75 No No 2,145 1,750 0,535 0,000 2,680 1,750
Barnes & Noble, Inc. 0,625 Yes Yes 0,000 0,000 2,604 2,848 2,604 2,848
Lowe's Companies, Inc. 0,6 No Yes 2,225 2,181 1,500 0,525 3,725 2,706
Yahoo, Inc 0,67 Yes Yes 1,500 0,000 1,120 1,490 2,620 1,490
Blackbaud, Inc. 0,72 Yes Yes 0,437 0,000 0,870 1,370 1,307 1,370
Blucora, Inc. 0,5 No No 0,540 0,000 0,450 0,216 0,990 0,216
Linkedin Corporation 0,875 No No 0,507 0,000 0,636 0,450 1,143 0,450
CA Technologies, Inc. 0,8 Yes Yes 1,500 0,000 1,764 1,790 3,264 1,790
Compensation after 
1st period, million $
Compensation after 
2nd period, million $
Sum of compensation 
for two periods, million 
$
Company
Change of strategy𝑞0
0,000
0,500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
Compensation for the second period
Compensation after 2nd period,
million $ Fact
Compensation after 2nd period,
million $ Model
0,000
0,500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
Sum of compensations for two periods 
Sum of compensation for two
periods, million $ Fact
Sum of compensation for two
periods, million $ Model
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Figure 6. Compensation comparison for the sum of two periods 
 
Figure 7. Comparison between industries on % variance of modeled value to actual 
 As we see, in general, for the sum of two periods, the model shows a good result by the 
example of five companies (Fred's, Dollar Tree, Barnes & Noble, Lowe's Corporation, Blackbaud), 
but has some deviations in certain periods, and, in general, better Works for the retail industry. 
In addition, it should be noted that the model works best if the strategy and CEO change after 
the first period, which can be explained by the fact that the new model assumes no reputation risks 
for the new manager, and the historical effects in this case practically do not affect the formation of 
the amount of compensation. 
The general trend among all the examples considered is that, based on the results of theoretical 
modeling in eight examples, companies overpaid the CEO in terms of incentive compensation, which 
is especially noticeable in the IT industry. 
Of course, companies could save money in case of the CEO's dismissal, but, most likely, such 
a move would seriously damage the company's reputation in the labor market for top management. 
Also in real practice the company introduces more than one strategy at the same time, and business 
is very often diversified, so the board of directors decides to appoint a CEO award based on a wider 
range of factors than those considered by us. 
In addition, the fact that the model considers the finished game for 2 periods determines the 
distribution of high reputational risks for these periods. In real practice, strategies are introduced over 
a longer period and it is worthwhile to consider several more periods in order to more accurately 
assess the probability of outcomes and more accurately predict the winnings for the players and 
distribute the reputation risks more evenly. Also, because of the limited play in two periods, the 
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reputational stimulation of the second period is significantly less than the first, but, in fact, it is 
important for the CEO of a lonely person to show a high result both in the first and second period in 
order to receive a greater reward. 
In order for the theoretical model to be more accurate in cases of a low result in the company's 
current operations, it was necessary to introduce and test additional parameter that determines the 
degree of payment of the monetary bonus depending on the degree of achievement of the targets 
individually for each company. As we described earlier in Chapters 2 and 3, in almost all public 
companies, there is a practice of partial bonus payment (less than 100%) even if the target 
performance indicators are not reached, although the model assumes that the manager does not 
receive incentive compensation at a low result in the company's current activity. To account for that 
fact we and to improve our modeling accuracy introduced adjustment. The results are presented 
below:  
Table 37. Summary table on the results of modeling with adjustment coefficients 
 
Fact Model Fact Model Fact Model Fact Model
Fred’s, Inc. 0,75 No No 1,345 1,300 0,000 0,200 1,345 1,500
Dollar Tree, Inc. 0,545 No No 1,800 3,210 1,900 0,450 3,700 3,660
Kohl’s Corporation 0,75 No No 2,145 1,900 0,535 0,840 2,680 2,740
Barnes & Noble, Inc. 0,625 Yes Yes 0,000 0,100 2,604 3,330 2,604 3,430
Lowe's Companies, Inc. 0,6 No Yes 2,225 2,200 1,500 0,530 3,725 2,730
Yahoo, Inc 0,67 Yes Yes 1,500 1,900 1,120 1,788 2,620 3,688
Blackbaud, Inc. 0,72 Yes Yes 0,437 0,220 0,870 1,410 1,307 1,630
Blucora, Inc. 0,5 No No 0,540 0,337 0,450 0,325 0,990 0,662
Linkedin Corporation 0,875 No No 0,507 0,540 0,636 0,535 1,143 1,075
CA Technologies, Inc. 0,8 Yes Yes 1,500 1,330 1,764 1,790 3,264 3,120
Company
Change of strategy
Compensation after 
1st period, million $
Compensation after 
2nd period, million $
Sum of compensation 
for two periods, million 
$
𝑞0
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Figure 8. Compensation comparison for the 2nd period with adjustments 
 
 
Figure 9. Compensation comparison for the sum of two periods with adjustments 
 
0,000
0,500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
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Compensation for the second period (with adj.)
Compensation after 2nd
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Compensation after 2nd
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0,500
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1,500
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Figure 10. Comparison between industries on % variance of modeled value to actual with adjustments 
This methodology slightly improves overall accuracy of modeling for the suggested 
methodology, especially concerning IT-industry, where there were several cases when CEO got 
nothing in the first period according to basic model. Some extremes are also appeared with adjustment 
coefficients because not always in reality the board of directors is willing to pay a manager the whole 
proportional bonus after his achievements. As we see there three more companies in the adjusted 
scenario which should have paid their managers more according to modeling results. 
 Also, the chart below helps to emphasize that real practice adjustment in all of the cases lead 
to the increase of overall incentive payments as in real practice very rarely companies pay nothing to 
top executives. 
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 Figure 11. Adjusted results % variance to non-adjusted results 
Note that the coefficients, as well as the possible more detailed scaling of targets, are 
established by each company and are subject to adjustment. As a result, such a modification of the 
considered model as we suggested will allow to adapt the model to modern incentive reward practices, 
considered in Chapter 4 of this work, and to increase the practical applicability and accuracy of the 
model. 
4.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter of my research work, we presented an analysis of 10 examples of modeling of 
the incentive part of compensation for companies from the retail industry and the IT industry in order 
to check whether the model considered in Chapter 2 can be used as a real management tool for 
evaluating the range of incentive awards for the CEO. 
Using the example of these 10 companies, we demonstrated the applicability of the theoretical 
model as a tool for quantifying the incentive reward to motivate a high level of CEO efforts during 
the implementation of the strategy in cases of: failure of strategy and CEO change, strategy success, 
evaluation of both short- and long-term incentive packages, One, and several targets, evaluation of 
the reputation of the CEO for work experience in other companies or separately in the company in 
question. 
As a result, we can conclude that the theoretical model considered, with some amendments, 
can be used as an auxiliary and recommendatory tool for public companies headquartered in the 
United States in terms of material incentives for general directors. In addition to companies, 
researchers like me may be interested in such a technique. And, finally, companies engaged in 
business consulting services can expand their tools by using the method of forming the variable part 
90 
 
of remuneration for CEOs of public companies headquartered in the United States. If the decision 
making process, regulation, transparency of executive compensation in any country can be compared 
to the US, the model could be applied to international public companies from this country with some 
adjustments. In terms of our research, it was only possible to show the applicability of the modeled 
on the US headquartered companies due to access to all of the data for model specification. 
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Conclusions 
In this Master thesis the following tasks were accomplished: 
 Based on the analysis of scientific literature on the topic of the CEO compensation, the 
requirements to the mechanism of forming the variable part were justified; 
 The practice of decision making and regulation on forming the size of the variable part of 
compensation of CEOs on examples of international public companies from the retail and IT 
industries was analyzed; 
 The model of forming the variable part of CEO compensation was selected and improved in 
accordance with the requirements; 
 The chosen model introduced reputation as an important factor of influence on manager’s 
efforts application; 
 A comparative analysis of the results of theoretical modeling and real practice of forming the 
variable part of CEO compensation on examples of international public companies was made 
and applicability of the mechanism was proven; 
 The suggested mechanism can be used as a tool by board of directors in public companies or 
researchers with possibilities for individual adjustments. 
As a result, the goal of this Master thesis was completely achieved, namely, based on the 
analysis of existing theoretical models and approaches to determining the size of the variable part of 
material compensation for CEOs, the methodology for determining the amount of such remuneration 
was improved and the possibility of its practical application on examples of public companies in the 
U.S. 
I would like point out that the theoretical model presented in the work uses reputation as one 
of the parameters that influence what level of effort the manager can use in the future. So, the CEO 
takes into account not only monetary compensation, but also reputational risks in case of low 
performance of the company's current activity. This approach is very relevant in the light of modern 
research in the field of accounting and measurement of talent manager. Due to the fact that reputation 
is the determining factor for successful execution of the strategy, the manager will try to maintain his 
reputation with all his will. 
In addition, the theoretical model explains the process of managerial entrenchment when he 
remains in the company even after achieving a low result in the company's current activity in the first 
period, because changing the strategy and hiring a new CEO is a costlier option for the owners. 
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The developed methodology was used in the analysis of 5 cases on examples of companies from the 
retail industry and 5 cases on examples of companies from the IT industry.  
In 10 cases, we demonstrated the applicability of the model as a tool for assessing the variable 
part of the CEO's remuneration in order to stimulate high efforts in implementing the strategy in 
several cases: 
 Strategic disruption and change of the CEO; 
 Short-term non-equity incentive plan evaluation; 
 A performance indicator consisting of a single indicator; 
 A performance indicator, consisting of several indicators; 
 The CEO working in several companies before the current tenure; 
 The CEO working in the current company in different positions 
The resulting estimates, as a rule, correspond to the actual values of compensation in the 
companies. The developed mechanism can be applied to other state-owned US companies in the retail 
and information technology industries and, with special changes and inspections, in other 
environments. 
The system of corporate governance in Russia differs significantly and partially lags behind 
in the development of institutions from the corporate governance system in U.S. public companies. 
However, with the development of relevant institutions, especially the institute of independent 
directors, it is possible to develop a similar methodology for the formation of variable part of the 
remuneration of CEOs of Russian public companies. 
 
Limitations and further research 
The research was conducted on the example of U.S public companies in retail and IT 
industries. However, there are more countries with publicly traded companies and more industries 
where such companies are represented. But given the number of industries in U.S. alone, it is hardly 
possible to cover them all in one paper. Moreover, as we explained earlier only data for U.S. 
headquartered companies was enough for us to test the applicability of the mechanism. Second, we 
could not test the chosen mechanism on every company from the sample. Third, part of the companies 
has multiple strategies implemented with different time frames which makes it a more complicated 
task to evaluate them all. Additionally, only non-equity incentive plans were modeled using the 
mechanism, thus the results of incentive plans improvement are limited to only one of the part from 
a compensation structure. 
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There is a room for improvement for this research by expanding the analysis into more 
industries in U.S. and possibly other countries with the similar systems of corporate governance. With 
more results it would be possible to conclude to exact applicability of the mechanism for certain 
environments. Also, this research can be also extended to improving the mechanism for other 
compensation components. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Modified game tree 
 
 
Figure 14. The modified game tree. Source: [Casamatta, Guembel, 2007].  
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Appendix 2. Solution of the modified game 
 
Figure 15. The modified game solution. Source: [Casamatta, Guembel, 2007].  
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Appendix 3. Sensitivity analysis on the example of CA Technologies Inc. 
Table 38. Sensitivity analysis to change of q0 
 
Table 39. Sensitivity analysis to change of  
 
Table 40. Sensitivity analysis to change of  
 
 Table 41. Sensitivity analysis to change of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Change? Payoff
0,5 0,01786 0,89286 0,08205 31,588 2,409674 -30,071 84,9333 1,69867 73,4874 Yes 1787,351
0,6 0,02655 0,88496 0,12291 31,5471 3,482042 -30,03 57,1278 1,71383 48,5766 Yes 1923,268
0,7 0,0407 0,87209 0,19078 31,4792 5,104704 -29,963 37,2667 1,73911 30,7887 Yes 2059,178
0,8 0,0678 0,84746 0,32566 31,3443 7,847434 -29,828 22,3708 1,78967 17,4597 Yes 2195,07
0,9 0,14063 0,78125 0,72343 30,9466 13,48115 -29,43 10,7852 1,94133 7,13462 Yes 2235,046
Change? Payoff
0,5 0,1 0,15385 0,76923 0,80177 30,86823 14,3026 -29,3516 9,85833 1,97167 6,802753 Yes 1634,1716
0,6 0,2 0,12698 0,79365 0,64468 31,02532 12,5782 -29,5087 11,9438 1,911 8,567812 Yes 1750,8951
0,7 0,3 0,09836 0,81967 0,48598 31,18402 10,4735 -29,6673 15,4194 1,85033 11,52431 Yes 2072,3639
0,8 0,4 0,0678 0,84746 0,32566 31,34434 7,84743 -29,8277 22,3708 1,78967 17,45974 Yes 2195,07
0,9 0,5 0,03509 0,87719 0,16367 31,50633 4,47859 -29,9897 43,225 1,729 35,3116 Yes 2308,2267
w_hh Change? Payoff
0,5 0,5 1,11123 30,5588 3,72588 2,6 -27,959 38,35 3,068 6,65811 Yes 1682,116
0,6 0,6 0,89527 30,7747 4,36828 2,166667 -28,608 31,9583 2,55667 9,62761 Yes 1825,77
0,7 0,7 0,67623 30,9938 5,27833 1,857143 -29,137 27,3929 2,19143 12,6394 Yes 1969,403
0,8 0,8 0,45405 31,2159 6,66737 1,625 -29,591 23,9688 1,9175 15,6943 Yes 2113,015
0,9 0,9 0,22866 31,4413 9,04857 1,444444 -29,997 21,3056 1,70444 18,7934 Yes 2256,606
w_hh Change? Payoff
0,1 0,4186 0,05814 2,95368 28,7163 13,95252 -27,2 3,62315 26,0867 1,76572 No 1986,535
0,2 0,39024 0,12195 2,65298 29,017 13,80171 -27,5 3,88646 12,4367 1,94846 No 1986,82
0,3 0,35897 0,19231 2,34593 29,3241 13,61254 -27,807 4,225 7,88667 2,19478 No 1987,073
0,4 0,32432 0,27027 2,0323 29,6377 13,36824 -28,121 4,67639 5,61167 2,53688 No 1987,274
0,5 0,28571 0,35714 1,71189 29,9581 13,04059 -28,441 5,30833 4,24667 3,03277 Yes 1987,385
0,6 0,24242 0,45455 1,38448 30,2855 12,57816 -28,769 6,25625 3,33667 3,7985 Yes 2059,332
0,7 0,19355 0,56452 1,04983 30,6202 11,87625 -29,103 7,83611 2,68667 5,10486 Yes 2105,23
0,8 0,13793 0,68966 0,70771 30,9623 10,68386 -29,446 10,9958 2,19917 7,76432 Yes 2150,271
0,9 0,07407 0,83333 0,35785 31,3121 8,210741 -29,795 20,475 1,82 15,8393 Yes 2191,856
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Appendix 4. Performance histories of CEOs for case analysis 
 
Table 42. Performance history of CEO in Yahoo Inc. Source: [Thomas Reuters, Bloomberg]. 
   
Table 43. Performance history of CEO in Yahoo Inc. Source: [Thomas Reuters, Bloomberg]. 
 
Table 44. Performance history of CEO in Blackbaud Inc. Source: [Thomas Reuters, Bloomberg]. 
 
Table 45. Performance history of CEO in Blackbaud Inc. Source: [Thomas Reuters, Bloomberg]. 
 
Table 46. Performance history of CEO in Blucora Inc.  Source: [Thomas Reuters, Bloomberg]. 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Net Sales, bln 534167 496693 617126 740167 820182 936324 947491 824945 951643 1233767 1523200 1839800
Growth rate, % 0,174995381 -0,07015409 0,24247 0,199377 0,108104 0,141605 0,011926427 -0,12934 0,153584 0,29646 0,234593 0,207852
Operating Income, bln 129027 64555 103442 136822 35511 138780 131804 53849 109420 261573 381800 391300
Growth rate, % 0,201245682 -0,499678362 0,602386 0,322693 -0,74046 2,908085 -0,050266609 -0,59145 1,031978 1,390541 0,459631 0,024882
Operating margin, % 24,15 13 16,76 18,49 4,33 14,82 13,91 6,53 11,5 21,2 25,07 21,27
Indusrty average, % 5,2 6,95 25,7 29 14,13 7,84 7,75 10,2 9,9 9,8 11,75 15,07
Carol Bartz, CEO, Autodesk Inc.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Net Sales, bln 6138560 10604917 16593986 21795550 23325858 29118000 37862000
Growth rate, % 73% 56% 31% 7% 25% 30%
Operating Income, bln 2107278 3590796 5084400 6631969 7987481 10178000 12199000
Growth rate, % 0,703997289 0,415953 0,304376 0,204391 0,274244 0,198565534
Operating margin, % 34,33 33,86 30,64 30,43 34,24 34,95 32,22
Indusrty average, % 9,9 10,2 10,3 11,3 10,8 11 15,5
Marissa Mayer, Google Vice President of Search Products and User Experience
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Net Sales, bln 166296 191959 257038 302495 309338 327094 370868
Growth rate, % 0,198572922 0,15432121 0,339026 0,176849 0,022622 0,0574 0,133826973
Operating Income, bln 45724 47709 52407 47401 45792 45904 53728
Growth rate, % 1,115676476 0,04341265 0,098472 -0,09552 -0,03394 0,002446 0,170442663
Operating margin, % 27,5 24,85 20,39 15,67 14,8 14,03 14,49
Indusrty average, % 11,75 15,07 19,8 22,4 20,16 19,5 20,01
Mark Chardon, CEO, Blackbaud Inc.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Net Sales, bln 3922000 4739000 4077000 4133000 4337000 4482000 4814000
Growth rate, % -0,136912484 0,208312086 -0,13969 0,013736 0,049359 0,033433 0,074074074
Operating Income, bln 758000 927000 946000 1007000 1031000 1056000 1061000
Growth rate, % 0,018432554 0,222955145 0,020496 0,064482 0,023833 0,024248 0,004734848
Operating margin, % 19,33 19,56 23,2 24,36 23,77 23,56 22,04
Indusrty average, % 19,8 22,4 20,16 19,5 20,01 19,6 19,96
Mike Gianoni, President, fiserv Investment Services Group President, Financial Institutions Group
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Table 47. Performance history of CEO in Linkedin Corporation.  Source: [Thomas Reuters, 
Bloomberg]. 
 
Table 48. Performance history of CEO in CA Technologies.  Source: [Thomas Reuters, Bloomberg]. 
 
Table 49. Performance history of CEO in CA Technologies. Source: [Thomas Reuters, Bloomberg]. 
 
 
Table 50. Performance history of CEO in Fred's Inc.  Source: [Thomas Reuters, Bloomberg]. 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Net Sales, bln 140537 156727 207646 214343 238791
Growth rate, % -0,621945085 0,115200979 0,32489 0,032252 0,11406
Operating Income, bln -75285 5512 9616 5800 21479
Growth rate, % 6,041904406 -1,073215116 0,744557 -0,39684 2,703276
Operating margin, % -53,57 3,52 4,63 2,35 9,39
Indusrty average, % 10,3 11,3 10,8 11 15,5
William Rukelshaus, Predisdent и CEO, Blucora Inc.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Net Sales, bln 717422 953067 1625097 3574517 5257668 6425679 6969274 7208502
Growth rate, % -0,353777502 0,328460794 0,705124 1,199571 0,470875 0,222154 0,084597285 0,034326
Operating Income, bln -96049 88188 295666 688581 1107725 940966 695413 607354
Growth rate, % -1,299586719 -1,918156358 2,352678 1,328915 0,608707 -0,15054 -0,260958419 -0,12663
Operating margin, % -13,39 9,25 18,19 19,26 21,07 14,64 9,98 8,43
Indusrty average, % 14,8 14,96 14,2 7,65 9,9 10,2 10,3 11,3
Jeffrey Weiner, EVP, Yahoo!
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Net Sales, bln 3530000 3796000 3943000 4277000 4271000
Growth rate, % 0,077533578 0,075354108 0,038725 0,084707 -0,0014
Operating Income, bln 374000 253000 412000 969000 1229000
Growth rate, % 0,32155477 -0,323529412 0,628458 1,351942 0,268318
Operating margin, % 10,59 6,66 10,45 22,66 28,78
Indusrty average, % 11,75 14,85 20,08 21,3 19,9
William McCracken, EVP, CA Technologies 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Net Sales, bln 78410 97043 127941 168419 198412 237275 315395
Growth rate, % -0,013548 0,237635506 0,318395 0,31638 0,178086 0,19587 0,329238226
Operating Income, bln 1392 -5129 3682 -6502 -510 4163 -1135
Growth rate, % -0,31431 -4,684626437 1,717879 -2,76589 0,921563 9,162745 -1,272639923
Operating margin, % 1,78 -5,29 2,88 -3,86 -0,26 1,75 -0,36
Indusrty average, % 8,02 8 8,1 8,3 7,7 9,98 14,86
Michael Gregoire, CEO, Taleo Inc.
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Table 51. Performance history of CEO in Dollar Tree Inc.  Source: [Thomas Reuters, Bloomberg]. 
 
Table 52. Performance history of CEO in Kohl's Corporation.  Source: [Thomas Reuters, Bloomberg]. 
 
Table 53. Performance history of CEO in Barnes & Noble, Inc.  Source: [Thomas Reuters, 
Bloomberg]. 
 
Table 54. Performance history of CEO in Barnes & Noble, Inc.  Source: [Thomas Reuters, 
Bloomberg]. 
 
Table 55. Performance history of CEO in Lowe´s Companies.  Source: [Thomas Reuters, 
Bloomberg]. 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Net Sales, bln 1780923 1798840 1788136 1841755 1879059
Growth rate, % 0,007743152 0,010060514 -0,00595 0,029986 0,020255
Operating Income, bln 22657 26418 38694 44723 49355
Growth rate, % -0,458601161 0,165997264 0,464683 0,155812 0,103571
Operating margin, % 1,27 1,47 2,16 2,43 2,63
Indusrty average, % 4,9 4,52 1,98 3,06 6,54
Bruce Efird, CEO, Fred's Inc.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Sales, bln 1197960 1688105 1987271 1929468 2799872 3126009 3393924 3969400 4242600 4644900 5231200 5882400
Growth rate, % 0,303821151 0,409149721 0,17722 -0,02909 0,451111 0,116483 0,085705128 0,169561 0,068827 0,094824 0,126224 0,124484
Operating Income, bln 163463 207402 203865 -101136 293597 293551 283239 311300 331100 367000 514100 631100
Growth rate, % 0,326993173 0,268800891 -0,01705 -1,49609 -3,90299 -0,00016 -0,035128479 0,099072 0,063604 0,108426 0,400817 0,227582
Operating margin, % 13,65 12,29 10,26 -5,24 10,49 9,39 8,35 7,84 7,8 7,9 9,83 10,73
Indusrty average, % 3,9 4 3,9 3,4 3,1 3,7 4,2 4,8 4,9 4,52 1,98 3,06
Bob Sasser, COO, Dollar Tree Inc. CEO
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Sales, bln 4557112 6151996 7488654 9120287 10282094 11700619 13402217 15544184 16473734 16389000 17178000 18391000
Growth rate, % 0,237752674 0,349976915 0,217272 0,217881 0,127387 0,137961 0,145428032 0,159822 0,059801 -0,00514 0,048142 0,070614
Operating Income, bln 448275 651315 850749 1090383 1023304 1236702 1416181 1814801 1804477 1536000 1712000 2092000
Growth rate, % 0,32758105 0,452936256 0,306202 0,281674 -0,06152 0,208538 0,14512712 0,281475 -0,00569 -0,14878 0,114583 0,221963
Operating margin, % 9,84 10,59 11,36 11,96 9,95 10,57 10,57 11,68 10,95 9,37 9,97 11,38
Indusrty average, % 3,4 3,7 2,9 3,1 2,85 2,7 2,4 4,4 4,8 4,1 2,4 2,6
Kevin Mansell, Президент, Kohl's Corporation CEO
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Net Sales, bln 4188279 5753671 6277638 6373410 1445095 4420608 5810564 6998565
Growth rate, % -0,338147772 0,373755426 0,091067 0,015256 -0,77326 -0,1369 0,314426432 0,204455
Operating Income, bln 166078 344906 442456 371067 -50361 -12896 102446 -62402
Growth rate, % -0,585016642 1,076771156 0,282831 -0,16135 -1,13572 -1,08318 8,944013648 -1,60912
Operating margin, % 3,97 5,99 7,05 5,82 -3,48 -0,29 1,76 -0,89
Indusrty average, % 8,1 9,4 10,2 10,3 11,3 2,4 2,6 6,6
William L. Lynch, CEO, Gifts.com CEO, Barnes & Noble, Inc.
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Net Sales, bln 4932864 5175911 5927462 6484481 7230116 7773276 7231249 6700848
Growth rate, % 0,18091674 0,049270971 0,145202 0,093973 0,114988 0,075125 -0,069729545 -0,07335
Operating Income, bln 43908 510263 612596 917605 1141515 1429632 1522400 1248496
Growth rate, % 0,31347034 10,62118521 0,20055 0,497896 0,244016 0,252399 0,064889426 -0,17992
Operating margin, % 0,89 9,86 10,33 14,15 15,79 18,39 21,05 18,63
Indusrty average, % 8,7 8,1 9,2 10,8 11,1 10,2 8,4 8,6
Michael Huseby, EVP и CFO, Cablevision Systems Corporation
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Net Sales, bln 18778559 22111108 26491000 30838000 36464000 43243000 46927000 48283000 48230000 47220000
Growth rate, % 0,180626 0,17746564 0,198086 0,164093 0,182437 0,185909 0,085192979 0,028896 -0,0011 -0,02094
Operating Income, bln 1402265 1797788 2541000 3178000 3743000 4680000 5157000 4733000 3815000 3226000
Growth rate, % 0,196117702 0,282060096 0,413404 0,250689 0,177785 0,250334 0,101923077 -0,08222 -0,19396 -0,15439
Operating margin, % 7,47 8,13 9,59 10,31 10,26 10,82 10,99 9,8 7,91 6,83
Indusrty average, % 6 4,9 4,8 6,3 6,2 5,8 6,5 5,7 3,9 3,8
Robert Niblock, CFO, Lowe´s Companies CEO
Appendix 5. IT-industry company data on CEO compensation 
Company Year 
Base 
Salary, 
USD 
Bonus, 
USD 
Stock 
awards, 
USD 
Stock 
Options, 
USD 
Non-equity 
incentive 
plan, USD 
All other 
compensat
ion, USD 
Total 
compen
sation, 
million 
USD  
Market 
capitalisati
on, Billion 
USD 
Age of 
CEO, 
years 
CEO 
tenure in 
the 
company
, years 
Total 
CEO 
tenure, 
years 
LINKEDIN 
CORP 
2015 583750 0 18709690 28678729 1094531 4664 49 26,100 43 5 5 
2014 535000 0 0 0 636650 3750 1 12,590 42 4 4 
2013 422500 0 6638000 0 507000 3750 8 6,076 41 3 3 
TRIPADVISOR 
INC 
2015 500000 450000 0 38054126 0 10101 39 11,780 49 13 13 
2014 469231 750000 0 5126804 0 47440 6 5,989 48 12 12 
2013 300000 500000 0 3345249 0 51802 4 3,101 47 11 11 
PANDORA 
MEDIA INC 
2015 153425 150000 10690000 18153321 0 20642 29 5,198 53 1 8 
2014 400000 330000 0 0 0 2425 1 1,561 52 8 8 
2013 325000 175000 0 0 0 3829 1 1,615 51 7 7 
YAHOO INC 
2015 1000000 2250 8312316 13847283 1700000 73863 25 41,240 37 1 1 
2014 454862 0 35000002 0 1120000 40540 37 23,150 36 0 0 
2013 700000 0 7728320 3135514 420000 4365 12 19,960 62 2 17 
COMPUTER 
SCIENCES 
CORP 
2015 1250000 0 13656687 2936580 3002000 442921 21 8,756 58 1 8 
2014 48077 0 0 0 0 1442 0 7,512 57 0 7 
2013 1107692 0 4602406 2703160 1314000 2819090 13 4,824 59 4 4 
PRICELINE 
GROUP INC 
2015 550000 0 8000326 0 6500000 7974 15 61,190 56 11 11 
2014 550000 0 4499707 0 5250000 7824 10 30,040 55 10 10 
2013 550000 0 4500097 0 4000000 7674 9 24,110 54 9 9 
INTL 
BUSINESS 
MACHINES 
CORP 
2015 1500000 0 11703869 0 0 761808 14 201,260 
62 10 10 
2014 1500000 0 9259000 0 3915000 1510727 16 216,890 61 9 9 
2013 715000 0 5109845 0 1470000 1047425 8 217,990 60 8 8 
EBAY INC 
2015 993269 0 8855064 2199263 1620270 165508 14 69,990 53 5 28 
2014 970353 0 23729962 2000000 2844346 160420 30 65,010 52 4 27 
2013 945577 0 8854607 3799993 2688984 167367 16 39,920 51 3 26 
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MONSTER 
WORLDWIDE 
INC 
2015 1098077 2375000 9690004 0 0 66827 13 0,744 
59 6 8 
2014 1000000 0 0 0 0 66577 1 0,666 58 5 7 
2013 1000000 0 0 0 0 66327 1 1,013 57 4 6 
IAC/INTERACTI
VECORP 
2015 500000 2750000 0 0 0 753090 4 5,622 71 3 17 
2014 500000 3000000 0 0 0 790268 4 4,060 70 2 16 
2013 500000 2500000 0 4815000 0 1007611 9 3,518 69 1 15 
COGNIZANT 
TECH 
SOLUTIONS 
2015 608000 0 9882687 0 844812 12177 11 30,080 44 19 19 
2014 590000 0 9594952 0 405780 21687 11 21,960 43 18 18 
2013 566500 0 10285710 0 908248 1500 12 19,390 42 17 17 
UNITED 
ONLINE INC 
2015 109315 1275000 569605 0 0 160624 2 0,185 38 0 0 
2014 997750 0 0 528650 1106595 12689 3 0,098 57 12 18 
2013 997750 0 0 1960581 2039352 27080 5 0,095 56 11 17 
ZILLOW INC 
2015 473570 0 0 10113600 0 0 11 3,220 37 3 3 
2014 331333 101 0 6754184 0 0 7 0,940 36 2 2 
2013 281667 100101 0 376915 0 0 1 0,620 35 1 1 
TRULIA INC 
2015 351314 0 6270600 2841390 310000 0 10 1,252 39 9 9 
2014 278917 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,447 38 8 8 
2013 241667 0 0 674654 0 0 1 0,607 37 7 7 
VERISIGN INC 
2015 752885 0 6810008 0 957750 20484 9 8,179 58 5 5 
2014 752885 0 4500792 0 593550 9650 6 5,869 57 4 4 
2013 326730 340625 3999978 0 0 20180 5 5,765 56 3 3 
YELP INC 
2015 37501 0 0 8010363 0 50100 8 4,887 35 9 9 
2014 300000 0 0 0 0 40657 0 1,197 34 8 8 
2013 220000 0 0 6624459 0 6741 7 1,472 33 7 7 
ATHENAHEALT
H INC 
2015 540000 0 0 6967506 491076 28551 8 4,977 44 17 17 
2014 530000 0 0 7813482 719600 7801 9 2,723 43 16 16 
2013 475000 0 0 1525418 592000 5012 3 1,740 42 15 15 
2015 1 0 5999971 1492579 2 139027 8 8,466 56 16 16 
2014 806175 0 5466255 1770370 1730661 0 10 7,321 52 7 7 
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AKAMAI 
TECHNOLOGIE
S INC 
2013 756843 0 9799922 1199994 119988 0 12 5,779 
51 6 6 
SERVICENOW 
INC 
2015 350000 0 4413000 2210460 413604 441 7 7,861 54 2 8 
2014 300000 0 0 0 273548 1005 1 3,795 53 1 7 
2013 200000 0 0 8527384 153718 0 9 2,959 52 0 6 
IHS INC 
2015 507928 0 1010700 0 505544 -68436 2 7,749 54 0 0 
2014 617796 0 4181038 0 0 299887 5 5,901 70 6 12 
2013 602154 0 4084000 0 0 5372 5 5,581 69 5 11 
GROUPON INC 
2015 0 0 7109996 0 0 0 7 7,570 45 0 0 
2014 757 0 0 0 0 4534 0 3,193 31 4 4 
2013 757 0 0 0 0 7186 0 13,160 30 3 3 
COSTAR 
GROUP INC 
2015 561267 0 3432576 1919830 1127500 20677 7 5,302 49 17 17 
2014 542789 0 1741575 875283 1100000 38245 4 2,454 48 16 16 
2013 500122 0 1006016 900769 1025000 6104 3 1,691 47 15 15 
CORELOGIC 
INC 
2015 800000 0 2414959 1208495 953650 61661 5 3,301 51 3 5 
2014 800000 0 2639969 971999 1774600 573866 7 2,653 50 2 4 
2013 790000 0 1619991 1071230 525000 746279 5 1,341 49 1 3 
BAZAARVOICE 
INC 
2015 307008 0 316026 6136560 0 630 7 0,561 54 0 11 
2014 235833 0 0 917799 138000 799 1 0,533 40 7 9 
2013 131061 60000 0 1363799 60519 5485 2 1,130 39 6 8 
AOL INC 
2015 1000000 0 2255092 1043088 2176000 7650 6 3,589 42 4 4 
2014 1000000 500000 2757575 5051163 2750000 12684 12 2,508 41 3 3 
2013 1000000 0 0 0 2204000 12534 3 1,505 40 2 2 
TERADATA 
CORP 
2015 786849 0 2491131 2611170 367188 14809 6 7,302 60 6 6 
2014 700000 0 6161043 2428243 951125 15236 10 10,330 59 5 5 
2013 700000 0 2455132 2247278 1392125 14986 7 8,296 58 4 4 
LIMELIGHT 
NETWORKS 
INC 
2015 488611 0 1695000 3057200 181500 16753 5 0,187 51 1 1 
2014 90000 0 133500 283425 0 5000 1 0,233 50 0 0 
2013 416000 133266 1768500 298040 0 23841 3 0,329 45 5 5 
2015 557230 40692 3211040 1246512 139308 37061 5 1,262 45 13 13 
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SYNCHRONOS
S 
TECHNOLOGIE
S 
2014 541000 40575 801360 0 211948 34080 2 0,798 44 12 12 
2013 525000 65625 1322332 2685016 758438 35697 5 1,195 
43 11 11 
CIBER INC 
2015 675000 0 4089440 0 436488 1524 5 0,321 50 3 14 
2014 662885 0 0 0 488374 3048 1 0,239 49 2 13 
2013 600000 0 2088000 0 259500 37584 3 0,291 48 1 12 
WEB.COM 
GROUP INC 
2015 560000 771400 2678002 1050539 0 139161 5 1,650 60 13 15 
2014 560000 784000 1367268 608381 0 24778 3 0,733 59 12 14 
2013 560000 1250000 872716 408828 0 24105 3 0,569 58 11 13 
HOMEAWAY 
INC 
2015 509375 0 1522686 2283467 523383 3893 5 3,776 54 9 10 
2014 487500 0 0 1491056 449767 2451 2 1,836 53 8 9 
2013 420833 0 0 10769000 501480 4047 12 1,874 52 7 8 
LIFELOCK INC 
2015 477340 0 0 3133620 860000 17552 4 1,468 46 8 8 
2014 450038 0 0 815312 671460 21259 2 0,704 45 7 7 
2013 408462 0 0 0 212790 20567 1 0,632 44 6 6 
EARTHLINK 
HOLDINGS 
CORP 
2015 825001 0 1680001 1118211 668251 34643 4 0,507 57 6 14 
2014 825000 0 1250002 1253125 669900 26072 4 0,669 56 5 13 
2013 805288 0 2160001 0 814100 284760 4 0,682 55 4 12 
INFOBLOX INC 
2015 405833 0 2443060 815550 410716 0 4 1,690 64 9 15 
2014 358750 0 0 1308400 249984 0 2 0,961 63 8 14 
2013 280000 0 0 0 125000 0 0 0,937 62 7 13 
BOOZ ALLEN 
HAMILTON 
HLDG CP 
2015 1162500 0 431385 0 612266 1645421 4 3,211 
68 14 14 
2014 1162500 0 376887 0 439379 634107 3 1,865 67 13 13 
2013 1162500 0 0 0 1081846 640267 3 2,302 66 12 12 
ENERNOC INC 
2015 602931 0 2934200 0 99995 2740 4 0,524 45 10 10 
2014 411588 0 1662400 0 65000 0 2 0,345 44 9 9 
2013 409096 0 1589500 0 350000 0 2 0,270 43 8 8 
DEMAND 
MEDIA INC 
2015 360570 40900 714900 0 0 12906 1 0,198 41 0 0 
2014 475792 56490 0 0 397710 25623 1 0,320 43 6 113 
111 
 
2013 450000 90000 0 0 360000 23335 1 0,221 42 5 12 
INTRALINKS 
HOLDINGS INC 
2015 475000 0 1645000 806025 475000 6033 3 0,680 52 2 8 
2014 475000 0 2121250 0 228000 4750 3 0,342 51 1 7 
2013 19792 0 0 4269200 0 0 4 0,339 50 0 6 
J2 GLOBAL INC 
2015 625672 78000 1621184 0 1058071 22377 3 2,277 57 5 5 
2014 575000 32492 1511560 0 829133 34891 3 1,410 56 4 4 
2013 509000 0 0 0 749625 17674 1 1,343 55 3 3 
ANGIE'S LIST 
INC 
2015 418881 0 0 2089853 374084 24266 3 0,886 48 14 14 
2014 372839 0 0 0 339194 24116 1 0,694 47 13 13 
2013 355692 0 0 0 508950 20609 1 0,895 46 12 12 
BLUCORA INC. 
2015 450000 0 823140 1094270 450450 10515 3 1,205 49 3 3 
2014 415192 0 506800 634379 613311 4873 2 0,622 48 2 2 
2013 400000 150000 371200 2325087 540000 8748 4 0,459 47 1 1 
SYNTEL INC 
2015 249999 0 0 0 0 21053 0 3,811 41 3 37 
2014 250000 0 0 0 0 16933 0 2,229 40 2 36 
2013 250000 0 0 0 0 82952 0 1,979 39 1 35 
BLACK BOX 
CORP 
2015 449231 0 992533 278622 0 58129 2 0,368 52 6 6 
2014 351346 0 813423 348641 123000 158525 2 0,366 51 5 5 
2013 358750 0 694500 467424 371000 5373 2 0,454 50 4 4 
NIC INC 
2015 478333 0 1006760 0 759738 115661 2 1,559 54 5 5 
2014 460458 58566 739614 0 292831 67701 2 1,048 53 4 4 
2013 402167 0 567000 0 503717 92377 2 0,842 52 3 3 
ELLIE MAE INC 
2015 410000 30504 980000 494255 410000 34138 2 0,742 72 16 16 
2014 365000 450000 5678200 0 450000 33988 7 0,723 71 15 15 
2013 350000 140000 0 305484 400000 42093 1 0,117 70 14 14 
TRAVELZOO 
INC 
2015 562000 60000 0 1415250 184364 24429 2 0,328 42 3 3 
2014 562000 17500 0 0 0 46327 1 0,302 41 2 2 
2013 556500 43500 0 0 40000 46555 1 0,409 40 1 1 
PERFICIENT 
INC 
2015 386667 0 1400001 0 414982 15184 2 0,787 50 4 4 
2014 350000 0 1135416 0 259200 21274 2 0,384 49 3 3 
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2013 315000 0 1089000 0 0 20490 1 0,311 48 2 2 
VIRTUSA 
CORP 
2015 421475 0 1431000 0 324000 0 2 0,966 47 13 13 
2014 393193 0 1657478 0 176000 0 2 0,612 46 12 12 
2013 331269 0 962000 0 187500 10000 1 0,439 45 11 11 
COMPUTER 
TASK GROUP 
INC 
2015 630000 0 545952 332746 515723 101336 2 0,348 62 12 12 
2014 505000 0 579040 301170 758233 92772 2 0,330 61 11 11 
2013 478781 0 456000 233685 1024995 58480 2 0,265 
60 10 10 
CARBONITE 
INC 
2015 340000 0 0 1141137 240975 51684 2 0,307 65 8 10 
2014 340000 0 0 1282701 0 154572 2 0,239 64 7 9 
2013 297500 0 0 2024430 100706 11890 2 0,279 63 6 8 
FACTSET 
RESEARCH 
SYSTEMS INC 
2015 300000 705000 0 666667 0 41424 2 4,508 
51 13 13 
2014 275000 715000 0 600000 0 35808 2 4,099 51 12 12 
2013 275000 800000 400000 133333 0 35752 2 4,024 49 11 11 
REACHLOCAL 
INC 
2015 216696 0 150121 649000 0 0 1 0,347 64 0 0 
2014 400000 251320 102180 390000 242273 7169 1 0,372 41 8 10 
2013 400000 100528 0 2267300 0 6697 3 0,192 40 7 11 
BLACKBAUD 
INC 
2015 408933 0 0 0 436693 30340 1 1,714 58 8 8 
2014 608925 0 942827 0 589421 42026 2 1,023 57 7 7 
2013 595500 0 1987244 0 436859 69445 3 1,268 56 6 6 
INCONTACT 
INC 
2015 300000 0 0 904620 66000 15444 1 0,441 44 8 8 
2014 280000 40000 157500 475439 145200 14028 1 0,284 43 7 7 
2013 250000 26000 0 153927 26650 13321 0 0,194 42 6 6 
LIVEPERSON 
INC 
2015 500271 0 0 332360 412500 6887 1 0,794 45 18 18 
2014 500189 0 0 855030 268200 6907 2 0,725 44 17 17 
2013 457025 0 0 2911040 178000 5831 4 0,691 43 16 16 
KEYW 
HOLDING 
CORP 
2015 496742 0 281750 364693 300000 85478 2 0,485 69 5 7 
2014 415002 0 111150 61318 366875 77961 1 0,432 68 4 6 
2013 412502 0 94705 353694 0 43480 1 0,197 67 3 5 
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CONVERSANT 
INC (Valueclick) 
2015 583333 0 0 0 300000 5100 1 1,561 53 1 1 
2014 400000 0 8707500 0 800000 2772400 13 1,469 52 0 0 
2013 450000 0 573600 0 545625 4900 2 1,403 66 10 20 
XO GROUP INC 
2015 400000 0 369600 0 0 85743 1 0,403 47 17 17 
2014 395000 0 0 0 103488 18257 1 0,237 46 16 16 
2013 370000 0 333300 0 276460 13479 1 0,246 45 15 15 
QUINSTREET 
INC 
2015 512425 0 0 0 246095 28713 1 0,347 53 14 14 
2014 512425 0 0 0 244545 966 1 0,409 52 13 13 
2013 497500 0 0 0 611045 200 1 0,566 51 12 12 
RACKSPACE 
HOSTING INC 
2015 400000 0 0 0 332000 35515 1 5,384 42 13 13 
2014 400000 0 1312423 437455 388000 2361 3 9,897 41 12 12 
2013 400000 0 2468148 820105 461000 2403 4 5,754 40 11 11 
FACEBOOK 
INC 
2015 1 0 0 0 0 653164 1 132,020 30 9 9 
2014 503205 266101 0 0 0 1221408 2 63,140 29 8 8 
2013 483333 445500 0 0 0 783529 2 81,740 28 7 7 
TECHTARGET 
INC 
2015 600000 0 0 0 0 2000 1 0,220 51 14 14 
2014 600000 0 2496000 0 28489 2000 3 0,207 50 13 13 
2013 600000 0 0 0 134111 2000 1 0,239 49 12 12 
RENTRAK 
CORP 
2015 199650 125000 0 0 100000 82409 1 0,728 59 4 13 
2014 181500 100000 304986 1448939 100000 82018 2 0,262 58 3 12 
2013 165000 75000 0 1854588 100000 65527 2 0,254 57 2 11 
HEALTHSTREA
M INC 
2015 265567 0 108500 0 35209 0 0 14,690 47 12 12 
2014 253000 20151 0 0 0 0 0 11,340 46 11 11 
2013 240000 0 0 0 85750 0 0 10,360 45 10 10 
SHUTTERSTO
CK INC 
2015 250000 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,867 40 10 10 
2014 250000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,871 39 9 9 
2013 250000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,711 38 8 8 
MORNINGSTA
R INC 
2015 100000 0 0 0 0 5295 0 3,666 56 13 26 
2014 100000 0 0 0 0 5295 0 2,946 55 12 25 
2013 100000 0 0 0 0 4831 0 3,011 54 11 24 
114 
 
GOOGLE INC 
2015 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 376,400 40 6 6 
2014 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 233,400 39 5 5 
2013 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 209,200 38 4 4 
CA 
TECHNOLOGIE
S INC 
2015 234849 500000 1826459 2900588 0 342151 6 12,790 47 0 7 
2014 1000000 0 3909219 821710 1764000 282672 8 11,665 71 2 2 
2013 1000000 0 4073518 1473826 1266000 214091 8 12,195 70 1 1 
LEIDOS 
HOLDINGS INC 
2015 1119808 0 1875003 1125000 1248000 0 5 4,485 67 1 1 
2014 1000000 0 1750000 1870208 710000 14847 5 5,998 63 3 3 
2013 1000000 0 1693607 1381683 1077750 0 5 7,406 62 2 2 
ZYNGA INC 
2015 481109 5969863 38035712 13327036 0 371 58 1,630 50 0 15 
2014 300000 0 0 0 0 810 0   47 5 16 
2013 300000 3750 0 0 0 1374764 2   46 4 15 
CACI 
INTERNATION
AL INC 
2015 275503 400000 15870000 0 0 2813 17 1,629 58 0 2 
2014 780000 0 2419200 0 1982220 202216 6 1,782 64 5 5 
2013 756300 0 1999850 0 2211665 219634 5 1,575 63 4 4 
IGATE CORP 
2015 379167 28000 10840000 1534110 147000 0 13 0,989 45 0 0 
2014 1041667 365000 0 0 0 151746 2 0,980 48 4 4 
2013 980417 1130000 6606778 0 0 99873 9 0,535 47 3 3 
PROTO LABS 
INC 
2015 270000 0 0 0 508433 0 1 0,753 53 12 12 
2014 241084 0 0 0 200919 0 0   52 11 11 
2013 240017 0 0 0 273331 0 1   51 10 10 
SRA 
INTERNATION
AL INC 
2015 840000 2000000 0 0 0 8750 3 14,813 46 1 4 
2014 790192 5500000 1000000 3803158 546000 16750 12 12,299 45 0 3 
2013 680000 0 200600 511484 419220 12625 2 13,106 60 4 4 
ACXIOM CORP 
2015 637500 0 2468039 824304 858000 51320 5 1,149 45 1 1 
2014 409321 0 3155052 2176476 300000 77151 6 1,359 44 0 0 
2013 630000 0 2355880 623143 0 2630210 6 1,390 54 3 7 
PROGRESS 
SOFTWARE 
CORP 
2015 637885 0 12738276 0 767000 96074 14 1,502 61 0 12 
2014 646154 0 4216000 5148900 0 47815 10 1,771 43 0 0 
2013 550000 0 1224132 1740955 11315 106445 4 1,351 51 2 2 
2015 637778 785742 1540212 0 0 7650 3 0,775 57 17 23 
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MEDASSETS 
INC 
2014 570554 427916 0 0 0 11250 1 0,885 56 16 22 
2013 570554 290429 0 0 0 6125 1 1,246 55 15 21 
INTELIQUENT 
INC 
2015 495000 371200 111400 456671 0 74178 2 0,392 63 2 9 
2014 495000 158400 0 0 0 70765 1 0,475 62 1 8 
2013 369115 148500 2896000 2441061 0 61412 6 0,603 61 0 7 
VERISK 
ANALYTICS 
INC 
2015 773846 0 3000018 2999985 1300000 57755 8 7,530 57 0 0 
2014 1000000 0 1530001 1530002 3000000 75991 7 4,525 63 12 12 
2013 1000000 0 750016 2249993 3000000 68554 8 3,559 62 11 11 
INGRAM 
MICRO INC 
2015 876923 0 4996994 4982180 1437978 23819 12 2,847 61 4 5 
2014 840501 0 4453150 0 1613670 34169 7 3,160 60 3 4 
2013 850000 0 4577935 0 1554075 22350 1 2,953 55 6 6 
MANHATTAN 
ASSOCIATES 
INC 
2015 475000 0 3039094 0 508250 11193 4 0,997 53 0 0 
2014 500000 0 1204996 0 500000 10118 2 0,644 56 8 9 
2013 484000 0 1060612 0 494000 5707 2 0,597 55 7 8 
ASPEN 
TECHNOLOGY 
INC 
2015 600000 0 2624990 981476 800000 9322 5 1,959 51 8 16 
2014 600000 0 2014000 737000 750000 5713 4 1,363 50 7 15 
2013 550000 0 1171696 700920 750000 5887 6 0,957 49 6 14 
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Appendix 6. Retail industry company data on CEO compensation 
Company Year 
Base 
Salary, 
USD 
Bonus, 
USD 
Stock 
awards, 
USD 
Stock 
Options, 
USD 
Non-
equity 
incentive 
plan, 
USD 
All 
other 
compe
nsatio
n, 
USD 
Total 
compens
ation, 
USD 
Market 
capitalis
ation, 
Billion 
USD 
Age of 
CEO, 
years 
CEO 
tenure in 
the 
company, 
years 
Total 
CEO 
tenure, 
years 
TARGET CORP 
2015 1500000 0 10224120 0 0 1229094 12,95 38,78 57 5 5 
2014 1500000 0 5285245 5248573 2880000 5733646 20,65 34,65 56 4 4 
2013 1500000 1250000 4857502 3696982 2205000 6197623 19,71 39,41 55 3 3 
MACY'S INC 
2015 1600000 0 4762258 3100000 1850200 718513 12,03 16,54 60 10 10 
2014 1591667 0 4630824 3099994 1907200 2610846 13,84 9,74 59 9 9 
2013 1541667 0 4649988 3099998 5105100 3253949 17,65 8,84 58 8 8 
BON-TON 
STORES INC 
2015 1000000 1000000 6330500 0 0 125087 8,46 0,15 45 1 13 
2014 976923 1000000 1789750 0 500000 148983 4,42 0,23 44 0 12 
2013 1000000 0 1410300 0 0 89185 2,50 0,18 64 7 8 
KOHL'S CORP 
2015 1339300 0 6000119 0 535720 303165 8,18 11,81 61 5 5 
2014 1329300 0 2800011 2800003 531720 355758 7,82 15,33 60 4 4 
2013 1300000 0 2799984 2806198 2145000 371261 9,42 16,96 59 3 3 
DOLLAR 
GENERAL 
CORP 
2015 1291515 0 3440634 2059459 0 855567 7,65 15,30 59 5 10 
2014 1235626 0 16554441 3091549 1591956 686688 23,16 10,19 58 4 9 
2013 1196947 0 0 0 1850386 785036 3,83 8,72 57 3 8 
DOLLAR TREE 
INC 
2015 1410577 0 3839768 0 1909929 58089 7,22 10,89 61 9 9 
2014 1301923 0 13676384 0 1847813 6367 16,83 6,60 60 8 8 
2013 1080769 0 3193858 0 1813020 56769 6,14 4,93 59 7 7 
DILLARDS INC 
2015 1000000 0 238796 0 2405300 3033082 6,68 2,88 68 11 11 
2014 950000 0 686491 0 3000700 253303 4,89 2,20 67 10 10 
2013 900000 0 602205 0 3248100 7046538 11,80 1,60 66 9 9 
WALMART 
2015 1315731 0 13649520 0 4373180 1355114 20,69 207,54 63 4 4 
2014 1264775 0 13066877 0 2878305 921781 18,13 183,51 62 3 3 
2013 1232670 0 12652363 0 3852059 975629 18,71 210,85 61 2 2 
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FAMILY 
DOLLAR 
STORES 
2015 1115046 0 1953291 1650621 686336 47283 5,45 6,65 53 10 10 
2014 1051346 0 1721723 1464998 942006 47175 5,23 6,48 52 9 9 
2013 1030289 0 1435958 1197158 982253 101737 4,75 4,96 51 8 8 
COSTCO 
WHOLESALE 
CORP 
2015 650000 88800 4527994 0 0 118681 5,39 39,17 60 3 3 
2014 662500 168233 3870300 0 0 109740 4,81 30,87 59 1 2 
2013 649999 99200 2496024 0 0 90642 3,34 26,75 58 0 0 
BIG LOTS INC 
2015 678461 0 2714418 1407945 0 562405 5,36 2,99 58 0 0 
2014 1453846 0 10524000 0 0 341920 12,32 3,10 62 7 14 
2013 1400000 0 10280000 0 0 244662 11,92 3,03 61 6 13 
TUESDAY 
MORNING 
CORP 
2015 88271 0 37500 691651 0 0 8,17 0,15 75 0 11 
2014 475377 200000 132360 150345 0 11905 9,70 0,20 63 12 12 
2013 450000 200000 0 0 0 11240 0,66 0,24 62 11 11 
PRICESMART 
INC 
2015 568480 0 3216800 0 192500 126293 4,10 2,06 46 3 3 
2014 544000 0 0 0 220000 122901 0,89 0,99 45 2 2 
2013 506667 0 0 0 200000 156440 0,86 0,69 44 1 1 
PENNEY (J C) 
CO 
2015 810606 0 0 0 0 1582024 2,39 8,07 53 2 2 
2014 1500000 0 0 0 0 388587 18,89 8,57 52 1 1 
2013 1864583 0 64056935 3600006 2111302 16210001 87,84 7,41 51 0 0 
FREDS INC 
2015 700000 0 0 0 0 22277 7,22 0,52 54 4 4 
2014 682692 0 395000 965000 0 44464 2,09 0,49 53 3 3 
2013 650000 0 340379 106500 227500 14483 1,34 0,41 52 2 2 
FIVE BELOW 
INC 
2015 600000 0 0 0 0 564 6,01 2,00 59 8 9 
2014 623564 0 8696129 0 240000 586 9,56 2,00 58 7 8 
2013 600000 3000000 0 0 0 48062 3,65 1,43 57 6 7 
BEST BUY CO 
INC 
2015 492596 3500000 11801306 3750002 0 6788 19,55 9,21 53 1 11 
2014 1121154 0 3632679 2265594 1140000 55532 8,21 12,43 54 8 8 
2013 1061540 0 0 3206125 746667 15168 5,03 17,14 53 7 7 
ULTA BEAUTY 
INC 
2015 548901 320000 2179408 2400027 548901 43577 6,04 5,61 52 0 3 
2014 878096 0 255082 1445034 867013 0 3,45 2,78 52 2 2 
2013 795430 0 0 1819500 1108071 41740 3,76 1,26 51 1 1 
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SALLY BEAUTY 
HOLDINGS INC 
2015 997077 0 1084064 3387480 441379 13904 5,92 4,52 61 7 7 
2014 959154 0 0 3188030 1351197 9333 5,51 2,41 60 6 6 
2013 921923 0 569500 2584961 1928522 15542 6,02 1,54 59 5 5 
OFFICE DEPOT 
INC 
2015 1400000 2350000 12500000 4473000 0 148581 20,87 1,02 60 0 16 
2014 1200000 0 2000700 0 1267200 38687 4,51 1,40 73 3 14 
2013 1646154 0 4284000 0 815015 71766 6,82 2,13 72 2 13 
AARON'S INC 
2015 850000 0 2926000 0 323000 4511 4,10 1,98 72 1 12 
2014 850000 0 2489000 0 718797 333 4,06 1,91 71 0 11 
2013 500000 0 0 0 921433 234359 1,66 0,20 59 3 3 
LUMBER 
LIQUIDATORS 
HOLDINGS INC 
2015 655769 0 1469911 3374996 1350000 16207 6,87 0,68 48 2 6 
2014 567308 7187 0 0 654063 14195 1,24 0,65 47 1 5 
2013 471154 60000 329982 4399997 66563 7191 5,33 0,68 46 0 4 
BARNES & 
NOBLE INC 
2015 1200000 1800000 0 3865000 630000 31228 7,53 0,86 42 3 5 
2014 1142308 450000 3098340 5285000 0 32750 10,01 0,54 41 2 4 
2013 900000 675000 0 0 0 28181 1,60 1,32 40 1 3 
FRANCESCA'S 
HOLDINGS 
CORP 
2015 550000 0 0 0 365750 50000 0,97 1,36 57 0 0 
2014 336058 162500 0 5618908 349038 45000 6,40 0,00 42 5 5 
2013 375000 175000 0 6079144 375000 45711 7,05 0,00 41 4 4 
STAGE 
STORES INC 
2015 932693 0 2195856 0 0 289878 3,40 0,50 65 1 13 
2014 850000 0 2638923 0 1488945 95107 4,94 0,65 64 0 12 
2013 841346 0 2207765 595265 0 175667 3,82 0,58 51 3 3 
BUILD-A-BEAR 
WORKSHOP 
INC 
2015 336538 168867 656289 770317 628086 117744 2,68 0,09 50 0 0 
2014 659200 0 475949 0 0 3508 1,14 0,12 64 15 15 
2013 654031 0 510760 169954 0 4273 1,34 0,13 63 14 14 
CHRISTOPHER 
& BANKS 
CORP 
2015 800000 0 0 0 0 45496 0,85 0,08 60 1 6 
2014 153846 200000 0 3751900 0 32817 4,14 0,22 59 0 5 
2013 187692 0 315484 3457350 0 2077 3,96 0,29 65 1 1 
GNC 
HOLDINGS INC 
2015 1070596 223678 843758 0 577816 145756 2,86 3,57 61 8 8 
2014 1049039 0 1687500 843750 1680000 161505 5,42 0,00 60 7 7 
2013 983192 0 487963 4763673 1327310 50564 7,61 0,00 59 6 6 
2015 1066000 0 4865877 2374991 2618076 122837 11,05 75,30 64 6 6 
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HOME DEPOT 
INC 
2014 1086500 0 4591142 2624997 2499386 291889 11,09 58,39 63 5 5 
2013 1066000 0 4477108 2624997 2385516 241332 10,79 55,03 62 4 4 
LOWE'S 
COMPANIES 
INC 
2015 1220000 0 9801340 4120364 3299258 273231 18,71 38,32 51 8 8 
2014 1185000 0 5343893 3740875 1664996 201878 12,14 36,16 50 7 7 
2013 1155000 0 5599700 3232749 1494732 160562 11,64 36,48 49 6 6 
TJX 
COMPANIES 
INC 
2015 1426924 0 10872000 654630 6050370 48550 21,77 29,02 59 6 6 
2014 1320000 0 0 708954 4309576 48660 11,09 18,96 58 5 5 
2013 1575000 0 12559150 947524 4127571 43495 23,08 17,60 57 4 4 
ROSS STORES 
INC 
2015 1299837 0 3000040 0 1844576 86573 6,23 12,87 63 17 17 
2014 1238024 0 7000078 0 2145785 177941 10,56 8,18 62 16 16 
2013 1203114 0 8500014 0 2224032 99580 12,03 6,63 61 15 15 
STAPLES INC 
2015 1249208 299810 8225007 0 667415 326440 10,77 11,64 56 16 16 
2014 1203386 0 2467504 2467502 0 336212 6,47 14,32 55 15 15 
2013 1174035 0 2272908 3401201 1427996 584964 8,86 17,31 54 14 14 
FOOT LOCKER 
INC 
2015 1100000 0 3496281 5669402 3290375 218739 14,09 4,62 62 4 4 
2014 1100000 0 1925017 3040800 4233625 247120 11,05 2,89 61 3 3 
2013 1100000 500000 2867015 2878750 5954052 238856 14,06 2,28 60 2 2 
WILLIAMS-
SONOMA INC 
2015 1350000 0 6999976 0 3500000 72826 11,92 3,96 45 3 3 
2014 1280769 0 5960024 0 2800000 69579 10,11 4,00 44 2 2 
2013 1156731 0 2738699 2691081 2600000 25020 9,21 2,56 43 1 1 
DICK'S 
SPORTING 
GOOD INC 
2015 1000000 0 4499990 1499993 1240842 117238 8,53 4,61 59 29 29 
2014 1019231 0 5250015 2249965 2010766 104909 10,83 3,68 58 28 28 
2013 961538 0 3800000 2698110 3351187 103187 11,11 2,34 57 27 27 
TRACTOR 
SUPPLY CO 
INC 
2015 831154 0 701980 1637042 1591267 24283 4,79 6,24 58 0 0 
2014 999912 0 375373 886668 1361834 28558 3,25 3,92 63 5 9 
2013 995667 0 376334 715130 1270786 28333 2,92 2,15 62 4 8 
CABELA'S INC 
2015 989000 0 967290 2022205 1580422 10200 5,57 2,56 60 4 15 
2014 989000 0 844080 1638560 1874155 10000 5,36 1,69 59 3 14 
2013 834885 0 645360 459200 1189000 141217 3,27 1,17 58 2 12 
2015 1 0 4309523 0 0 0 4,31 8,51 51 0 1 
2014 1019231 0 0 0 0 278741 1,30 8,87 47 1 1 
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SEARS 
HOLDINGS 
CORP 
2013 930769 150000 8000118 0 0 852037 9,93 
11,90 
46 0 0 
BELK INC 
2015 1050192 0 2070029 0 1099170 215307 4,60 1,37 58 9 9 
2014 986552 0 2000028 0 1376000 167485 4,70 1,10 57 8 8 
2013 895415 0 3600410 0 1360047 115126 6,05 0,84 56 7 7 
VITAMIN 
SHOPPE INC 
2015 400000 0 399976 0 59390 360 1,10 1,26 61 4 4 
2014 400000 0 199978 0 436590 360 1,11 0,92 60 3 3 
2013 450000 0 0 0 326953 1410 0,78 0,59 59 2 2 
ALCO STORES 
INC 
2015 471000 0 0 162489 0 5805 0,64 0,03 51 3 3 
2014 450000 0 0 127773 0 5654 0,58 0,05 50 2 2 
2013 450000 0 0 106621 0 11701 0,55 0,05 49 1 1 
L BRANDS INC 
2015 1924000 0 7509032 2256513 2839670 936302 15,88 13,67 77 17 18 
2014 1924000 0 8605824 2681763 4970885 677571 19,23 9,74 76 17 17 
2013 1924000 0 8822133 2596103 4899158 649172 19,23 7,98 75 16 16 
O REILLY 
AUTOMOTIVE 
INC 
2015 571154 0 287586 0 0 32802 0,89 11,41 63 8 8 
2014 546154 0 275034 0 0 28517 0,85 7,81 62 7 7 
2013 525000 0 262527 0 0 27097 0,81 5,78 61 6 6 
AUTOZONE 
INC 
2015 1019231 0 90043 2513124 1509736 173031 5,31 14,72 48 8 8 
2014 1000000 0 88997 2142316 1316000 194168 4,74 11,10 47 7 7 
2013 992308 0 6609251 1575207 2009424 173829 11,36 8,40 46 6 6 
GAP INC 
2015 1500000 0 14200512 0 2675567 350833 18,73 12,81 52 6 13 
2014 1500000 0 18267270 0 4500000 360542 24,63 12,78 51 5 12 
2013 1500000 0 3119506 3174120 823500 210968 9,71 16,02 50 4 11 
BED BATH & 
BEYOND INC 
2015 3867981 0 6750034 6750011 1753736 22993 19,14 15,88 54 10 10 
2014 3478846 0 5999994 5749992 684106 22211 15,94 11,61 53 9 9 
2013 2894231 0 5225036 5000003 790392 17572 13,93 11,50 52 8 8 
CARMAX INC  
2015 1086154 0 1152682 3458082 1203088 283140 7,41 7,83 48 7 7 
2014 1037308 0 955904 2905722 898560 319390 6,47 7,47 47 6 6 
2013 993077 0 760025 2280068 1507500 262693 5,91 5,27 46 5 5 
2015 700000 0 1375028 1375018 774962 57926 4,28 6,48 48 5 5 
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ADVANCE 
AUTO PARTS 
2014 700000 0 687505 2062503 0 56726 3,51 5,19 47 4 4 
2013 700000 0 687500 2062502 601650 117541 4,17 3,99 46 3 3 
COACH INC 
2015 1500000 0 2549991 4390932 2335125 348763 11,12 22,51 67 18 18 
2014 1500000 0 2549968 4082738 3672750 470549 12,28 14,74 66 17 17 
2013 1452350 0 2549992 4306001 3630875 452256 12,39 11,89 65 16 16 
AUTONATION 
INC 
2015 1150000 0 0 3323093 1645420 164951 6,28 4,47 64 14 14 
2014 1150000 0 0 3163567 2055126 179752 6,55 4,97 63 13 13 
2013 1150000 0 0 3578048 1506040 194273 6,43 3,15 62 12 12 
CARTER'S INC 
2015 882692 0 4445250 1004273 1293800 23000 7,65 2,82 52 5 5 
2014 818846 0 5752350 1068900 2103750 22500 9,77 1,56 51 4 4 
2013 760000 0 3408800 960000 855000 22000 6,01 1,79 50 3 3 
KATE SPADE & 
CO INC 
2015 1300000 0 0 2218120 2154750 179927 5,85 1,22 51 7 7 
2014 1300000 0 4567500 2190000 0 177562 8,24 0,48 50 6 6 
2013 1300000 0 0 2047504 1950000 151584 5,45 0,68 49 5 5 
GAMESTOP 
CORP 
2015 1059423 975000 3002227 998757 2120000 193692 8,35 3,28 49 3 3 
2014 1049808 1515000 7164087 0 1545000 163299 11,44 3,17 48 2 2 
2013 1027692 2254445 1042500 0 1545000 5743 5,88 3,48 47 1 1 
HSN INC 
2015 1200000 0 8327269 3000000 1273085 0 13,80 2,19 55 5 14 
2014 1200000 0 0 3000012 1140000 0 5,63 1,76 54 4 13 
2013 1200000 0 0 3000002 1800000 7951 6,18 1,67 53 3 12 
DSW INC  
2015 1050000 0 269871 558283 623700 0 2,15 1,80 62 4 8 
2014 1062500 0 225172 604204 755950 0 2,25 0,65 61 3 7 
2013 1000000 0 146172 456945 975000 0 2,21 0,42 60 2 6 
BUCKLE INC 
2015 988800 1634576 0 0 0 229057 2,85 2,30 63 16 16 
2014 960000 3401728 3901500 0 0 273502 8,54 1,68 62 15 15 
2013 950000 5228163 3203100 0 0 190681 9,57 1,68 61 14 14 
CHICO'S FAS 
INC 
2015 968269 0 4100012 0 1423356 9058 6,50 2,62 63 4 16 
2014 950000 0 2738000 0 1048800 8126 4,74 2,46 62 3 15 
2013 950000 0 1378000 0 1426900 12888 3,77 2,53 61 2 14 
LITHIA 
MOTORS INC 
2015 800000 0 3318571 0 1158000 277846 5,56 0,57 46 2 2 
2014 741333 0 1132656 0 1055520 220065 3,16 0,32 45 1 1 
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2013 624000 0 402120 0 819000 100115 1,95 0,15 44 0 0 
ASBURY 
AUTOMOTIVE 
GROUP INC 
2015 916667 0 2248571 0 1586500 32423 4,78 0,84 56 2 2 
2014 750000 0 1748896 0 1035000 26799 3,56 0,56 55 1 1 
2013 735346 0 1499954 0 705000 22338 2,96 0,46 54 0 0 
TECH DATA 
CORP 
2015 1024230 750375 2380508 0 0 47113 4,20 2,22 58 7 12 
2014 986769 985000 2300009 0 0 40725 4,31 2,26 57 6 11 
2013 957000 1878113 2105406 0 0 39116 4,98 2,26 56 5 10 
MATTRESS 
FIRM HOLDING 
CORP 
2015 500000 0 275460 559255 0 29971 1,36 1,18 44 3 3 
2014 500000 0 0 0 166002 22922 0,69 0,00 43 2 2 
2013 424940 0 0 1477620 606100 19989 2,53 0,00 42 1 1 
GROUP 1 
AUTOMOTIVE 
INC 
2015 1000000 0 2583900 0 666667 259173 4,65 1,26 59 8 8 
2014 1000000 0 2467350 0 1250000 242084 5,07 0,95 58 7 7 
2013 1000000 0 2015750 0 1000000 243145 4,34 0,82 57 6 6 
ABERCROMBIE 
& FITCH INC 
2015 1500000 0 0 0 0 696321 2,24 4,48 68 21 21 
2014 1528846 0 0 0 1731600 800538 8,16 4,62 67 20 20 
2013 1500000 0 0 43201893 1188000 719182 48,07 3,87 66 19 19 
GENESCO INC 
2015 810500 0 1771161 0 3790198 31344 6,47 1,80 59 5 9 
2014 794500 0 2134219 0 3675887 26274 6,64 0,88 58 4 8 
2013 778500 0 1835968 0 2164230 28860 4,91 0,70 57 3 7 
ANN INC 
2015 1200000 0 2696498 1165589 3336200 441339 8,83 1,37 58 9 9 
2014 1200000 0 1236000 1236000 6706200 285091 12,70 1,45 57 8 8 
2013 1200000 0 1328000 1328000 4734285 98780 10,80 1,17 56 7 7 
CATO CORP 
2015 1119402 0 1210583 86747 462897 36132 2,92 0,75 62 15 15 
2014 1092100 0 813981 0 0 423170 2,33 0,64 61 14 14 
2013 1065375 0 690796 0 1591920 140714 3,49 0,59 60 13 13 
FINISH LINE 
INC 
2015 950000 0 478750 1258750 495513 69906 7,53 1,22 62 5 6 
2014 950000 0 1187500 1187500 1460000 32130 4,82 0,89 61 4 5 
2013 775000 56250 562063 562063 1583750 79282 3,62 0,74 60 3 4 
ZUMIEZ INC 
2015 649769 0 0 0 61581 6679 0,99 1,11 53 13 13 
2014 631324 0 0 0 199290 8421 0,51 0,72 52 12 12 
2013 606456 0 0 0 348758 8646 0,66 0,59 51 11 11 
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STEIN MART 
INC 
2015 563835 0 0 0 364813 39032 0,69 0,28 67 2 14 
2014 553200 0 0 0 280287 641052 1,47 0,43 66 1 13 
2013 215715 0 0 0 0 135504 0,35 0,39 65 0 12 
TIFFANY & CO  
2015 997315 0 1883925 1939516 1200000 126365 6,15 9,26 61 14 14 
2014 997315 0 1569229 1505835 140000 141158 6,14 7,24 60 13 13 
2013 997315 0 1569700 1514352 1150000 172178 8,98 5,88 59 12 12 
RENT-A-
CENTER INC 
2015 983250 0 1616686 630388 511803 15066 3,76 2,08 55 12 12 
2014 950000 0 1484252 539506 1726746 9775 4,71 2,10 54 11 11 
2013 865700 0 0 84900 1099326 10028 2,06 1,49 53 10 10 
PIER 1 
IMPORTS INC 
2015 1050000 0 11842575 0 1837500 279712 18,76 1,94 60 6 6 
2014 1050000 0 1226250 0 2625000 135631 8,48 1,09 59 5 5 
2013 1050000 248719 406250 0 2100000 62172 6,46 0,78 58 4 4 
SONIC 
AUTOMOTIVE 
INC 
2015 1161333 0 1673609 0 1451880 113166 4,40 0,73 86 16 16 
2014 1127500 318400 1228362 0 1091183 98250 3,86 0,53 85 15 15 
2013 1100000 0 614290 0 1760000 95390 3,57 0,48 84 14 14 
HIBBETT 
SPORTS INC 
2015 440000 0 504691 0 458150 11250 1,41 1,39 55 4 4 
2014 420000 0 400128 0 420000 10625 1,25 0,84 54 3 3 
2013 400000 0 408588 0 350000 10857 1,17 0,75 53 2 2 
RUSH 
ENTERPRISES 
INC 
2015 1100016 1300000 652500 475699 0 199785 3,73 0,21 55 7 7 
2014 1100016 1500000 352200 821558 0 164879 3,94 0,17 54 6 6 
2013 900016 1000000 281100 651300 0 167690 3,00 0,12 53 5 5 
STAMPS.COM 
INC 
2015 443000 118689 0 0 438311 5100 1,01 0,44 45 13 13 
2014 425834 26498 0 0 353502 5000 0,81 0,18 44 12 12 
2013 412500 0 0 1195000 370000 4600 1,98 0,14 43 11 11 
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